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SPEAKING IN CIRCLES: 
 
COMPLETENESS IN KANT’S METAPHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS 
 
ELIZABETH ANN ROBINSON 
 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2014 
 
Major Professor: Manfred Kuehn, Professor of Philosophy 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation presents and responds to the following problem. For Kant a field 
of enquiry can be a science only if it is systematic. Most sciences achieve systematicity 
through having a unified content and method. Physics, for example, has a unified content, 
as it is the science of matter in motion, and a unified method because all claims in physics 
must be verified through empirical testing. In order for metaphysics to be a science it also 
must be systematic. However, metaphysics cannot have a unified content or method 
because metaphysicians lack a positive conception of what its content and method are. 
On Kant’s account, metaphysicians can say with certainty what metaphysics does not 
study and what methods it cannot use, but never how it should proceed. Without unified 
content and method systematicity can only be guaranteed by some either means, namely, 
completeness. Without completeness metaphysics cannot have systematicity and every 
science must be systematic. Completeness can only be achieved if we severely limit the 
scope of metaphysics so that it contains only the conditions for the possibility of 
experience.  
This dissertation defends the claims made about the centrality of completeness in 
understanding Kant’s conception of metaphysics as a science in two ways. First, the first 
 ix 
two chapters point to a substantial body of textual evidence that supports the idea that 
Kant was directly concerned about the notion of completeness and links it to his 
conception of metaphysics as a science. Chapters 3 and 4 consider some possible 
objections to thinking that metaphysics as a science can be complete, giving special 
consideration to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Chapter 5 explains why, if this 
position is as clear as this dissertation has argued, previous scholars have failed to 
acknowledge it. Giving a full answer to this question requires considering the general 
neglect of the “Doctrine of Method” section of Kant’s primary theoretical text, The 
Critique of Pure Reason.  The Doctrine of Method contains many of the passages which 
most directly support my thesis. Chapter 6 explains why scholars have ignored this 
important passage and argues that they should not continue to do so.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the opening passages of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
1
 
Kant describes the nature and aim of his project with the following words: 
Now the concern of the critique of pure speculative reason consists in that 
attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an 
entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural 
scientists. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but 
it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of 
its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure.
2
 
In this dissertation I propose that in interpreting the KrV we take Kant at his word 
regarding the way in which he describes his own project. The primary aim of carrying out 
a critique of pure reason is to transform the current method of metaphysics. Metaphysics 
cannot follow the methods of mathematicians and natural scientists, but it can learn from 
their example. The KrV is not alone sufficient to present the entire system of 
metaphysics, but it is adequate to show its method and to provide sufficient guidelines for 
those who would like to further the project (including, in later works, Kant himself). The 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter, “KrV.” References to the KrV will be given using the standard “A” and “B” pagination. See 
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Raymond Schmidt, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1930). Unless otherwise stated all translations are taken from the Guyer/Wood edition. See Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). References to Kant’s other works will be given using the Akademie edition page numbers, hereafter 
“Ak.” See Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian (subsequently German, then 
Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900–
). Unless otherwise attributed, all English translations of Kant’s works are from the Cambridge editions. 
Please see the bibliography for information concerning the relevant editors, translators and publication 
information. 
2
 KrV, Bxxiii. 
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procedures provided are enough to guarantee the systematic unity and the completeness 
of metaphysics as a science.  
 Kant’s statement of this explicit methodological aim for the KrV is not limited to 
the single mention given above. Near the end of the KrV Kant writes that, “By the 
transcendental doctrine of method, therefore, I understand the determination of the formal 
conditions of a complete system of pure reason.”3 In the discussion of the antinomy we 
see that, “Human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e., it considers all cognitions as 
belonging to a possible system, and hence it permits only such principles as at least do 
not render an intended cognition incapable of standing together with others in some 
system or other.”4 Later on Kant continues, “among all speculative cognition, 
transcendental philosophy has the special property that there is no question at all dealing 
with an object given by pure reason that is insoluble by this very same human reason…”5 
Throughout the KrV Kant repeatedly points to the importance of method, and the 
connection between metaphysical methodology and completeness. 
If the aim of this project is to uncover something about the nature of metaphysics, 
then a natural starting point is the question, “What is metaphysics?” Generally speaking, 
it is something like the search for order or the organizing principles of the universe. 
Notions of cause and effect, the nature of human beings, the structure of space and time, 
the guiding forces behind physical laws and interaction, etc. all constitute metaphysical 
issues or pursuits. These are questions that experimentation cannot answer and that the 
                                                 
3
 KrV. A708/B736. 
4
 KrV. A474/B502. 
5
 KrV. A477/B505. 
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other sciences cannot reveal to us. For many philosophers metaphysics is a kind of “first 
philosophy.” It contains a set of fundamental questions about the nature of the universe 
and the beings within it which must be answered before one can proceed to 
considerations of ethics, politics, art or even knowledge more broadly. 
While the earliest known text using the term “metaphysics” are those of Aristotle, 
the questions we now think of as metaphysical have been around much longer.
6
 Many of 
the pre-Socratics were interested in finding the fundamental element (fire, water) that 
composed the universe. Plato’s dialogues are replete with conversations about the nature 
of the deity, the origins and ends of life, and the relationship between body and soul. In 
his work known to contemporary readers simply as the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives a 
series of puzzles about the nature of being and the ways in which “being” is said. The 
study of metaphysics in the late middle ages was devoted to examinations of many of the 
same questions and arguments that Aristotle raised. In an effort to reconcile Aristotle’s 
teachings with those of a variety of powerful and influential religious movements much 
of philosophy from the tenth through the fifteenth centuries considered whether the world 
was eternal, how God was capable of interacting in time, whether human beings were 
free or determined in their actions, etc. In other words, these questions consider what 
kinds of beings God, humans and the world really are.  
With the rise of the so-called “modern” philosophers in the sixteenth century, 
philosophy began to take its cues less from religion and more from the growing body of 
knowledge comprising the natural sciences. If we know that the world was created by a 
                                                 
6
 For an interesting history of the term “metaphysics” and its Aristotelian origins see chapter 1 of Vasilis 
Politis, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics. (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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divine, rational being, then we can assume that the world operates in accordance with 
rational and rationally discoverable laws. Early modern metaphysicians were still 
concerned with the being of God, humans and the world, but they now believed that we 
find knowledge of being not through examining the essences of objects, but, in a manner 
similar to that of mathematics, by deriving necessary truths from known principles. The 
universe moves in a law-like fashion and metaphysicians are tasked with discovering the 
laws that compel the motions of various beings. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was one of 
the last great thinkers before Kant to work in this tradition of rationalist metaphysics 
before Kant’s own attempt at metaphysics. Furthermore, Kant was clearly deeply 
influenced by Wolff at least early on in his career.   
 In light of this, we may ask what Kant thinks metaphysics is. Without a doubt 
Kant was aware of the traditional metaphysical questions. He was familiar with the 
writings of Leibniz, Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) and spent 
his entire life lecturing on metaphysics from the textbooks of Baumgarten at the 
university in Konigsberg. Kant’s teaching ranged over a wide variety of subjects, but the 
chair he held beginning in 1770 was that of logic and metaphysics. A large part of his 
pre-critical years attempting to answer many of the same questions raised by Leibniz and 
Wolff.
7
 His early writings speak readily to his metaphysical knowledge and interests. 
Indeed, in his essay Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, Kant 
himself laid claim to having “fallen in love” with metaphysics.8 In a letter to Moses 
                                                 
7
  See, for example, Immanuel Kant, “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the 
Existence of God,” in Ak 2: 65-163. 
8
 See Immanuel Kant, “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics,” in Ak 2:367. Kant 
does claim, however, that this is a love “from which I can boast of only a few favors,” but in spite of this he 
5 
 
Mendelssohn concerning this essay Kant wrote, “I am far from regarding metaphysics 
itself, objectively considered, to be trivial or dispensable; in fact I have been convinced 
for some time now that I understand its nature and its proper place among the disciplines 
of human knowledge and that the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on 
metaphysics - an appraisal that would seem fantastic and audacious to anyone but you.”9 
The Inaugural Dissertation, demonstrates a fundamental shift in Kant’s thinking 
about metaphysical issues, and it is this shift which inspired the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Influenced by Hume’s skepticism and general disregard of speaking towards topics about 
which one cannot gain knowledge via experience, Kant concludes that the answers to 
questions concerning, God, cosmology, and the nature of the human soul cannot be 
formulated with any degree of certainty by the limited means available to us. Knowing, 
for example, whether or not there is a God entails making claims about things I cannot 
know through experience and thus cannot know at all. 
 The paradigm of certainty which Leibniz and Wolff desired metaphysics to attain 
was that of mathematics. If metaphysics is as sure a science as mathematics, which surely 
it must be, for uncertain principles cannot govern the universe, then why can I not know 
metaphysics in the same way and to the same degree which I know mathematics? To 
answer such a question we must first explain what kind of a science mathematics is and 
how one arrives at mathematical certainty. Only then can we move on to the more 
pressing question of what prevents me from knowing metaphysics in this manner. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
still refers to himself as a metaphysician within the work’s title. Translation from Immanuel Kant, 
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, ed. and trans. David Walford in collab. with Ralf Meerbote 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
9
 Ak. 10:70. 
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distinction may be viewed as a variation of the inside/outside problem. I can know 
mathematics because its truth is in some sense internal to me, but knowledge of 
metaphysics requires knowledge of the world outside of myself, knowledge that I can 
only gain through experience. Experience cannot provide me with this kind of certainty 
as Hume so rightly pointed out, but as to why it cannot, here Kant begins to chart a course 
all his own. The underlying structure of my experience conditions my perceptions of the 
world to such a degree that I never have unfettered access to the “outside” as such.10 
Metaphysics then becomes a new kind of study, an attempt to sort out the difference 
between what I or my mind contributes to my experience (the so called “conditions for 
the possibility of empirical experience”) and what is contributed by something other than 
myself. If metaphysics is responsible for explaining the fundamental workings of the 
universe, the first metaphysical truths must be those which show which parts of my 
knowledge and experience are in fact of the universe. 
 While Kant’s metaphysical thought was clearly influenced by the tension he 
perceived between the empiricism of Hume and the systematic dogmatism Wolff, this 
was one of several important debates being carried about by the leading intellectuals of 
Kant’s day. Another concerned the extent to which knowledge of various kinds could be 
systematized. A growing movement of scholars used the phrase “spirit of system” as an 
insult to lodge at opponents they felt extended the notion of an explanatory system further 
than its genuine use would allow. Cartesian physics, politics and economics were prime 
                                                 
10
 It turns out that I lack unfettered access to the “inside” as such as well, but this I will put to one side for 
the time being. 
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targets of anti-systematic outcries, but some supporters of Locke felt that philosophy has 
also fallen prey to the false “spirit of system.”11 
 Jean d’Alembert and the Abbé de Condillac were two of the most prominent 
voices of opposition against the tide of outcries against systematic thinking and the calls 
for knowledge based in sentiment, sensibility and experience. Condillac feared that the 
movement would overextend its usefulness by moving from decrying poorly developed 
political or economic theories and turning towards criticizing well established systems as 
well. His Traité des systems was aimed at showing the value of system in fields like 
mathematics and technical languages. D’Alembert in an introductory text for the 
Encylopédie argued for the value of the “systematic spirit” which recognized the utility of 
being able to explain a wide variety of phenomena with a relatively small number of 
guiding principles. Both thinkers felt that rejecting all kinds of systematic thought meant 
selling short the possibilities for expanding human understanding.  
 Though d’Alembert’s discourse seemed to have disappointed Diderot, its effect 
on Kant was a positive one. Kant is clearly opposed to the dogmatic “spirit of system” he 
encountered in Wolff, but in the KrV he rises to the challenge of d’Alembert’s call to 
embrace the “systematic spirit.” Kant rejects the notion that metaphysics is a field that 
can be systematized in a manner imported directly from mathematics. However, he does 
not reject systematic metaphysics altogether. Rather, he finds an alternate route for 
                                                 
11
 For an interesting account on the tide of anti-system sentiment see chapter 4 “From Electricity to 
Economy” in Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French 
Enlightenment. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002. 
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making metaphysics a rigorous science that recognizes the value of systematic thinking 
while avoiding the dogmatism inherent in false systems.
12
  
One hope I have for my project is to avoid adding to the preexisting conflicts 
within Kantian scholarship and to make an attempt at broaching a truce (or at least a 
temporary cease fire). The world of Kant scholarship frequently fails to engage in mild 
and uncontentious discourse. This may seem to be the inevitable outcome of a field in 
which disagreements run deep, but I frequently wonder if we cannot all learn to get along 
anyway. Many, if not all, of the readers of this dissertation will disagree with what I have 
to say. What I hope they cannot do is accuse me of leaning on assumptions I fail to make 
explicit or believing that I find my reading the only one of any potential use. I offer a 
reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, one in which I both assume and argue for the 
view that metaphysics is a central component of Kant’s project. I believe that embracing 
this view, even temporarily, leads to important insights into portions of the text that 
deserve more attention. I also believe that even those who dismiss this view might benefit 
from considering why others find it plausible.  
In both English and German the preposition in the title of the KrV has an intended 
ambiguity. The KrV is a critique "of" pure reason both in the sense that it is the critique 
which pure reason performs and in that pure reason is that which is being critiqued. (we 
see here both Kant's embrace and abandonment of Hume in comparison to Hume's 
statement that examining reason is like looking at the eye since in both cases the tool, 
                                                 
12
 For further insight into the link between d’Alembert, Condillac and eighteenth century rational 
philosophy see Manfred Kuehn, “Reason and Understanding,” in Routledge Companion to Eighteenth 
Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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under consideration is also used to complete the task at hand.) This kind of a "double 
meaning" is meant to be reflected in the title of my dissertation. There are at least three 
senses in which Kant can be said to speak in circles. First, the title refers to Kant's 
embrace of mathematics as a point of comparison for metaphysics or philosophy more 
generally. To “speak in circles” is to speak of metaphysics with mathematics as its 
primary point of comparison. It is to speak of circles (often quite literally) as a metaphor 
or simile for what metaphysics strives to do. Second, “speaking in circles” has reference 
to the structure Kant uses to organize the KrV. Main ideas taken up at the beginning of 
the work are considered again at the end. Often Kant employs a term only to gesture at a 
definition later, forcing the reader to circle back and reevaluate what was previously said. 
The introduction and the Doctrine of Method mutually illuminate each other and overlap 
in content. There is a sense in which the book ends right where it began, both in its 
repetition of content and in the lack of increase in our understanding of reality as such, 
independent of our experience. However, there is hope that these repetitions do lead to an 
improvement in our understanding of the conditions under which experience of the world 
is possible. Third, throughout history circles have been used as a symbol of wholeness or 
completeness. Accordingly, I wish to emphasize the circle as a completed line is an ideal 
image for the picture of Kant’s metaphysics. For Kant, metaphysics is possible as a 
science only because the limitations of metaphysics as critique allow it to be a complete 
science with all of its principles and concepts already known. 
One could also say that it is not only Kant who speaks in circles but those who 
speak about Kant. Since the earliest beginnings of Kant scholarship it has been fraught 
10 
 
with conflict and stark disagreement. More than 200 years after the work’s initial 
publication whether we are closer to or further from understanding the author’s intended 
meaning is still an open question.  
One ongoing debate in both earlier and more contemporary Kant scholarship is 
whether Kant has a positive metaphysical doctrine or even an affirmative interest in 
metaphysical questions. It is still relatively common to read Kant as an epistemologist 
who viewed the task of metaphysical enquiry as hopelessly doomed to suffer from 
dogmatic assertion rather than put forth arguments based in reason. While this view 
remains a popular one it overlooks both the historical influences on and the subtlety of 
Kant’s thought. I will argue that Kant was not only concerned with metaphysical topics 
but develops his own metaphysical theory. Thus Kant makes numerous mentions of 
metaphysics throughout the entirety of the KrV even referring to metaphysics as the 
“queen of all the sciences.”13  
The Transcendental Dialectic, for example, is devoted almost entirely to 
traditional metaphysical topics. Rather than develop a positive metaphysical system Kant 
here instead engages in what P. F. Strawson aptly calls “the work of demolition.”14 The 
entire section is devoted to uncovering transcendental illusion, a “natural and 
unavoidable” tendency to expand the use of reason beyond its properly established 
boundaries.
15
 Kant does not here provide us with a new set of metaphysical claims, but 
grounds for abandoning almost all of our old ones. Still, even if only in a negative sense, 
                                                 
13
 KrV, Aviii. 
14
 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1966), 155. 
15
 KrV, A297/B354. 
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however, it seems that one must admit the centrality of metaphysical claims to Kant’s 
overall trajectory of the First Critique.  
It is the “deconstructive” nature of the KrV that leads many contemporary 
commentators to claim that the book is not even intended as a work of metaphysics. The 
constant talk of “our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is possible”16 leads 
many to claim that the true topic of the KrV is restricted to mere epistemology.
17
 
However, this view seems to overlook (or at least oversimplify) the relationship between 
Kant and the influential thinkers which preceded him as well as the connection between 
Kant’s early writings from his “pre-critical period” and his later work. The KrV can be 
read at least in part as a response to and criticism of the Leibnizian and Wolffian 
metaphysics which dominated the intellectual landscape of Kant’s day. If Kant viewed 
his philosophy as refining or responding to a project to which others have contributed he 
must put forth some sort of metaphysical teaching even if it is nothing more than “the 
whole of metaphysical enterprise is wrong-headed and doomed to failure.” Moreover, it 
is clear from Kant’s early writings that questions concerning the existence and nature of 
God or the supernatural, the laws which govern the universe and the immortality of the 
human soul were not foreign to him. Though Kant may have been willing to abandon his 
early views as dogmatic, it seems unlikely that his interest in the questions would have 
entirely dissipated as well.  
                                                 
16
 KrV, A11/B25. 
17
 See, for example, Strawson, Bounds of Sense; Patricia Kitcher, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); or C. Thomas Powell, Kant’s Theory of Self-consciousness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); just to name a few. 
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Furthermore, Kant characterizes his own transcendental philosophy in terms of 
metaphysics. In addition to the extensive metaphysical content of the KrV, Kant also 
devotes space to metaphysics in several of his other works. The aptly titled Metaphysics 
of Morals and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science give strikingly similar 
definitions of “metaphysics.” The definitions emphasize the new direction Kant wishes to 
set for metaphysical enquiry. Metaphysics is concerned with knowledge from concepts. 
The event of knowledge and the content of the concepts must be worked out in any fully 
developed metaphysics. This is what Kant counts as “good” metaphysics. 
“Bad” metaphysics is metaphysics which begins from any starting point other 
than considering the conditions for the possibility of experience. Until we know the form 
and contents of cognition as well as what relationship our cognition bears to the world, all 
metaphysical assertions, and even arguments, are dogmatic. We assume that what appears 
in our knowledge is not from us but directly from the world. However, this is an 
assumption which we have no grounds for making and which seems clearly false. Even in 
Kant’s day it was commonly thought that other sentient beings (dogs, insects, etc.) have a 
perception of the world that differs from our own. If what I see differs from what a bat 
sees then it must be the case that my cognitive faculties contribute something to my 
perceptions. Recognition of these cognitive preconditions of experience becomes the 
cornerstone and grounding for all first principles of Kant’s metaphysics. 
Once one accepts that the KrV has important implications for a new kind of 
metaphysics, a more interesting question of the specific metaphysical contents of this 
teaching open up: what are the specific contributions he wanted to make to metaphysics? 
13 
 
What was metaphysics for him? There is, as we have seen, first and foremost, a negative 
or “cleansing” component to Kant’s metaphysical project. Sorting through the received 
wisdom of historical metaphysics to determine which statements we can justify and 
which topics we can legitimately consider to be within the limitations of human 
reasoning is both a necessary and desirable task. Traditional metaphysics is full of 
groundless assertions which can be neither justified empirically nor through the use of 
reason alone. Kant seems to have believed that if we examine carefully what grounds we 
have available to us for making metaphysical claims and how metaphysical 
argumentation is possible, we can relatively easily determine which of our beliefs are 
unable to withstand scrutiny and thus need to be removed. However, the negative or 
destructive element of Kant’s metaphysics should be seen only as the first overall 
positive goal. It is necessary for Kant to tear down the old, damaged system of dogmatic 
metaphysics so that we can build anew on a firmer foundation. Kant himself makes quite 
clear that this is his mission in the introduction to the “Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method.” Indeed, he compares the traditional course of metaphysics to the failure of 
those in Babel attempting to build a tower that reaches the heavens. The remedy is to 
survey the materials and methods available for building before determining what sort of 
construction project it is possible for us to realistically undertake.
18
 
I do not wish to argue, however, that the KrV is a work of metaphysics, but rather 
that it is a work primarily about metaphysics. It is, in a sense, a work that is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of doing metaphysics at all. It sets the stage for Kant’s later 
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metaphysical works. Given Kant’s strict insistence that things-in-themselves are 
unknowable it is tempting to simply claim that all of metaphysics as a science is thus 
impossible. However, as Kant points out in the B preface of the KrV it is not that reason 
can make no progress in metaphysics but that reason can make no progress in 
metaphysics without criticism.
19
 
“For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience 
and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason necessarily and with 
every right demands in things in themselves for everything that is conditioned, 
thereby demanding the series of conditions as something completed. Now if we 
find that on the assumption that our cognition from experience conforms to the 
objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought at all 
without contradiction, but that on the contrary, if we assume that our 
representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as 
they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our 
way of representing, then the contradiction disappears; and consequently the 
unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with 
them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are not 
acquainted with them, as things in themselves…”20 
Kant’s discussion of transcendental illusion in the KrV does much to illuminate the 
distinction between good and bad metaphysics that Kant wished to draw. Reason 
inevitably leads us to move beyond the confines of experience and seek the grounds of all 
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knowledge and experience. When we attempt to learn about God, freedom, immortality, 
etc. through the same means we use for gaining empirical knowledge we are unavoidably 
led into error. In explaining the source of our mistaken belief that we have acquired 
knowledge of these areas, Kant also begins to reveal what we can know concerning 
metaphysics.  
Transcendental illusion "carries us away beyond the empirical use of the 
categories, and holds out to us the semblance of extending the pure understanding. We 
will call the principles...that would fly beyond these boundaries transcendent 
principles."
21
 What Kant has in mind here is something more than a simple application of 
the principles of the understanding outside the realm of empirical experience.  
Transcendental illusion does not involve the mere misapplication of the principles of pure 
reason, but rather an attempt to expand the powers of reason and develop new principles. 
Specifically, transcendental illusion is an attempt to develop the unconditioned principles 
under which the principles of reason which govern the unity of experience are subsumed.  
Kant provides a second characterization of transcendental illusion which helps to 
clarify the first. He claims that it is caused by the fact that: 
in our reason (considered subjectively as a human faculty of cognition) there lie 
fundamental rules and maxims for its use, which look entirely like objective 
principles, and through them it comes about that the subjective necessity of a 
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certain connection of our concepts on behalf of the understanding is taken for an 
objective necessity, the determination of things in themselves.
22
 
In these brief passages we see three important characteristics of transcendental illusion. 
First, we learn that the illusion is one which leads us to believe that we can extend pure 
understanding. We believe that there is new territory to be forged, and there are new 
principles to be discovered. Second, we see that the source of our conviction that we can 
expand the pure understanding is the mistaken belief that certain concepts are connected 
objectively and necessarily and applicable to things in themselves. Third, we see that 
illusion will always involve a confusion between what is “subjective” and what is 
“objective.” Kant describes things that belong or pertain to objects as being “objective.” 
Likewise “subjective” qualities are those that are of or pertain to subjects. If a claim has 
objective necessity, in this Kantian sense, it indicates that it is not a claim about what a 
perceiving subject adds to an object in order for that object to become an appearance for 
him or her. Rather, the objective claim is one which concerns the object directly, 
independent of any experience of it. 
Reason, according to Kant, has both a logical and a transcendental function. The 
logical function is that of drawing inferences from given concepts. It allows us to 
"subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (the minor) by means of the power 
of judgment.”23  Unlike the understanding which is only capable of making judgments 
based upon intuition, reason can combine these judgments, form syllogisms and make 
inferences. The understanding can tell me that Kant is a man or that all men are mortal, 
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but it takes the understanding to infer from these judgments that Kant must thus be 
mortal. However, given that "reason itself contains the origins of certain concepts and 
principles, which it derives neither from the senses nor from the understanding," the 
transcendental function of reason is that of generating concepts.
24
 Kant claims that 
concepts of the understanding, “contain nothing beyond the unity of reflection on 
appearances, insofar as these appearances are supposed to belong necessarily to a 
possible empirical consciousness.”25 The concepts of the understanding allow me to make 
judgments which apply to intuition, but never ones that extend beyond possible 
experience. When I claim that grass is green or that rain causes the ground to become 
wet, I am making a judgment of the understanding about empirical experience. However, 
when I say that God created the world or that everything is composed of indivisible 
simple substances then I am no longer speaking of mere experience and am making a 
judgment of reason. For Kant concepts of reason, “deal with something under which all 
experience belongs, but that is never itself an object of experience; something to which 
reason leads through its inferences…”26 The concepts of “god” and “substance” are not 
ones I encounter in experience and must be concepts of reason rather than the 
understanding. 
Reason, as a faculty of principles, seeks to unify and organize our knowledge. The 
pure, transcendental use of reason is to develop a priori synthetic principles which apply 
not to intuitions but to concepts and judgments.  "The unity of reason is therefore not the 
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unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from that, which is the unity of 
understanding."
27
 The example Kant gives here is of the causal principle. This is not a 
principle of reason, but one of the understanding as it makes experiences, rather than 
cognition, possible.
28
 
In Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison seeks to further clarify the 
distinction between the transcendental error of reason and that of the understanding 
Allison notes: 
There are two quite distinct kinds of illicit extension of the categories, each 
calling for a separate analysis and remedy. One, which has been described 
above, is their extension from objects of possible experience to things in 
general. The other is their extension from the conditioned objects of the 
understanding to the unconditioned objects of reason.
29
 
What makes the latter error, the transcendental error, different is that rather than 
involving a simple misapplication, it involves "the assumption of an additional sphere of 
objects."
30
 Reason inevitably falls into the transcendental illusion because it seeks these 
unconditioned objects of reason of which it can have no knowledge. Knowledge of these 
objects is impossible because we have no evidence of their existence. Insofar as we have 
experience we can know that there are objects of our experience, and insofar as we 
cannot entirely determine our own experience (and our human experiences correspond to 
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one another) we have reason to believe that there are things in themselves which give rise 
to the objects of our experience. However, Kant cannot make the jump to assuming that 
because our reason provides us with principles applicable to experience we must have 
access to the unconditioned principles under which they are subsumed. What is assumed 
in this line of thought is that just as transcendental principles unify and mold our 
experience, so too some higher or transcendent principles must unify and mold the 
principles of reason. While reason does have the transcendental use of developing its own 
a priori concepts, it is only an illusion to think that reason can develop principles apart 
from the ones necessary for cognizing experience. 
If experience cannot lead us to metaphysical first principles about the outside 
world, is there hope for some other source of metaphysical information? Can we learn 
metaphysics a priori? The answer Kant provides (in good philosophical fashion) is both 
yes and no. If we consider the form that cognition must take in order to make empirical 
experience possible a metaphysical topic, then the answer is “yes.” However, insofar as 
metaphysics is supposed to grant us some insight into whatever reality lies beyond the 
confines of our own perceptions (and the faculties that make them possible) then the 
answer is “no.” Kant opens an entirely new domain of metaphysical inquiry, that of the 
necessary conditions of possible experience. At the same time, however, he closes off all 
possibility of answering the traditional questions of metaphysics using the standard 
methods of argumentation. 
Kant keeps open the possibility of metaphysics as an enterprise but forces it to 
shift dramatically in both content and in form. Without a first principle to stand on and 
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with a clear directive to avoid all types of dogmatism, Kant seems left without a method 
of argumentation suitable to his topic. Much work has already been in the secondary 
literature on the kinds of arguments Kant offers in support of transcendental idealism. It 
is generally thought that Kant introduces a new kind “transcendental argument” to justify 
that human reasoning must be structured in a particular way in order for cognition to 
happen. These arguments open up not only a new way of doing metaphysics, but a new 
territory for it as well, namely the necessary conditions of human knowledge. 
While the literature on transcendental arguments can be extremely helpful for 
understanding large parts of Kant’s philosophy, it fails to properly account for the 
historical influences on and the evolution of Kant’s thought, and therefore it does not 
account for the entirety of Kant’s project. In addition to his own early writings and 
metaphysical predecessors, Kant’s work on metaphysics is also influenced by his theories 
concerning mathematics. Kant’s work on the relationship between mathematical and 
metaphysical propositions and entities in his early work is echoed and modified in the 
KrV.
31
 Though the later Kant does not hold that metaphysics can achieve the same kind 
of certainty that his earlier writings on metaphysics claim, he still wishes to draw some 
sort of analogy between mathematics and metaphysics.
32
 Devoting attention to what Kant 
has to say about the nature of mathematics can illuminate the claims he attempts to make 
about metaphysics. 
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In the Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology 
and Morality Kant argues that the certainty of which philosophy (specifically 
metaphysics) is capable is "altogether different in nature" from the certainty which one 
can have concerning mathematics.
33
 The difference between metaphysical certainty and 
mathematical certainty as one of nature, is meant to indicate that there is not a difference 
in degree. Kant holds that mathematics is capable of a different kind of certainty than 
metaphysics. This holds true with respect to both objective and subjective certainty. In all 
respects the certainty of which metaphysics is capable is different in kind than that of 
mathematics. 
Kant intends to show that mathematical certainty differs in kind from 
metaphysical certainty with respect to both subjective and objective certainties. With 
objective certainty, the difference in kind is demonstrated through appeal to the origins of 
mathematical and metaphysical concepts. Mathematical concepts are based on definitions 
and therefore synthetic in their origin, giving mathematics the power to "say with 
certainty that what it did not intend to represent in the object by means of the definition is 
not contained in that object. For the concept of what has been defined only comes into 
existence by means of the definition."
34
 In other words, since mathematics invents its 
concepts, it can define them in whatever manner it pleases. If a triangle is defined as a 
three-sided figure whose angles equal two right angles, my drawing of a four sided figure 
or of three straight lines which do not enclose a space poses no threat to my definition. 
These things simply are not triangles.  
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Metaphysics, on the other hand, does not have the same ability to conjure its own 
concepts. Since mathematical concepts stem from their construction in pure intuition we 
can immediately confirm them as legitimate. Metaphysical concepts, on the other hand, 
must conform to our experience but also have an objective certainty which means that the 
concepts cannot be derived from experience. This fact alone is enough to make the 
concepts of metaphysics, in Kant's own words "a great deal more uncertain.”35 Rather 
than, as in mathematical definitions, delineate from other objects the particular things I 
wish to think about at the moment, metaphysical definitions seek to define what already 
exists. If the concept of "triangle" is my own invention, I can never be wrong about it. 
However, if I attempt to define "space" as something which exists in my experience of 
the world, my definition can be incorrect if it fails to accurately correspond to what is. 
Mathematics is Kant’s primary example of what a science should be. The 
methods of mathematics are secure, the results it provides are certain, and all of its 
questions are decidable. Newton, in a move which revolutionized the natural sciences, 
introduced mathematics into physics. Even on Kant’s later view the physical sciences 
were as scientific as they were mathematical. If Newton had been so successful with 
physics, could Kant be as successful as metaphysics. In a revolution he compared to that 
of Copernicus’ heliocentric universe, Kant claimed that metaphysics could be seen as a 
certain science if we realized that we had mistakenly placed objects and substances at the 
center of our metaphysics rather than the conditions under which these substances 
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become possible objects of experience. The answer to metaphysical certainty lies not in 
our stars (or our substances) but in ourselves.  
The strange thing about Kant’s revolution is that it is not accomplished through 
the same means as Copernicus’. Kant reordered the universe, but he did not introduce 
mathematics into metaphysics. And why, failing to make metaphysics more 
mathematical, did Kant think that he had still managed to secure its place as a science of 
certainty? More than simply failing to make metaphysics mathematical he removes from 
it the mathematical method that Leibniz and Wolff had illegitimately introduced. In 
following the “systematic spirit” of d’Alembert Kant seeks to encourage only the good 
and proper forms of system while tearing down those based on false principles. 
At the heart of this dissertation is Kant’s claim that metaphysics is a science and 
the ways in which this claim must clash with Kant’s further claim that metaphysics 
cannot be mathematical. What does the non-mathematical science of metaphysics look 
like and how do we make progress in it? What metaphysical methodology can secure its 
place as a certain science? Metaphysics becomes scientific not by following the methods 
of mathematics but by finding, through its own methods, the two features that allow 
mathematics to be a secure and certain science: systematicity and completeness. 
Mathematics is systematic in that it follows iterative procedures that can be safely used 
within the confines of the mathematical field for which they were designed. Progress is 
possible because there are rules that allow one to know how to proceed. The rules apply 
consistently and without exception. Results are rarely surprising. Mathematics is 
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complete in that, on Kant’s account, all possible questions within the realm of 
mathematics are answerable.  
My dissertation will thus address several questions relating to the role 
metaphysics plays in Kant’s critical philosophy. Since the “Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method” has been sorely neglected in the literature. I devote most of the dissertation to 
considering the importance this ending section of the KrV has for Kant’s critical project. 
This neglect has lead to a literature which focuses on the aspects of Kant’s philosophy 
that have to do with the epistemological and theory of mind in such a way that it 
overlooks Kant’s own explicitly stated interest in metaphysics. To say it again, the 
project of the KrV is to make metaphysics rigorously scientific in a manner that is 
analogous to what Newton has done for the field of physics. The KrV is not a work of 
metaphysics, but a work that prepares the proper grounding for all future metaphysics. In 
pushing toward his project Kant uses mathematics as a continual point of comparison for 
what metaphysics is and should be as well as what it cannot and should not do. Though 
Kant eventually rejects the similarities between metaphysics and mathematics he 
endorses in his early writings, he continues to view the comparison as essential to 
understanding what methods are appropriate to metaphysics. The comparisons between 
mathematics and metaphysics illuminate not only what metaphysics is, but also the ways 
in which the intuition, understanding and reason distinctly contribute to knowledge 
formation. (Thus in seeking to explore the metaphysical strain of Kant’s thinking we also 
uncover the epistemological.) Kant argues that our only hope for metaphysics as a 
science is to narrow the scope of the field such that it is no longer required to answer 
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questions whose scope includes knowledge of the world beyond experience. Metaphysics 
is the search for the conditions of the possibility of experience in general.  
But in what sense is it possible to consider the conditions for the possibility of 
experience in general a science? Kant employs a rather restrictive definition of science 
that excludes even such fields as chemistry and anthropology. To say it again, a field of 
study is only as much a science as it has mathematics in it. Metaphysics, on Kant’s own 
definition, can contain no mathematics at all. Kant solves this problem by making 
metaphysics a science not because it is based on mathematics but because it shares the 
essential features of mathematics. Both fields are a priori collections of knowledge, 
systematic and complete. Systematicity and completeness then become not merely 
ancillary but essential, constitutive features of Kant’s metaphysics. In order for Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy to be successful on his own terms it must be able to 
demonstrate these two features. 
There is a substantial body of literature questioning whether or not Kant’s 
metaphysics is appropriately systematic. Much of this literature considers the argument 
structure of the KrV as a whole or the Transcendental Deduction in particular to 
determine whether the argument genuinely employs the synthetic method (put otherwise 
“is progressive”). However, I believe that the claim of completeness, while less discussed 
in the literature, is far more critical to determining the success of Kant’s project. Indeed, 
completeness is the key feature of Kant’s understanding of metaphysics. It ensures the 
possibility of metaphysics as a science by providing the only means through which 
metaphysics can be systematic. Encouraged by the recently discovered solutions to many 
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long unsolved mathematical difficulties, Kant thought that mathematics, as a science, was 
theoretically completeable. Metaphysics, properly limited in scope, was a science he 
could complete himself. Accordingly, it will be a central part of this dissertation to 
examine what this means, and what in particular it has to do with twentieth century 
discoveries by Gödel concerning the completeness of arithmetic which may have 
devastating consequences for the completeness of Kant’s metaphysics. I conclude that 
while metaphysics may not be possible as a science, the important negative or critical use 
Kant outlines for it is still extremely important for metaphysics today. 
In trying to determine what Kant thinks is the proper method of metaphysics, 
contemporary scholars tend to look primarily at the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories. This is, in some sense, Kant’s key employment of his method and many 
believe that the overall success of Kant’s critical project stands or falls with this 
deduction. However, many scholars focus on the deduction to the detriment of paying 
sufficient attention to Kant’s explicit writings about his own method. The example of 
transcendental argumentation presented in the deduction of the categories is helpfully 
illuminated by Kant’s descriptions of how the method works and what pieces it must and 
cannot contain. As a result of focusing on the example rather than Kant’s explicit 
discussion of metaphysical method, accounts of what Kant’s metaphysics is and how it 
takes on scientific status tend to focus on two criteria: unity and systematicity. While 
these are vital features of Kant’s account of metaphysics as a science, there is a third key 
feature which I believe the Transcendental Doctrine of Method (along with the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) helpfully explains, namely completeness. 
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Chapter 1 discusses whether or not Kant is actually successful in following the 
methods he outlines. Though the later chapters will make more substantive arguments 
about the content of Kant’s method, here I argue for the need to take Kant’s notion of 
method seriously in order to understand the larger philosophical picture of the KrV. I 
examine some of the existing literature on method in Kant and discuss ways in which I 
think the discussion can be productively expanded. In part one I examine some of the 
limitations of considering whether or not Kant’s method is an analytic or synthetic one as 
a central question for understanding his method. In part two I look at the evolution of 
Kant’s method with respect to first principles and axioms of metaphysics. 
Chapter 2, “Mathematics and Construction,” discusses more thoroughly the 
analogy Kant makes between mathematics and metaphysics that I alluded to in this 
introduction. As Kant’s paradigm science, a discussion of mathematics is necessary 
background for understanding what a science is and how metaphysics can be made a 
science. I suggest a holistic, minimal reading of Kant’s mathematics that focuses on the 
role of construction in forming mathematical judgments. Math is distinct from other 
sciences in that its objects are a priori. It is distinct from the other a priori sciences in that 
its basis in pure intuition gives it the unique ability to construct its own objects. I also 
provide some reasons to think that the standard account of Kantian mathematical objects 
provided by Charles Parson’s is misguided. I examine Kant’s views on mathematics. I 
will also argue that while much of the literature on Kant’s mathematics is useful for the 
purpose of historical comparisons or for explaining how Kant’s views of mathematics 
mesh with those of later thinkers, it frequently fails to attempt an understand of Kant in 
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terms of himself. In the latter half of the chapter I attempt to illustrate such a reading of 
Kant’s mathematics focusing on his arithmetic and placing a special emphasis on 
passages that explicitly compare mathematics with metaphysics.  
While the second chapter focuses on the importance of understanding how 
according to Kant, we develop mathematical knowledge, Chapter 3, “What Mathematics 
Cannot Teach Us,” reveals some shortcomings in the comparison between mathematics 
and metaphysics. The chapter begins with a discussion of what Kant thinks metaphysics 
is and what relation is bears to mathematics by examining the features of mathematical 
enquiry that metaphysical enquiry cannot share. In particular, metaphysical knowledge 
must come about without the aid of definitions, axioms or true demonstrations. Making 
substantial usage of the “Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use,” I argue that the 
frequently unread “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” is central for a proper 
understanding and interpretation of the KrV as a whole. The chapter includes a discussion 
of the features metaphysics must have in order to qualify as a science in the Kantian 
sense. I discuss Kant’s claim that philosophy, and by extension metaphysics, is a science. 
It might be thought that it is a strange thing for Kant to assert that metaphysics is a 
science in light of the fact that the methods of both mathematics and the ordinary 
empirical sciences have been explicitly eliminated by Kant as methods for philosophy. I 
contrast Kant’s arguments concerning fields such as physics or chemistry which Kant 
believes to be sciences with those like anthropology which are not. This comparison 
sheds light on what qualities metaphysics must have in order to be considered a science. 
In particular, I argue that while previous scholarship has emphasized the necessity of 
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unity and systematicity in order for metaphysics to be a science they have neglected the 
fact that completeness is also a central component of making metaphysics a science. 
In the following two chapters I focus on the science of metaphysics as redefined 
by Kant.  I discuss the efficacy of transcendental arguments in uncovering knowledge 
about metaphysical issues (in both the traditional and “new” sense). Chapter 4, 
“Metaphysics and Completeness,” considers whether or not Kant’s claim that 
metaphysics as a science is complete, is complicated by the known incompleteness of 
standard arithmetic. If Kant views metaphysics as being a science on the model of 
arithmetic then the incompleteness of the one provides a compelling reason to suspect the 
completeness of the other. Though the chapter ultimately concludes that Kantian 
metaphysics faces no serious challenge from Gödel, the question is worth examining if 
completeness is as central a factor to maintaining metaphysics’ status as a science that I 
argue it is in chapter 2. 
In Chapter 5, “Themes from the Doctrine of Method,” I discuss the Doctrine of 
Method more generally. The chapter continues to consider what method Kant thinks is 
appropriate to philosophy in contrast with that of other sciences. I discuss the notion of 
method as Kant presents it and the various traditional methods of knowledge expansion 
that Kant rejects as inappropriate for metaphysics. To further explain the role 
completeness plays in Kant’s metaphysics, I examine the claim in the “Architectonic of 
Pure Reason” that the various branches of knowledge follow from the concept of reason.  
Since there is almost no literature devoted to the Doctrine of Method (and the 
preceding chapter deals exclusively with it), Chapter 6 “Kant’s Last Chapter” presents an 
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argument for the importance of the Doctrine of Method in light of the key themes the 
section discusses that are lost if one fails to properly take it into account. Taken together, 
chapters 5 and 6 provide an argument that one of Kant’s primary aims in the KrV is to 
provide the proper method for continued study in both the metaphysics of nature and the 
metaphysics of morals. 
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CHAPTER 1: ANALYTIC, SYNTHETIC AND TRANSCENDENTAL METHODS 
Introduction 
One primary theme running through this dissertation is the need to take Kant’s 
notion of method seriously in order to understand the larger philosophical picture of the 
KrV. While I want to claim that the arguments I make are new arguments, it would be 
wrong to allow the reader to surmise that I imagine myself to be the only scholar 
concerned with issues of method in Kant. In the following chapter I wish to examine 
some of the existing literature on method in Kant and discuss ways in which I think the 
discussion can be productively expanded. In section one I examine some of the 
limitations of considering whether or not Kant’s method is an analytic or synthetic one as 
a central question for understanding his method. In section two I look at the evolution of 
Kant’s method with respect to first principles and axioms of metaphysics. In section 3 I 
consider how the concerns of method introduced in this chapter are insufficient for 
understanding the broader role that method plays in a proper understanding of Kant’s 
metaphysics and set the stage for further considerations of metaphysical method in later 
chapters.  
1. The Distinction between the Analytic and Synthetic Methods 
In the introduction to Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Paul Guyer gives an 
outline of what he takes to be the inherent ambivalence of Kant’s conclusion about 
metaphysics based on the two “moods” of his method. Kant wavers between (1) insisting 
that we must have certain principles which are necessary and universal and that our 
knowledge of these principles must be based on a set of “conceptions and capacities” 
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which we impose on reality, and (2) showing the principles we must adopt to be able to 
confirm empirical judgments.
36
 The first mood, as Guyer describes it, seems to require 
the kind of dogmatism that Kant explicitly rejects as a way forward for metaphysics, 
while the second mood, assuming it can be rephrased as the search for the conditions of 
the possibility of experience, seems to accurately describe the aim and method of much 
of Kant’s project. If Guyer is correct in asserting that the first mood is also present in the 
KrV then it amounts (as he claims later in the introduction) to an assertion about the 
circularity of Kant’s transcendental arguments.  
What Guyer fails to mention about his two “moods” is that Kant understood them 
as methods. In the Prolegomena (and elsewhere) Kant references the distinction, often 
used in the eighteenth century, between two methods of philosophy: the analytic and 
synthetic methods. Generally speaking, to work analytically one starts with the 
proposition one hopes to prove and shows its derivation from readily accepted axioms 
and definitions. Using the synthetic method, one starts only with irrefutable first 
principles and works from there in search of only those propositions which the first 
principles can justify. The analytic method seems roughly equivalent to Guyer’s first 
mood and the synthetic method to the second. Kant, of his own admission, employs both 
methods. In the preface to the Prolegomena he mentions that though the KrV was written 
using the synthetic method (one which is necessary for the “systematic exposition of a 
ready-made science.”37), the Prolegomena employs a analytic method in order to allow 
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the key points of his philosophy to be delivered in a relatively short space.
38
 To switch, in 
the middle of an argument, from the synthetic to the analytic method would indeed result 
in circularity. However, to restate analytically what one has already derived synthetically 
would not create any circularity. Once the deduction is complete there is no problem in 
restating the argument beginning with the conclusion. In order to test the soundness of 
Guyer’s claim it is necessary to determine in what combination Kant employs these two 
methods. 
It is important to note that the way in which I have characterized both the analytic 
and synthetic methods when discussing them in conjunction with Guyer’s introduction is 
as methods of presentation. However, the distinction between the analytic and synthetic 
methods is frequently spoken of as one that concerns not only presentation but also 
appropriate content. For example, Karl Ameriks in “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as 
a Regressive Argument”39 argues that the transcendental deduction is an example of a 
regressive argument. “When I argue that the [transcendental] deduction [of the 
categories] is regressive as just defined, this is to say that it is not progressive in their 
sense, that is, it is not a radical argument from a premise not assuming the possession of 
knowledge. This does not put me into conflict with Kant's claim in the Prolegomena that 
the Critique has a progressive form, for his criterion of ‘progressive’ refers not to the 
premise but to the conclusion of the argument. It can be agreed that the deduction is 
progressive simply in the sense that it proceeds toward the establishment of synthetic a 
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priori principles.”40 Ameriks believes that the two methods are distinct with respect to the 
epistemic import of their conclusions. 
Alternatively, Dieter Henrich argues that the transcendental deduction does use 
the synthetic method.
41
 Henrich claims that Kant considered changing the structure of the 
proof of the transcendental deduction in the B edition, but retained a version similar to 
the one found in the A edition because the alternate proof under consideration used the 
analytic method.
42
 Henrich’s discussion seems to view the distinction of the methods as 
one that also pertains primarily to modes of presentation rather than differences in 
conclusion. If the conclusion rather than the modes of presentation differed between the 
analytic and synthetic methods than it would not be possible to easily substitute one kind 
of argument for the other as Henrich suggests Kant considers. Henrich quotes Kant in his 
correspondence saying that the analytic method lacks the clarity and facility of the 
synthetic method.
43
 However, Henrich does not think it is clear that Kant was reflecting 
on the pros and cons of these two methods of deduction while he was in the process of 
writing or revising the KrV. The letter Henrich presents as evidence of Kant’s preference 
for the synthetic method was not written until almost a decade after the publication of the 
B edition. It is strange that Henrich does not mention the corroborating evidence of the 
Prolegomena or the logic lectures both of which make clear Kant’s preference for the 
synthetic method as the truly philosophical one, and both of which were written in a time 
frame which roughly corresponds to the publication of the B edition of the KrV.  
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Henrich also points out that if the transcendental deduction were, “conducted 
according to the analytical method, then the necessity of the forms of intuitions would 
first have to be justified,”44 whereas in the synthetic form the second step of the proof, 
“has recourse to the results of the Aesthetic as to facts.”45 While his characterization of 
the synthetic method as one which can safely rely on that which is already established by 
proof fits well with Kant’s characterization of that method, it is less clear how Henrich’s 
characterization of the analytic method maps on to Kant’s. Why would the analytic 
method require first showing the necessity of the forms of intuition? Wouldn’t the 
analytic method start by claiming what it intends to prove, namely the categories 
themselves? 
Kant declares in the Prolegomena that the KrV follows the synthetic method 
while the Prolegomena itself, as a guide to the KrV intended for a more popular audience, 
would be written using the analytic method. Ameriks claims that even though the 
argument of the transcendental deduction is regressive it does not stop the KrV as a whole 
from using a progressive method. He claims that Kant’s criteria for progressive, “refers 
not to the premise but to the conclusion of the argument.”46 Ameriks states that, “a 
progressive argument would show z is a sufficient condition of knowledge x, where z is a 
type of representation not defined as epistemic.”47 However, it is not clear to me what 
passage in Kant Ameriks is using as the basis for this claim. When Kant speaks of 
regressive and progressive arguments in the Jäsche logic they are clearly affiliated not 
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with distinct kinds of conclusions, but with distinct methods. The analytic method is 
regressive while the synthetic method is progressive. It seems that either the method of 
the transcendental deduction needs to be progressive or Kant is wrong about his own 
classification of his work in the Prolegomena.  
Norman Kemp Smith also makes an interesting contribution to the catalog of 
views on Kant’s distinction between the analytic and synthetic methods. In his A 
Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Kemp Smith also argues that the 
distinction is not merely one of presentation, but that the two methods result in different 
kinds of conclusions. He claims that the analytic method is sufficient to explain the 
grounds of the conclusion but not to prove its validity. In the synthetic method, on the 
other hand, “the grounds which are employed to explain a priori knowledge are such as 
also at the same time suffice to prove its validity.”48 Kemp Smith wishes to further 
distinguish a third method which he describes as the “analytic procedure which is 
involved in the complete synthetic method.”49 He titles this Kant’s new transcendental 
method and considers it the most important of the three methods. It is worth noting that 
the distinctions that Kemp Smith provides, regardless of whether they accurately map 
onto the content of Kant’s works, are not distinctions that Kant himself makes. Finding 
something akin to Kemp Smith’s distinction between providing grounds alone as opposed 
to grounds and validity requires a rather heavily reliance on a turn of phrase Kant 
employs in fleshing out the analytic synthetic distinction in the Prolegomena. Kant 
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claims that in using the analytic method we “start from what is sought, as if it were 
given.”50 Kemp Smith takes this “as if it were given”51 as support for his claim that the 
grounds of a priori knowledge provided in analytic arguments cannot also serve as proof 
of the validity of that knowledge. Even if Kemp Smith is correct in his reading of the 
Prolegomena passage, Kant does not there provide a contrasting definition of the 
synthetic method to lend support to Kemp Smith’s view that the synthetic method can 
both provide grounds and prove validity. 
On Kemp Smith’s reading of the analytic/synthetic distinction, whether or not 
Kant properly employs the synthetic method throughout the KrV becomes an important 
question. If Kant uses the analytic method (particularly in any of the central arguments) 
then his text cannot provide a solution to the skeptical doubts of those who wish to reject 
the validity of the a priori knowledge under examination. Only the synthetic method 
could properly provide for such a conclusion. Kemp Smith’s emphasis on the differing 
types of conclusions that analytic and synthetic arguments can offer seems to map well 
onto the distinction Ameriks makes between progressive and regressive arguments. If 
Ameriks is right in claiming that the Transcendental Deduction is a regressive (analytic) 
argument, then it is not clear that the argument has any resources to answer someone who 
doubts that these are in fact the kinds of judgments which we make. 
In light of the apparent contradiction between Kant’s claims concerning his own 
method and the actual content of the KrV, there are two questions a careful reader needs 
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to consider. Is the claim Kant makes in the Prolegomena consistent with the content of 
the two works and does Kant provide us with a consistent distinction between the analytic 
and synthetic methods that would allow us to judge whether this claim is true? 
Along with characterizing the distinction between the analytic and synthetic 
methods in different ways, the passages of Kant’s various lectures on logic that discuss 
the distinction also contradict each other. The Blomberg Logic, for example, includes two 
subcategories of the analytic and synthetic methods that do not appear in the later logic 
lectures. Kant divides the two methods into subordinate and coordinate versions. The 
subordinate forms concern the relationship between grounds and consequences (the 
analytic method moves from grounds to consequences, the synthetic combines grounds 
with consequences). The coordinate forms concern the relationship between wholes and 
parts (The analytic method resolves wholes into parts, the synthetic combines parts with 
wholes). However, in the Dohn-Wundlacken and Jäsche logics Kant defines the analytic 
method as moving from consequences to grounds. This is the opposite of the description 
Kant gives of the analysis of subordination in the Blomberg Logic.  
The Blomberg lecture notes are thought to be based on lectures Kant gave in the 
late 1770s. It is possible that the claims Kant makes here were not intended to represent 
his own views on the topic, but to convey to the students the content of the text(s) from 
which he was teaching (Meier’s logic, based on that of Alexander Baumgarten). The 
Hechsel, Warschuer, Dohna-Wundlacken and Jäsche logic notes all characterize the 
analytic method as one that moves from consequences to grounds. The general agreement 
found in these texts based on notes taken at a variety of lectures (given over the course of 
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nearly two decades) lends credence to the idea that their characterization of the analytic 
method is representative of Kant’s actual view. Moreover, this later view is consistent 
with descriptions of the distinction between the analytic and synthetic method given in 
other places. Lambert, for example, describes the analytic method as moving from a 
proposition towards axioms and definitions. In the Prolegomena Kant describes the 
difference between the analytic and synthetic methods thus: “The analytical method, 
insofar as it is opposed to the synthetical...signifies only that we start from what is 
sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible...it 
were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or 
progressive.”52 One could also consider the discussion of the analytic, synthetic method 
distinction given in the Bauch lecture notes, but the description there is incoherent in a 
way that points to an error on the part of the note-taker. However, from the time that the 
KrV was published Kant seems to have held a standard, consistent view of the 
synthetic/analytic method distinction. 
If it is the case that Kant’s view of the analytic/synthetic method distinction is 
consistent from the critical turn forward, it raises the question of why this view is not 
consistent with the one expressed in the Blomberg lectures. I suggested earlier that 
perhaps Kant was lecturing from a text and the view in the lecture notes represents that of 
the Leibnizian tradition rather than his own. It is also possible that the reversal was an 
error on the part of the student note-taker. Afterall, this seems to be the most reasonable 
explanation for the fact that the Bauch logic gives the same definition for both the 
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analytic and synthetic methods. We could also attribute the reversal of position to an 
error without faulting Blomberg. Perhaps Blomberg faithfully copied down what Kant 
said, but Kant himself misspoke without catching it. It is also possible that Kant reversed 
his position in response to what he perceived as the content of his own work. It seems 
possible that Kant wrote critical passages of the KrV knowing that only the synthetic 
method is acceptable for truly scientific thinking. When he decided (or realized) that what 
he wrote was closer to his past characterizations of the analytic method he changed his 
position to allow his own work to be synthetic. It also seems possible that Kant wrote the 
work using a method that many consider to be analytic, but a method he thought at the 
time was synthetic. When he later reversed his position on the methods he failed to 
recognize that it would require him to reclassify his earlier work as analytic. However, 
for the last explanation to be the case Kant would have had to change his mind about the 
distinction sometime after the publication of the KrV, a circumstance that one could 
perhaps prove false if we could accurately date the Hechsel logic notes. 
Many of these possible solutions would offer interesting insight into the way Kant 
viewed his own work, its relationship to his predecessors and the evolution of his own 
views. The view that provides us with the least interesting information is the view 
claiming that the Blomberg reversal represents a simple error either in Kant’s speech or 
in Blomberg’s note taking. Unfortunately (or perhaps, “Fortunately”) this option seems to 
be the most likely. If one returns to Meier’s shorter logic (Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre), 
the one generally thought to be Kant’s primary text for these courses, it is plain that the 
description of the analytic, synthetic method distinction given in Blomberg’s notes is not 
41 
 
the same as the one found in Meier. Meier describes the analytic method as one that 
moves from consequences to grounds and the synthetic as one that moves from grounds 
to consequences.
53
 Even the original distinction in Meier maps onto the formulation 
found in the notes from Kant’s later lectures and the description in the Prolegomena. If 
we assume (as there is good reason to do) that Kant was teaching from Meier’s logic it 
seems unlikely that he would have embraced an alternative view of the analytic/synthetic 
method distinction.  
While Meier’s Auszug does little to support the idea that something substantial 
can be made of the reversed analytic/synthetic method distinction in the Blomberg logic, 
it does provide one interesting note on the usage of the distinction. Meier’s text makes 
clear that the methods he describes are alternative methods that one can employ while 
teaching. The methods are nowhere described as methods of discovery or of proof but are 
explicitly called methods of teaching. It is not clear that either method is preferable (or 
even used) for proving or discovering new ideas. It seems quite possible that this portion 
of the distinction also maps onto Kant’s usage. The discussion of the analytic and 
synthetic methods in the Prolegomena make it clear that either method can be used for 
presenting the ideas Kant expresses in the KrV. If the two methods are not necessarily 
ones that must be followed in order to determine the weight and scope of an argument’s 
conclusion, there seems to be less weight on the question of whether Kant was accurate in 
describing his own methods of presentation in the KrV and the Prolegomena.  
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There is some textual support for the idea that Kant would have rejected Meier’s 
claim that the analytic and synthetic methods are merely distinct methods of presentation. 
Kant, at the very least, was conscious of the distinction between a method of discovery 
and one of presentation. He addresses this distinction in the introductory section of the 
Jäsche Logic. “Here we distinguish exposition54 from method55, by the way. By method is 
to be understood, namely, the way to cognize completely a certain object, to whose 
cognition the method is to be applied. It has to be derived from the nature of the science 
itself and, as an order of thought that is determined thereby and is necessary, it cannot be 
altered. Exposition means only the manner of communicating one’s thoughts in order to 
make a doctrine understandable.”56 When Kant later describes the distinction between the 
analytic and synthetic methods he clearly refers to them as methods rather than 
expositions. “Analytic is opposed to synthetic method57. The former begins with the 
conditioned and grounded and proceeds to principles (a principiatis ad principia), while 
the latter goes from principles to consequences or from the simple to the composite. The 
former could also be called regressive, as the latter could progressive.”58 If Kant intended 
to discuss the analytic and synthetic methods only as methods of presentation then in the 
name of consistency he should have said, “Analytic is opposed to synthetic exposition.” 
The entire discussion of the analytic/synthetic method distinction in the Jäsche Logic 
occurs in a section distinguishing a variety of different methods (systematic, fragmentary, 
scientific, syllogistic, etc.). If we assume that Kant is entirely consistent throughout the 
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Logic, It seems clear from the terminology Kant uses and the way in which he defines it 
that the analytic/synthetic distinction is intended to be one of discovery rather than of 
mere presentation. 
However, the conclusion of the preceding paragraph rests on a conditional which 
may have a false antecedent. It may not be the case that Kant is entirely consistent with 
his usage of terms throughout the Logic. In fact, Kant seems to contradict his stated 
distinction between “method” and “exposition” on the same page in which he discusses 
the analytic/synthetic method distinction. In describing the difference between the 
acroamatic and erotematic methods Kant says, “Method59 is acroamaic insofar as 
someone only teaches, erotematic insofar as he asks as well.”60 The methods described 
here seem clearly intended as methods of presentation as they are explicitly attributed to 
teachers. What Kant here calls methods are just differing modes of exposition one might 
employ while instructing students. It is less than clear that the distinction between 
“method” and “exposition” Kant makes earlier in the text is applied in a consistent 
manner within the text itself. 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that consideration of whether Kant 
employs the synthetic or analytic method in the transcendental deduction of the 
categories is not going to be sufficient to show what Kant means by the distinction, 
whether or not he employs the distinction accurately or consistently, whether the 
conclusion of the deduction must be thought of as limited in scope or whether the 
deduction itself is valid. Though the transcendental deduction is frequently the focus of 
                                                 
59
 “Methode” 
60
 Ak. 8:149 (italics retained from the original). 
44 
 
discussions on Kant’s method and this debate is frequently framed in terms of whether 
the argument is “progressive” or “regressive,” it does not seem that a consideration of the 
deduction alone is sufficient to fully understand either the method Kant believes he 
employs or the one he actually employs (if the two are distinct). One helpful way to 
broaden the scope of the discussion about the method of Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy would be to look at what Kant has to say about method elsewhere in his 
writings.   
2. Principles as a Guide for Method 
In his introduction to Kant’s Philosophy of Natural Science, Robert Butts lists two 
rules for the proper method of metaphysics that Kant begins developing in the Prize 
Essay.
61
 First, in metaphysics one cannot begin with definitions. This is certainly a 
principle Kant continues to endorse in his later philosophy. According to the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method, not only can metaphysics not start with definitions it 
cannot end with them either. Metaphysics only offers us the resources to give an 
exposition of concepts, never to properly define them.
62
 The second principle Butts lists 
he words as, “having noted various propositions whose claims are immediately certain, 
one should separate those not contained in others, and make them the basis of inferences 
to other derived propositions; in short, one should look for immediate certainties that can 
act as axioms.”63 It is important to note that Butts does not say that Kant says we should 
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seek out actual axioms.
64
 Rather we should look for propositions whose claims are 
immediately certain that can act as axioms. Butts compares this to the method of 
Cartesian doubt. “We begin with ‘self-evident consciousness’ and seek the properties that 
reside in universals, a procedure that appears to be a kind of ‘deduction from the 
phenomena’.”65 Starting from what is immediately (intuitively) certain we move toward 
the laws and principles that must be the case for our experience to exist as it is. Butts 
claims that this method is modeled after the one employed in Newtonian science. If Butts 
is correct in his assessment of the Prize Essay, then Kant here speaks not only of a 
method of presentation but of a method of discovery.  
One question Butts’ interpretation might raise is whether or not transcendental 
arguments are the same thing as the analytic method? Looking at a particular example, 
there may be good reason to favor Butts’ view. Possibly the clearest example of an 
analytic argument is Descartes “Cogito.” I am thinking therefore it must be the case that I 
exist because existence is a necessary condition for the possibility of thinking. On this 
interpretation of the argument, its structure is roughly equivalent to the argument 
structure of the KrV as a whole. I have experience (fundamentally human experience 
shared by all finite, rational beings), now let us examine the necessary conditions that 
make that experience possible. Analytic arguments will always begin with some 
uncontrovertibly true fact about the world and move from there to what must also be the 
case for that fact to be true. 
                                                 
64
 In addition to not having definitions, Kant also argues in the KrV that metaphysics has no axioms. See 
KrV, A732/B760-A734/B762. 
65
 Butts, Physical Science, 6. 
46 
 
Butts also discusses the way in which Kant’s view of metaphysical method 
evolves in the Inaugural Dissertation. He claims that in the Dissertation Kant shows that 
“good” metaphysics must begin by rooting out any surreptitiously held assumptions that 
predicate subjective qualities to objects. Butts writes that in the Dissertation the four 
subreptic axioms are 1.“Whatever is, is somewhere and at some time.” 2. “Every actual 
manifold can be given numerically (thus every quantity is finite).” 3. “What is impossible 
contradicts itself.” 4. “Whatever exists contingently, at some time did not exist.”66 The 
first subretic axiom (wrongly) assumes that space and time are properties of objects. The 
second and third assume that principles which must be true of empirical objects (e.g. the 
principle of non-contradiction) extend beyond their use in empirical experience. The 
fourth axiom considers as a principle a claim which we can only be confirmed in 
empirical experience. These subreptic axioms are contrasted with three principles of 
harmony without which no judgments of the understanding can be made. “All things in 
the universe take place in accordance with the order of nature; Principles are not to be 
multiplied beyond what is absolutely necessary; No matter what comes into being or 
passes away – changes in nature are changes in form alone.”67  
On Butts’ reading, the four subreptic axioms and three principles of harmony 
given in the Inaugural Dissertation could have been discovered in accordance with the 
method Kant outlines in the Prize Essay. If I take only my experience as given, that alone 
is not sufficient to ground the subreptic axioms. They must rely on other assumptions that 
I cannot take as immediately certain. The principles of harmony, however, do represent 
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principles that must hold in order for experience to be possible. All four of the subreptic 
axioms seem consistent with Kant’s critical philosophy in a way that suggests he would 
continue to view them as principles which cannot be endorsed. The relationship between 
the Inaugural Dissertation’s principles of harmony and the critical philosophy is less 
clear. The first principle of harmony bears a strong resemblance to the second analogy 
and the third to the first analogy. The second principle of harmony (a rough analog of the 
principle of parsimony) is found in the KrV only as a brief note in the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method on what sorts of hypotheses are preferable.  
Butts devotes far more time to discussing the subreptic axioms than he does to 
Kant’s principles of harmony. He views the axioms as directly in line with the claims of 
the potential errors of transcendental reflection that Kant outlines in the Amphiboly of the 
Concepts of Reflection in the KrV.
68
 Butts links the principles of harmony to the KrV 
only insofar as he points to the KrV’s “commitment to empiricism in natural science” as 
linked with the Newtonianism of the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prize Essay.
69
 Butts 
does not connect the principles’ lack of appearance in the KrV (or, at least the reduction 
in status of the one which mirrors Newton’s principle of parsimony) with a possible shift 
in Kant’s relation to Newton. The principle is an acceptable ground of empirical physics, 
but it does not function as a proper metaphysical principle, not even one that serves only 
as a condition for the possibility of experience. Kant embraces the principle of parsimony 
in a more limited sense as a condition for framing adequate hypotheses within systematic, 
physics, but even here the wording of the principle has changed significantly from that 
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given in the Inaugural Dissertation. At the very least, it is worth noting its absence 
among the changes from Kant’s earliest attempt at critical philosophy and the KrV. 
Butts’ focus on the role of method in explaining the continuity between the 
subreptic axioms of Kant’s pre-critical works and the transcendental illusion of the KrV 
brings further attention to the ways in which Kant’s negative conception of method is far 
more robust than his positive conception. The subreptic axioms of the Inaugural 
Disseration, those which present things we cannot know, are maintained fully intact in 
the critical philosophy. The principles of harmony, principles we can know to be true, 
undergo a radical transformation. They are no longer principles without which judgments 
cannot be made. They are guides for empirical judgments only. Even in his earlier works 
Kant seems to have a much easier time telling us what we cannot do and cannot know 
than he does explaining how we can know the things that we do. 
If we consider principles such as the principle of non-contradiction
70
 or the 
principle of sufficient reason
71
, principles which Kant considered to be far more 
fundamental than the principles of harmony given in the Inaugural Dissertation
72
, even 
their place in Kant’s conception of method remains primarily negative. In Progress Kant 
claims that: “That every proposition must have a reason is the logical (formal) principle 
of cognition, which is subordinated to, and not set beside, the principle of contradiction. 
That everything must have its ground is the transcendental (material) principle, which no 
one has ever proven or will prove by means of the principle of contradiction (and in 
                                                 
70
 It is impossible that the same thing should both be and not be (at the same time). 
71
 Nothing which exists contingently can be without a ground which determines its existence antecedently. 
72
 Kant considered the principle of non-contradiction to be the guiding principle of all analytic judgments 
and the principle of sufficient reason as that of all synthetic judgments. 
49 
 
general from mere concepts without relation to sensory intuition).”73 In this essay Kant is 
responding to his critic Eberhard, and most of this particular passage is devoted to 
showing that his (Eberhard’s) attempt to derive the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) 
from the principle of contradiction (or, more contemporarily, the principle of non-
contradiction, PNC) fails. Kant claims that the logical form of the PSR, the form which 
relates to cognition alone and cannot be applied beyond appearances can be derived from 
the PNC. However, any application of the PSR beyond objects or propositions of possible 
experience is entirely separate and such a principle cannot be derived from the PNC. 
The PSR is in such a state that either it cannot be proven or it is not a truly 
metaphysical principle in that it applies only to experience. The PSR is essential for 
making judgments about the world and for proper temporal ordering of experience. 
However, we cannot be sure that it applies outside of the bounds of experience. In fact, 
insofar as we consider the PSR to be a principle about temporal causation we can be 
certain that it has no application outside of experience (and thus outside of time). The 
PNC, on the other hand, applies universally to judgments about experience as well as 
transcendental judgments. However, as the principle of all analytic judgments, the PNC 
cannot help us to expand our knowledge. It can only prevent us from falling intro 
contradiction. Even in outlining the two best candidates for fundamental metaphysical 
principles Kant restrains their usage to such a degree that they cannot help us to discover 
anything beyond the realm of experience. The advice Kant gives concerning their 
application details what they cannot do rather than what they can. 
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3. Methods of Philosophy and the Peculiar Science of Metaphysics 
For Kant metaphysics’ scientific basis is rooted in completeness, systematicity 
and a recognition of the limits and bounds of what knowledge is available to us. For 
contemporary thinkers science has more to do with empirical verifiability. Metaphysics, 
if a science, is an a priori science. It is grounded not in empirical data, but in conclusions 
drawn from irrefutable axioms or fundamental principles. For Kant we have no such 
metaphysical principles beyond the principle of contradiction (PNC) and even this will 
only help us in formulating analytic judgments. Thus there is very little that metaphysics 
can tell us in a positive sense. Metaphysics must be composed of synthetic claims, 
moving beyond what is already contained in the terms themselves, and the PNC is not an 
adequate resource to allow us to do this.  
This might present a reason to be skeptical of Lovejoy’s complaint that Kant’s  
“critical” philosophy bears little difference from that of his rationalist predecessors. He is 
correct that Kant accuses Leibniz et al of not being interested in the proper grounding of 
their fundamental principles when it is clear that they are, but Lovejoy’s criticism is 
misleading in overlooking the fact that Kant goes beyond this. The problem is not only 
the grounding of metaphysical principles but what can be derived from them once they 
are confirmed, namely: nothing. They cannot get us beyond analytic judgments, and the 
analytic judgments are only helpful if you have definitions (which metaphysics, at least in 
Kant’s sense, cannot).74 
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There is a sense in which one of the guiding questions of Kant’s critical 
metaphysics (“Is or should metaphysics be a science?”) can be subsumed under a larger 
and more fundamental question: “What method is appropriate to philosophy?” On this 
question it seems that Kant has a great deal of value to tell us. As we have seen earlier in 
the chapter, Kant believes that both the synthetic or analytic method are appropriate 
methods of conveying philosophical ideas. We have also seen that when a science cannot 
be based on input from intuition (of either the pure a priori or the usual empirical kind) it 
gains its status as a science through being complete.
75
  
For Kant any attempt to answer large, metaphysical questions about God, the 
soul, the universe as a whole must start with critique, a clear separation between the 
various parts and sources of knowledge. Until I have a clear sense of which parts of my 
experience of the world are provided by my own mental faculties I cannot know which 
parts, if any, are actually reflective of the world outside me. If I want to know anything 
about things-in-themselves outside of my experience of them (which is the topic of 
metaphysics) I need to first understand what parts of my experience stem from my own 
intuition and understanding. 
Because this critique is a prerequisite for any possible knowledge in metaphysics, 
without critique there is no possibility for the systematicity, unity and completeness we 
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want from a proper metaphysics. For Kant, metaphysical completeness can only be 
achieved if we limit metaphysics to those topics which we know are within the 
boundaries of our possible knowledge, namely the very conditions and boundaries of our 
knowledge itself. Without the completeness that allows metaphysics to exist as a unified 
system, we can’t guarantee metaphysics as a science. This completeness is only possible 
if we re-construe metaphysics as critique.
76
  
On the one hand, it does seem that Kant is correct. Systematicity, unity and 
completeness are features we want our metaphysics to have. A good metaphysics is one 
in which every question is solvable, and in which the answers form a coherent unit. On 
the other hand this presents a fundamental challenge for all current and future 
metaphysicians. If we agree that systematicity, unity and completeness are features we 
want our metaphysics to have, and Kant is right in asserting that we need critique first in 
order for metaphysics to have these features, then we must choose between metaphysics 
as critique, a fundamentally stripped down version of the metaphysics we would like to 
have, or abandoning the notion of metaphysics as a science.  
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CHAPTER 2: MATHEMATICS AND CONSTRUCTION 
Introduction 
The twenty-first century, thanks in large part to the serious study of the writings 
of Charles Parsons and Michael Friedman, has seen a new profusion of interest in Kant’s 
philosophy of mathematics.
77
 Though Kant makes relatively few remarks concerning 
mathematics, these remarks gesture towards the general importance Kant granted to 
mathematics and the methodology he finds appropriate to it. Mathematics, in many 
respects, serves as Kant’s paradigm science. Its truths obtain certainty, and its problems 
the assurance of solvability that we frequently wish were available elsewhere. In other 
sciences we are often left groping for answers, but mathematics reassures us with certain 
knowledge. What aspect of mathematics accounts for its ability to arrive at certain 
knowledge? On Kant’s account sciences are distinguished from one another either in 
terms of their form or their content. Is the certainty which mathematics provides a result 
of its object, or a product of its unique form? 
Before answering this question, it may be worthwhile to consider the stakes 
involved. Why, in other words, should one look at what Kant has to say about 
mathematics at all? Setting aside the interest that mathematics might have for historical 
reasons or as a topic of philosophical inquiry in its own right, it is plain that, at least in 
Kant’s case, mathematics has a great deal to tell us about scientific methodology more 
generally. In particular the explicit comparisons Kant makes between the science of 
mathematics and the science of metaphysics illuminate what kind of science Kant 
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believes metaphysics to be. In the early pages of the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter 
“KrV”) Kant refers to metaphysics as the “queen of all the sciences”78 and one which he 
wishes were on “the secure course of a science” as are mathematics and physics.79 If we 
are to consider metaphysics as a science it is helpful to know what it is that a science does 
and through what methods it does it.  
Indeed, one can construe the entire project of the KrV as a redefinition of the 
science of metaphysics. Within the book’s pages we do not see a rehashing of the various 
historical positions on metaphysical issues, but instead a grand plan to reject these issues 
in favor of more fitting considerations. If metaphysics is to emerge as a new science then 
its students must be taught how to go about the study of it. Rather than leave the new 
science’s new students adrift without a compass, Kant provides a frequent point of 
comparison for metaphysical study in the science of mathematics.  
Mathematics seems to be a particularly apt point of comparison for metaphysics, 
since both sciences uniquely lack grounding in empirical data. For Kant, if we wish to 
consider any claim of science to be universal then we cannot base our study in 
experience. For the purposes of this chapter I will therefore follow Kant in his 
assumption that mathematics (geometry included) is a non-empirical science. While I 
recognize that this is not a position without detractors, it would be outside the scope of 
this discussion to decide whether mathematics is a priori or not.
80
 For Kant, experience 
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can only ever yield us contingent and falsifiable statements. Mathematical claims 
maintain their necessity only if they are grounded a priori in pure reason. An a posteriori 
mathematics would be subject to possible revision if new empirical information provided 
reasons to doubt previous assertions. Since our access to empirical knowledge is always 
through intuition and intuitions are always singular geometrical proofs relying on drawn 
diagrams could only ever apply to the particular drawn figure. For Kant the universality 
of mathematics is dependent upon its being developed a priori. If we wish our 
metaphysics to likewise apply beyond the confines of our own experience then it must 
also be a priori. While the methods of mathematics will not suffice for metaphysical 
enquiry the mere fact that we can develop a mathematical science should be reason to 
hope that metaphysics as a science is possible. 
The comparison that Kant makes between mathematical and metaphysical 
judgment gives the reader good reason to think that understanding what Kant says about 
mathematics will provide insight into what he thinks about metaphysics.
81
 In an effort to 
better understand the import of the comparisons between metaphysics and mathematics, 
this chapter will be aimed at outlining Kant’s view of mathematical science. Kant says 
little about mathematics within the KrV and related texts. However, the limited textual 
evidence has not deterred commentators from discussing the nature and importance of 
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Kant’s mathematics or from attempting to relate Kant’s views to those of later 
mathematicians. Kant provides just enough material to give infuriating hints at a 
comprehensive theory of mathematics without actually constructing one. Though the 
temptation to develop a robust account of arithmetic on Kant’s behalf is strong the 
lacking textual evidence makes any such reading highly speculative and problematic.
82
 In 
addition to discussing the primary Kantian texts concerning mathematics, this chapter 
will also comment briefly upon some of the already existing literature. My hope is that 
drawing attention to both the strengths and weaknesses of extant theories concerning 
Kant’s mathematics will illuminate Kant’s own position. Within the context of the 
dissertation my aim is to reconstruct Kant’s mathematics for the purpose of 
understanding why he thinks the comparison to metaphysics is useful. This particular aim 
would not be furthered through adding to Kant’s theories the robustness they lack or by 
attempting to reconcile his theories with more contemporary views on mathematics. 
My goal is to work towards a clear account of what Kant says concerning 
arithmetic paying special attention to issues which have not been fully developed in 
previous commentary. My primary claim is that a minimalist reading of Kant’s 
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philosophy of arithmetic is most in keeping with the minimal text we have. A minimal 
account is also best able to expose what is truly unique and influential about what Kant 
says. In particular in light of what little Kant has left us, it seems prudent to avoid the 
temptation to “over-interpret” and provide instead a close and careful reading of the text 
we have. Though the primary texts contain discussions of both arithmetic and geometry, 
this chapter will devote most of its attention to arithmetic for reasons that relate primarily 
to future writing on Kant’s metaphysics which I hope to undertake.83 In general my 
account will focus on the role of construction in both arithmetic and geometry as I think 
this is the key to understanding both Kant’s mathematics and the relationship Kant spells 
out between metaphysics and mathematics.  
Critics typically consider the passages in the KrV where Kant discusses 
mathematics under one of two rubrics. There are those passages which are fairly 
straightforward and raise questions along the lines of “Is Kant correct?” Usually these 
passages argue for the synthetic a priori nature of mathematics or the connection of 
geometry to the intuition of Euclidean space. There are other passages which are difficult 
enough that we must first ask “What does Kant mean?” before we can wonder whether or 
not he is correct. Concerning the more difficult passages on mathematics, I will argue that 
they should and can be best interpreted in a way that makes them consistent with one 
another as far as this is possible. One way to go about doing this is to choose one passage 
as central to Kant’s mathematics, or carrying the most explanatory weight, and interpret 
the other mathematical passages around it. My goal in the following section is to consider 
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which passages might be the most central, and to dismiss several options which I believe 
are less than ideal. Section 1 is devoted to arguments that the discussion of mathematics 
in the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’84 contains the key elements of Kant’s 
mathematics and is essential for properly reading passages from earlier in the text. In 
Section 2 I will present some arguments against taking several passages that appear as 
central in the literature as the key interpretive passage, and I will also discuss what those 
passages do have to tell us about Kant’s views of mathematics. I will provide some 
concluding remarks in Section 3. 
1. The ‘Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’ 
There are several compelling reasons to think that the discussion of mathematics 
towards the beginning of the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’85 (hereafter 
‘Discipline’) is of central importance for the issue. The first set of reasons are stylistic 
ones. Kant frequently begins employing a concept, term or idea in the KrV and then 
defines or explicates it much later (if at all). It would not be out of keeping with Kant’s 
general style for the last passage on mathematics to be the most important. If the notion 
of construction is as central to Kant’s account of mathematics as I believe it is, it should 
not be seen as a problem that the most detailed account of construction in the KrV comes 
near the end of the text in the last major passage where Kant discusses mathematics.
86
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Additionally, the depth of the discussion in the passage contributes to the idea that it is an 
important one. This is perhaps Kant’s most sustained discussion of explicitly 
mathematical topics within the KrV and that alone is a good reason to give it substantial 
attention. 
Second, the notion of construction upon which the ‘Discipline’ passage relies so 
heavily also appears in both Kant’s earlier and later works. Some of the concepts which 
could be construed as central (the role of counting or the function of the imagination), 
shift dramatically or are absent altogether in Kant’s pre-critical or post-KrV accounts of 
mathematics. Rather than being discarded, the concept of construction is retained 
throughout the evolution of Kant’s thought. It plays into Kant’s account of mathematics 
in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and also the Inquiry Concerning the 
Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality.
87
  
The third and most compelling set of reasons to consider the ‘Discipline’ passage 
as central relate to the great explanatory power held by the notion of construction.
88
 It can 
fruitfully and coherently tie the earlier passages together (something the other passages 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinctness made precise, must conclude rather than begin the work” (KrV, A730-731/B758-759). Though 
the concept of construction under consideration here is one which has its use in mathematics, it is a 
philosophical concept. This is an issue I hope to explore in more detail in further projects. 
87
 See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. and ed. Michael Friedman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6, and the Prize Essay at Ak. 2:272-301. 
88
 For work on the importance of construction to Kant’s mathematics see Charles Parsons, “Kant’s 
Philosophy of Arithmetic,” in Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays, ed. Charles Parsons (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983); Lisa Shabel, “Kant on the ‘Symbolic Construction’ of Mathematical 
Concepts,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 29, no. 4 (1998); Ofra Rechter, “The View 
from 1763: Kant on the Arithmetical Method Before Intuition,” in Intuition and the Axiomatic Method, ed. 
Emily Carson and Renate Huber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006); Robert Hanna, “Mathematics for Humans: 
Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic Revisited,” European Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2002); Kristina 
Engelhard and Peter Mittelsstaedt, “Kant’s Theory of Arithmetic: A Constructive Approach?” Journal for 
General Philosophy of Science 39, no. 2 (2008); J. Michael Young, “Kant on the Construction of 
Arithmetical Concepts” Kant-Studien 73, no. 1-4 (1983). 
60 
 
do not seem able to do). It illuminates both the similarities and the differences between 
arithmetic and geometry while applying equally to both. It connects mathematics to 
intuition and the schematism. The ‘Discipline’ passage explicitly compares mathematics 
and metaphysics. As metaphysics is far more fundamental to Kant’s overall project in the 
KrV, it stands to reason that the passage which draws in the more central issue would be 
an important one. While I recognize that the role of metaphysics within Kant’s project is 
a topic of much disagreement I think at the very least one can claim that the KrV is not 
explicitly a book about mathematics but it might be one about metaphysics.  
Kant compares the a priori nature of mathematics and metaphysics near the 
beginning of the ‘Discipline.’ 89 He immediately goes on to point out the crucial 
difference between mathematical and metaphysical cognition. “Philosophical cognition 
is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the construction 
of concepts.”90 The distinction between mathematics and metaphysics is mathematics’ 
ability to construct its own concepts.  
This special method of construction is most easily seen in basic geometric proofs. 
Kant himself uses the example of attempting to demonstrate that the angles of a triangle 
are equal to two right angles. The triangle is constructed by being drawn on paper, and a 
parallel is added to the drawing to aid in finding the angle sum.
91
 In this particular 
example “construction” seems to entail taking that which is conceptual and adding (in the 
geometric case) a spatial component to it.  
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However, there is also a broader sense in which mathematical concepts are 
“constructed.” Construction is not only the way in which we explain how a thing came to 
be, but the way in which we bring about its existence. Prior to its construction, there was 
no Eiffel Tower. The tower certainly existed as an idea in the mind of the architect. It 
existed on paper as a drawing and the plan for it would have been known by many long 
before the tower itself was built. However, the tower itself did not exist until it was 
constructed. The construction took the tower from mere concept to actually existing 
thing.  
In many ways the tower example is analogous to what Kant argues we do when 
we do mathematics. If a geometer wants to show that the angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles he or she constructs a parallel. Prior to its being drawn on paper the 
parallel may exist only in the geometer’s mind. This simple explanation highlights the 
role of intuition in mathematical (here geometrical) construction. Through empirical 
intuition I am able to bring the parallel into existence. The parallel has been 
“constructed” in the sense that now I can see it, point to it, measure the angles it creates 
the same way I can do these things with the Eiffel Tower.  
 There is, however, also an important dis-analogy between construction in the 
tower example and the way Kant uses it with regard to mathematics. Mathematical 
cognition for Kant is not from concepts, nor is it construction (as with the tower) of 
objects. When we do mathematics we construct the concepts themselves. In this regard, 
doing mathematics is more similar to the initial designer’s sketch of the tower than its 
being built from iron. The designer, through his drawing, constructs a concept of the 
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building which can be expressed on paper but does not constitute an actual building. It is 
only through the process of physical construction (involving iron, wood, welding and 
workers) that a physical object comes to be. 
When we do mathematics we do not construct objects, we construct concepts. Let 
me explain, if I draw a triangle for the purpose of proving a geometrical theorem I have 
not in any technical sense created a real existing triangle. Human limitations prevent the 
drawing of perfect figures and many doubt that “real” triangles or other polygons exist 
anywhere in the world. I have constructed, in intuition, the concept of a triangle. This is 
not to suggest that I invent the concept of “triangle” any more than Gustav Eiffel 
invented the concept of “tower,” but that I have brought about an ostensive instantiation 
of the concept. 
The distinction between these two versions of the tower analogy (the first 
comparing mathematics to a built tower and the second to its initial design) draw out 
some important features of Kant’s views on mathematics. First, we see from the second 
version of the analogy a hint of the way in which mathematics can be both intuitive and a 
priori. My drawing of a triangle (or counting on my fingers) takes place in empirical 
intuition but does not result in the creation of an empirical object. Second, and related, 
the first version of the analogy draws attention to the fact that unlike in architecture, in 
mathematics there is no final step where a physical object comes into existence. There are 
no mathematical objects for Kant in the robust sense of “object.” 
There are two pieces of textual support for the claim that for Kant there are no 
mathematical objects. The first comes from the KrV. In the ‘Discipline’ Kant states that, 
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“in mathematical projects the question is not about this [the conditions for the possibility 
of experience] nor about existence as such at all, but about the properties of objects in 
themselves, sole insofar as these are combined with the concept of them.”92 Mathematics 
has no mechanism for considering the existence of its objects. Questions of existence are 
questions for philosophy or physics. Our primary concern about mathematical objects is 
never with their existence and always with their properties. The second passage is in 
Kant’s short essay “Settlement of a Mathematical Dispute Founded on a 
Misunderstanding.” Kant addresses an article by Reimarus refuting the truth of a claim he 
uses in a question as an example (“Why is it that the ratio of the three sides of a right-
angled triangle can only be that of the numbers 3, 4, and 5?”).93 Kant claims that their 
dispute is a mere misunderstanding and, importantly, that the example, “was only meant 
to serve as an example of the nonsense that the Pythagorean number-mysticism makes of 
mathematics, when seeking to philosophize about its propositions…”94 Kant dismisses 
the notion of taking mathematical entities as objects holding special philosophical 
significance. To ask questions about the existence of mathematical objects is to 
philosophize about mathematics (“a difficult business!”95), a task for which Kant seems 
to have little patience. 
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 In his paper “Arithmetic and the Categories” Charles Parsons claims that Kant's 
mathematics lacks "an articulated account of mathematical objects."
96
 He points out that 
"what plays the role of mathematical existence in Kant's usage is constructability."
97
 For 
Kant, we answer questions concerning the properties of mathematical entities by testing 
whether or not we can construct them, not by determining whether they exist as objects. 
If a geometer can construct a mathematical entity in intuition, then there is a minimal 
sense in which the entity being constructed exists as an object. However, we need 
empirical confirmation before anything more determinate can be concluded about the 
existence of an object. Empirical objects are clearly Kant’s paradigm case of what it 
means for something to exist as an object. Parsons views Kant as needing a middle 
ground between two claims that do not quite fit: that constructability alone is not enough 
to establish the possibility of the existence of mathematical objects without reliance on 
further philosophical claims, and that mathematical knowledge is independent of 
philosophical knowledge.
98
 As the passage at A713/B741 quoted earlier shows, 
philosophical cognition does not merely differ in content from mathematical cognition, it 
is entirely different in form as well.
99
 If there is no resolution to the dilemma, then the 
entire mathematical enterprise is in danger of becoming dependent upon philosophical 
reasoning. 
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 Parsons seeks to resolve this tension with a solution that stays true to Kant's intent 
while allowing for knowledge of mathematical objects in the "full-blooded" sense.
100
 His 
solution is to say that "although mathematical demonstration would yield knowledge of 
such objects...it would not establish that the concepts involved are objectively real."
101
 
This resolution seems to be in keeping with the nature of Kant's larger philosophical 
picture. Parsons acknowledges the separation between what we can know (the 
mathematical objects which we can construct) and what exists independently in the 
world. Our ability to construct something a priori tells us only of the necessity of its 
existence for human cognition. Our empirical construction of it is what cements this 
existence as being an appearance in the world for us. Parsons is able to keep the faculties 
of intuition and understanding from overstepping their organizing role by recognizing 
that the construction that the pure intuition provides is not sufficient for establishing 
objective existence. 
Parsons points out that “If arithmetic had for its object ‘an object of intuition as 
magnitude,’ i.e., forms such as the points, lines, and planes of geometry, then it would 
refer quite directly to a form of intuition.”102 The problem with such a comparison is the 
general dis-analogy between space and time. As the form of “inner” intuition, time lacks 
the outer characteristics that make “points” or “lines” of time anything more than 
metaphorical. The way in which one intuits space (or perhaps “in space”) is vastly 
different than the way one intuits in time. As a result it seems quite plausible that the 
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temporal nature of arithmetic would not be as easy to reproduce or explain as the spatial 
nature of geometry.
103
 
Parsons seems to pick up on this point later. “The special connection of arithmetic 
and time can, I think, be explained as follows: If one constructs in some way, such as on 
paper or in one’s head, such a sequence of symbols as the first n numerals, the structure is 
already represented in the sequence of operations and more generally in the succession of 
mental acts running through a group of objects, as in counting.”104 This “succession of 
mental acts” as Parsons puts it serves as the real connection between mathematics and 
intuition. Rather than some outer instance of intuition such as a line or angle, when 
considering arithmetic we have an inner intuition: the change of time as recognized when 
we move from one mental act to the next. In the case of counting, we are aware of the 
movement in time as we think “1” followed by “2” and so on. The counting happens in 
time (and without the construction of any empirical object) and as such is an act which 
cannot be performed other than intuitively. Through counting I construct various 
numbers. Though Kant calls arithmetical constructions “symbolic” rather than 
“ostensive” it is clear that the notion of construction is meant to apply to both arithmetic 
and geometry.  
One thing Parsons’ discussion of counting makes clear is the way in which 
construction unifies the work of the various faculties. How do I get from ‘7 + 5’ to ‘12’? 
It starts in one sense with the category of quantity. The category gives me the ability to 
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take my intuitions and any input from sensibility and organize them in terms of their 
quantity. The pure schema of quantity (as a conception of the understanding) is number. 
This means that when I think of the concept of quantity in the understanding, I spell out 
these quantities, I quantify or schematize them, in terms of number. The categories allow 
me to ask questions such as “How many?” or “How much?” and to recognize that these 
questions will be answered in terms of groups or units. The schema allows me to answer 
these questions with numbers: 5 apples, 2 gallons, 700 sheep. The process of enumeration 
(counting 1 apple, 2 apples, 3, 4, 5) follows the rule of the category for quantifying while 
creating the pure representation of the schematism in the form of numbers. Numbers meet 
the standard for a representation of the schematism because they represent the unity of a 
homogenous manifold. They are like the triangle of the geometer, used, within a proof, to 
represent all triangles generally. Beyond the notion of a particular quantity and perhaps 
something like “numberness” numbers lack specific features that might prevent them 
from applying equally to all objects we might wish to quantify (be they empirical or no). 
In the picture I have drawn thus far, we have the categories providing the capacity for 
quantifying and the schematism providing numbers which represent general quantities. 
It is the number of the schematism that allows me to connect the understanding to 
intuition. Arriving at a particular number that corresponds to the units I have collected 
requires a process: enumeration. Like all processes the process of counting is one that 
occurs (and must occur) in time. Hence the lion’s share of the work of arithmetizing takes 
place in intuition having been organized by the guiding hands of the schematism and the 
understanding. I take the quantifying tools at my disposal and I begin, in time, to count: 
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1, 2, 3, 4, 5; until I arrive at the precise number which represents the appropriate quantity 
of units. In Kant’s terms I have constructed the desired quantity. I can now produce a 
fully formulated judgment: “There are five apples in this bowl.” The above example 
shows how we arrive at a basic mathematical judgment concerning a set of empirical 
objects. However, we do not always apply numbers to things. If I am simply counting or 
adding with no empirical object in mind Kant still considers this to a form of symbolic 
construction, and it allows the notion of construction to be extended to algebra as well as 
basic arithmetic.
105
 
The process for deducing geometric proofs is similar. When a geometer draws a 
triangle within a demonstration of a proof, she means to show something about all 
triangles generally. The drawing is both a specific empirical triangle with a given set of 
properties (i.e. the drawn triangle must be scalene, isosceles or equilateral; its sides must 
have determinate lengths etc.), but also has the ability to represent the concept of a 
triangle generally. 
The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves 
to express the concept without damage to its universality, for in the 
case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the 
action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, 
e.g., those of the magnitude of the sides and the angles are entirely 
indifferent.
106
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In this way Kant is able to avoid the error of Locke who spoke of abstract concepts as 
needing to have both every possible specific characteristic of the concept they presented 
and none of them at the same time.
107
 Locke claims that the general idea of a triangle 
must be general enough to cover every kind of triangle (isosceles, scalene, obtuse, etc.) 
while not actually having any of these features, as any particular feature would detract 
from the idea’s generalness. In contrast, Kant claims that any drawing of a triangle we 
construct for a proof is a particular, individual triangle and as such has particular feature 
that keep it from being general. However, these particular features do not prevent the 
construction from expressing a more general concept as long as we only take into account 
the features of the construction that any other triangle would share. 
 It is only through the notion of construction that we get a full sense of the way 
mathematical judgments require the cooperation of all the cognitive faculties. 
Mathematics proves to be an incredibly helpful example of the ways the various faculties 
interact with one another. Looking at any one faculty in isolation will only ever provide 
part of the mathematical picture. The, by Kantian standards, rather detailed examples we 
get of mathematical judgments are extremely valuable for understanding how judgments 
work more generally. As I hope to argue in a later chapter, they also provide our first hint 
at why metaphysics is such a difficult enterprise. The source of mathematical concepts is 
radically different from that of metaphysical ones. 
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2. Other Substantial Discussions Within the Critique of Pure Reason 
 Having briefly examined the major discussion of mathematics within the KrV and 
looked at the vital role of construction to mathematical cognition, it seems necessary to 
turn to other important passages within the KrV. In this section I hope to address why 
these passages remain crucial to an understanding of Kant’s mathematics though they do 
not provide the crux of the account, as well as focus on the ways in which the passages 
can be better understood in light of what the ‘Discipline’ passage has to say. 
2.1 Preface, Introduction and Transcendental Aesthetic from the B Edition 
The early passages from the B edition of the KrV are a primary point of focus for 
commentators who are interested in the debate concerning the synthetic nature of 
mathematical judgments
108
, those who wish to use mathematics as a ground for more 
general claims about Kant’s notion of intuition109, or those who want to argue for the 
relevance (or lack of relevance) of Kant’s mathematics to contemporary mathematics.110 
All three of these aims are outside the scope of this chapter, and are not necessarily useful 
for an attempt to reconstruct Kant’s mathematical doctrine. While the early passages 
from the B edition do provide some insight into the role that intuition plays in 
mathematical construction, they are much easier to understand when read in light of the 
later passage from the ‘Discipline.’ As I will attempt to show later, the role of time in 
arithmetical judgments is in fact better illuminated by the Kant-Schultz correspondence. 
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One of the earliest mentions of mathematics in the KrV occurs in the B 
introduction. “Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a 
priori cognition independently of experience. Now it is occupied, to be sure, with objects 
and cognitions only so far as these can be exhibited in intuitions.”111 Mathematics itself is 
a pure science which deals only with pure intuitions and concepts of the understanding. 
However, as with all pure intuitions and concepts of the understanding, its application 
lies only in experience. This does not mean that we cannot have a pure science of 
mathematics or that we cannot have certain or necessary knowledge of numbers and 
mathematical propositions. What is intended is that while pure mathematics is possible 
and mathematics’ application to empirical reality is possible, there is not a transcendental 
use of mathematics. Kant confirms this view in a 1788 letter to Johann Schultz. He 
writes, “So we still cannot estimate the numerical magnitude of any object except one of 
possible sensible intuition, and thus there is no exception to the principle that 
mathematics applies only to sensibilia. The magnitude of divine perfection, of duration, 
etc. can be expressed only by means of the totality of reality; it cannot be represented by 
numbers, even if one were to take as standard a merely intelligible unity.”112  
Limiting mathematics to what “can be exhibited in intuitions” does not exclude 
any pure mathematics for we have two pure forms of intuition: space and time. 
Mathematics applied to space and time as such is a pure use of mathematics. As Kant 
points out in the B introduction, “properly mathematical propositions are always a priori 
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judgments and are never empirical, because they carry necessity with them, which cannot 
be derived from experience.”113 Indeed, Kant lists the necessity of mathematical 
judgments as one of the arguments in favor of the a priori intuition of space and time, for 
we cannot make mathematical judgments apart from space and time. 
It is clear from the B15-16 passage that Kant does intend intuition to play a major 
role in our arithmetizising and geometrizing. Though one may wonder why it is that 
mathematics is intuitive rather than conceptual, it seems clear that this is the case for 
Kant. The most readily apparent reason to allow math to be a function of the intuition 
rather than the understanding is the intimacy created between space or time and 
mathematics. It may seems a bit odd to rely so heavily on time for arithmetic, but trying 
to conceptualize a geometry without space may give some indication as to Kant’s 
motivation for the connection to intuition. Mathematics’ reliance on intuition also serves 
to again distinguish math from metaphysics. For Kant metaphysics does not rely upon 
intuition to any special degree. Metaphysics is an a priori science, but it is a conceptual 
rather than intuitive one.  
 The B introduction is also where Kant first makes the claim that mathematical 
judgments are both synthetic and a priori. In the midst of the discussion in the B 
introduction of “5+7=12” as an a priori synthetic judgment Kant states that “12” cannot 
be found in the concepts of “5” and “7” together. 
One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the 
intuition that corresponds to one of the two, one’s five fingers say, 
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or (as in Segner’s arithmetic) five points, and one after another add 
the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven. 
For I take first the number 7, and, as I take the fingers of my hand 
as an intuition for assistance with the concept of 5, to that image of 
mine I now add the units that I have previously taken together in 
order to constitute the number 5 one after another to the number 7, 
and this see the number 12 arise.
114
 
In the process Kant describes, one sees the equation “5+7” and thinks of the concept 7. 
One then proceeds to hold up one’s hand, an entity previously established as having five 
fingers, and proceeds to add the fingers to the 7 one already has (in one’s mind). The first 
finger is numbered as “8” (8 is one more than the seven previously held), and the fingers 
are counted off one at a time until one ends at 12. One can again see the importance of 
the notion of construction for Kant’s theory of arithmetic. The additional “5” are 
constructed symbolically on one’s fingers allowing one to arrive at “12” as the final sum.  
 The explanation of basic addition Kant provides in the B introduction is echoed in 
a corresponding passage in the Prolegomena.
115
 Here he writes that the proposition 7 + 5 
= 12 cannot be analytic because finding the sum requires going beyond the concepts of 
“7” and “5.” One can only go beyond these concepts by relying on intuition. Kant suggest 
the same intuitive examples, one’s five fingers or the familiar dots of Segner’s arithmetic, 
as common items one might count in moving from 7 to 12. Kant ends the Prolegomena 
                                                 
114
 KrV, B15-16. 
115
 Ak. 4:268-269. 
74 
 
discussion by emphasizing again that mere analysis would never allow us to solve the 
equation. 
This explanation of addition raises some concerns in the literature. One of the key 
questions revolves around how one continues to add when one has run out of fingers. The 
problem is far more complicated than this flippant formulation makes it seem. The 
objection can be broken down into two questions. Is my adding anything more than 
conceptual if I encounter and use numbers larger than those of which I can create images 
of in my head? And, is my adding anything more than empirical if I need an image in 
order to complete it? 
One of the early formulators of the objection, as Gottfried Martin points out, is 
Hermann Hankel.
116
 Both Martin and Hankel notice that Kant claims one “must” 
incorporate intuition into a solution to the equation.
117
 The “must” does not seem to apply 
to fingers specifically as Kant was surely aware of the need for adding together numbers 
much larger than can be accommodated on one’s hands.118 If counting without fingers is 
allowed, then the problem of mathematics being an empirical operation seems to be 
solved. “But is going from the terms to the sum a purely conceptual conclusion just 
because there are not enough fingers to do this? Certainly not; rather, with a larger 
number the sum is calculated. That means, therefore, that arithmetic has a calculus, or 
rather the reverse, arithmetic calculation is the model [Grundtyp] for any calculus. But 
any calculation occurs on paper or on a blackboard, i.e., through spatial perception. The 
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rules of arithmetic show that this is not accidental, e.g., those for addition.”119 If I add 
together two numbers spatial perception comes into play either in the use of 
representative images or in the use of figures drawn on paper. A calculation which one 
does on a calculator, for example, has not been “done” in any sense that matters 
cognitively.  
Martin shows that the second half of the finger problem can also be easily solved. 
Arithmetic is not purely conceptual because any act of addition requires a spatial 
perception.
120
 This is confirmed by the fact that we would not consider someone who can 
properly use a calculator, but cannot add without it, a person who has knowledge of 
arithmetic. Kant reiterates the non-empirical nature of mathematical construction again 
later in the KrV. “For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical intuition 
is required…Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting an object corresponding to this 
concept, either through mere imagination, in pure intuition, or on paper, in empirical 
intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without having had to borrow the pattern 
for it from any experience.”121 Counting on our fingers is non-empirical and counting 
without them is more than merely conceptual. In either case an intuition or the 
imagination is employed, and the relevant factor, the “five,” is not taken from my 
experience but attributed to it. “5” itself does not occur in nature or experience any more 
than the perfect triangle does. 
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2.2 The Schematism 
One way in which commentators frequently approach the mathematical content of 
Kant’s philosophy is to start with the passages on mathematics from the Schematism.122 
As a result of the focus in these passages on number itself and rudimentary grouping of 
objects (sets) explications of these passages frequently lead to comparisons between Kant 
and Frege.
123
 There are several reasons one might be tempted to view these passages as 
central and the comparison to Frege as particularly illuminating. First, What Kant has to 
say does bear some interesting similarities to Frege. Frege makes explicit his debt to Kant 
in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, and the debate about the analytic or synthetic nature 
of mathematical propositions fully deserves the vast attention it has received. I do think 
the discussion about whether or not arithmetical propositions are synthetic or analytic is 
intensely important, though I cannot equal support the necessity of all streams of the 
debate. Whether or not Kant would, given the opportunity, agree with Frege’s claim 
seems less essential a question to me than whether or not Kant’s notion of analyticity is 
far too narrow to make his claim concerning arithmetic’s synthetic nature meaningful. It 
is perfectly plausible to think that Frege’s understanding of the Kantian text can 
illuminate Kant’s views for the contemporary reader. Frege was a careful and intelligent 
reader, and there are certainly worse commentators and worse points of comparison for 
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Kant’s mathematical thought than that of Frege. If understanding the distinctions between 
Frege and Kant makes Kant’s own ideas more clear than this is a valuable path to pursue. 
A second reason one may be tempted to start with the Schematism is that the 
Schematism is a notoriously difficult and misunderstood passage. A great deal of time 
and effort has been invested into trying to determine just what Kant thinks the 
imagination is and what it does. If one could fully understand what role the schematism 
plays in mathematical judgments one might come closer to understanding the schematism 
as a whole.
124
  
A third reason commentators view the Schematism passage as crucial is the 
centrality many grant to the schematism within Kant’s thought. There is plenty of textual 
evidence to support the view that judgment is one of the most important concepts in 
Kant’s philosophy. The Critique of Judgment is devoted entirely to this issue, and a wide 
variety of commentators think that the imagination plays a significant role in the 
formation of judgments. Many, perhaps most famously Heidegger, thought that Kant 
underestimated the role that the imagination should play in our orientation toward the 
world. If the schematism discusses something which plays so crucial a role in Kant’s 
philosophy as a whole it makes a great deal of sense to think that the passages there 
which discuss mathematics are essential to understanding Kant’s mathematic more 
generally. 
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 In the KrV Kant refers to the schematism as that which mediates between the 
category and the appearance. In order to fulfill this role, the schema must be both 
intellectual and sensible, a product of the imagination.
125
 Number serves as the schema of 
magnitude "which is a representation that summarizes the successive addition of one 
(homogeneous) unit to another."
126
 If I intuit a line of trees standing in a row, or a stack 
of books piled on a shelf, it is number which allows me to answer the question “How 
many?” Specific intuitions will have specific quantities or numbers assigned to them, but 
numeration as a general procedure is left undetermined. Numbers as such are a pure 
product of the understanding, but to have any particular number (as opposed to a 
particular number concept) requires intuitional input. If I do not feel, see, taste, touch, 
hear or imagine something, there is nothing to count. “Thus number is nothing other than 
the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, because I 
generate time itself in the apprehension of intuition.”127  
 In his Philosophy of Arithmetic Husserl faults Kant’s description of the 
imagination’s role in counting for not being able to provide the resources Kant’s account 
needs. On Husserl's characterization of Kant's view, the category of quantity plus time 
somehow equals "particular, determinate number concepts."
128
 However, Husserl is 
bringing particular number concepts into the picture far too early. From quantity and time 
alone we cannot achieve particular number concepts. To begin with, Husserl has left out 
the role of the very factor he attacks in this passage, the schematism. Quantity and time 
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alone get us nowhere, but if you combine them with the intervening work of the 
imagination we arrive at magnitude. The schema of magnitude is number, which is 
merely a representation that "summarizes" the process of adding one unit to another.
129
 
Particular numbers require the intermixing of intuition. We do not require particular 
numbers until we have a particular number of things to count. At the very least, we 
construct the number we need as we have need of it, even if the "particular things" we are 
counting are nothing more than numbers themselves. In the case of “pure counting” (i.e. 
counting which requires no empirical input) we are not counting numbers but merely 
number concepts. It is views of this nature that allow some strict finitists to believe that 
the largest number there is, is simply the largest number than anyone has ever used. The 
existence of a particular number is dependent upon its empirical application. While I am 
not attempting to construct and argument in favor of this view, I do think that particular 
number concepts do not have the same kind of a priori status that number does. My 
interpretation of Kant's argument allows for the view that there is only a finite number of 
numbers, but certainly does not require it. One simply has to say that the metaphysical 
existence of numbers is something separate from their epistemological existence for us. 
Metaphysically speaking there is an infinite number of numbers. This is the view that I 
think would most closely represent Kant's own. 
 Time, as a consequence, plays a limited role in the formation of particular number 
concepts. Time serves as the form of inner intuition. Insofar as we think about numbers 
our thoughts are temporally ordered. Insofar as we count, we number objects 
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successively. Insofar as we are capable of counting we must have the ability to have 
representations of multiple objects simultaneously. However, these time determinations 
are only necessary conditions for the possibility of our cognition of numbers. They have 
no impact on the content of the objects which we count, and we can say nothing about the 
metaphysical reality of numbers, only about number in its capacity as a concept of our 
understanding.  
 A product of the imagination (i.e. the schematism) is both particular and general 
allowing it to mediate between an object and its concept. For example, when I imagine a 
triangle in order to demonstrate that the angles of a triangle are equal to 180 degrees, the 
triangle I imagine is both a particular (i.e. my image) and a general (a stand in for the 
concept of triangle generally). The role of the triangle in my demonstration is analogous 
to that of particular number concepts. As long as the numbers don’t leave my imagination 
they are pure and conceptual. The numbers themselves (particular numbers such as 5 or 
9), though, only come in when I draw or write them in experience. Number concepts are 
pure, but one must have intuition in order to have particular numbers.  
While the three reasons for supporting the centrality of the Schematism passage 
listed above may have been initially convincing I would like to suggest three reasons why 
this passage is not the one around which all of Kant’s other mathematical writings should 
be interpreted. First, in bringing up Frege one is immediately presented with what is 
lacking in Kant’s account rather than what is there. In order to adequately compare 
Kant’s account of arithmetic to Frege’s one is almost immediately required to attribute to 
Kant a more robust theory of mathematics than he actually has. Presentations of Kant’s 
81 
 
work quickly become anachronistic as commentators are forced to find Kantian 
equivalents of more modern terms and ideas. As I argue in another paper, it is possible 
that Kant did not even have the contemporary notion of mathematical objects that many 
commentators work so hard to find. While many points of comparison between Kant and 
Frege are there and do yield valuable insights, if what we are after is a clear sense of what 
the text says we should not start with a text published more than a hundred years later. 
A second reason to think that it would be a mistake to make the schematism 
passage the most crucial one for interpreting Kant’s mathematics is because the 
schematism is a notoriously misunderstood and difficult passage. If there is 
overwhelming disagreement about what role a particular faculty plays in Kant’s 
philosophy then it makes little sense to require that faculty to bear much of the 
explanatory weight of an already puzzling issue. If I cannot understand the schematism it 
seems foolish to think that the schematism will teach me Kant’s mathematics. 
Additionally I find it very difficult to take seriously claims that the schematism (or even 
judgment more generally) is really the most important component of the project of the 
KrV. There is some historical evidence to suggest that the schematism was more of an 
afterthought to Kant’s system than a primary component.130 
 Third, though the schematism does have an important role in the formation of 
mathematical judgments, it is intuition which seems to be the primary faculty at play. 
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Kant repeatedly emphasizes the role of time in mathematical judgments, and the temporal 
and/or spatial nature of mathematics ensures that intuition is key. In fact, the passages 
from the schematism seem to have more to say about number concepts than the 
mathematical calculations which produce them. It seems more likely that one would 
discover the uses of the imagination when thinking about Kant’ writings on orientation or 
aesthetics, while the writings on mathematics seem to more clearly illuminate the role of 
intuition.  
2.3 Schultz Correspondence and Commentary 
One set of texts that present a viable alternative to the ‘Discipline’ as Kant’s 
central mathematical text is the Kant-Schultz correspondence and Schultz’s resulting 
commentary on the KrV.
131
 The correspondence contains one of Kant’s clearest 
statements on the role of time in the construction of mathematical concepts and also gives 
us some interesting material to work with concerning the role of axioms in arithmetic. 
There are four reasons to think that Kant’s communication with Schultz and Schultz’s 
commentary are an appropriate starting place for an examination of Kant’s mathematics: 
First, The texts contain an extremely interesting discussion of axioms, and axioms play a 
pivotal role in contemporary mathematics. In fact, axioms tend to play an important role 
in any sort of systematic thought. It is possible that understanding axioms is the key not 
only to Kant’s mathematics but his philosophy as a whole. Second, Schultz’s provides us 
with the only authorized commentary of the KrV. There is good reason to think that his 
opinions reflect Kant’s own. Finally, the interpretation of Kant’s texts that most readily 
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presents itself if one focuses on these passages conforms most easily to Kant’s earlier 
writings (in particular the Prize Essay). If one wants to emphasize the continuity of 
Kant’s thought and the Leibnizian influence, focusing on Schultz’s commentary and the 
related correspondence is extremely helpful. 
For those concerned about the role of intuition in mathematics the Kant-Schultz 
correspondence is an excellent place to start. The clearest statement on the role of time in 
mathematical construction made by Kant himself is found in a letter to Schultz. 
As you [Schultz] quite rightly note, time has no influence on the 
properties of numbers (as pure determinations of magnitudes), yet 
it may [influence] the property of every alteration (as of a 
quantum) which itself is possible only relative to a specific 
condition of inner sense, and its form (time). Yet notwithstanding 
succession, which every construction of magnitude requires, the 
science of number is a pure intellectual synthesis, which we 
represent in thoughts. But in so far as magnitudes (quanta) are to 
be determined according to this [synthesis], they must be given to 
us so that we can apprehend their intuition successively, and thus 
this apprehension is subjected to the condition of time.
132
 
Time has no influence on the properties of numbers. I take this to mean that a number 
thought of at one time will not have different properties if thought of at a different time. 
Though it could also mean that time is not a necessary pre-condition for thinking of a 
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specific number or for the existence of the schema of number (i.e. we could still have 
number even if time was not a condition for the possibility of inner intuition. In such a 
world numbers would only be represented spatially). However, any alteration of numbers 
(adding, subtracting or counting) must take place in time, and the intuition of magnitudes 
must be apprehended successively. If this is the entire role time plays in the construction 
of numbers, time seems to have no further sway over mathematics then it does over any 
other intuition. Kant seems to attribute a special task in mathematical construction to 
time, but what that task is remains to be seen. 
 The confusion over time’s role in arithmetic for Kant was first expressed by 
Johann August Eberhard. Eberhard’s criticism came in response to Schultz’s Prüfung. 
Eberhard knew of Schultz’s proposed First Axiom of Arithmetic which states, “The 
quantity of the sum is the same whether one adds the second to the first or the first to the 
second, i.e., it is always the case that a + b = b + a.”133 Eberhard suggests that the 
symmetry of arithmetic equations which Schultz proposes as an axiom of arithmetic 
serves to negate the role of time in arithmetical construction. “So the truth of a 
proposition of arithmetic does not depend on time, i.e., on the order in which the parts of 
the sum have been thought…I ask anyone whether that does not mean that the truth of a 
proposition does not depend on time at all.”134 Eberhard, much like Hankel, also 
comments on the controversial finger-counting passage, and seems to suggest that such 
counting makes addition a merely empirical process. 
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 The reply to Eberhard’s objection comes not from Kant, but from Schultz, and is 
worth quoting at length. 
What Mr. Eberhard has to say concerning the apodictic certainty of 
arithmetic and analysis is based chiefly on the consideration that 
the pure intuition of time does not lie in the concept of number 
itself as its object, but only in the limits of our power of 
representation. But if this is the case, then Mr. Eberhard himself 
must admit that the concept which we have of a number is merely 
sensible, and thereby actually holds the intuition of time within 
itself. This is because, according to his system, the limits of the 
power of representation are precisely the source of sensibility. He 
therefore unavoidably contradicts himself, because counting units 
without adding them successively to one another is an obvious 
contradiction.
135
 
Schultz claims that Eberhard’s complaint is based on a misunderstanding of the role of 
time in the production of number concepts. According to (Schultz’s reading of) Eberhard 
the only reason one needs time for the process of enumeration is that all of our cognition, 
regardless of its content, must take place in time. If adding or counting is a process, then 
time must be part of our intuition of that process.  
Schultz’s reply highlights the fact that if time is necessary for arithmetical 
operations only in the same sense it is necessary for all cognition, then number becomes 
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something empirical. All empirical intuition must occur in time, and while pure cognition 
utilizes time (time is the pure form of inner sense) it does not hold time as its object. 
Mathematics must use time in a special sense because in ordinary intuition time is not in 
the object intuited but only in the mind which intuits it. If numbers are empirical 
intuitions then there is no time in them, only time added to them by the mind which 
intuits them. As quoted above, Kant claims that “number is nothing other than the unity 
of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, because I generate 
time itself in the apprehension of intuition.”136 Kant does not here grant to number the 
status of an empirical intuition. Time is generated in the apprehension of intuition. 
Number is not that which is apprehended, but that which provides unity to the synthesis 
of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general. It is the generality of numbers 
(what Kemp Smith refers to as their abstract nature
137
) that separates them from empirical 
intuitions. As with all the schemata, number provides unity to our intuitions by allowing 
them to be brought under the categories. On Schultz’s reading of Eberhard, the intuition 
of time must both be and not be in the concept of number. Since this contradiction cannot 
be the case, time must not lie in number concepts in so far as they are concepts, but in so 
far as these number concepts are counted as individual numbers. When we count we 
count successively and time is a necessary component of the counting. The role of time in 
the formation of numbers is unique not because of how time is utilized, but, rather 
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because time does not apply to numbers in the same way in which it applies to intuitions 
of empirical objects. Numbers, like time, are added to the objects. 
It is the Kant-Schultz correspondence which gives Gottfried Martin a basis for his 
theory that Kant granted axioms an important role in arithmetic.
 
Martin draws on 
Schultz’s discussion of axioms in his commentary to the KrV as well as Leibniz’s 
writings on mathematics. While Schultz, and many of Kant’s other students, believed that 
arithmetic must have axioms (reflexivity, for example) Kant himself explicitly states that 
there are no axioms of arithmetic. Martin argues that the agreement of Kant’s students on 
this issue combines with other evidence to form a convincing case for Kant eventually 
abandoning this view sometime after the publication of the KrV.
 138
 
We can already begin to see that taking the Kant-Schultz correspondence (and 
related texts) as most central creates more problems than it solves. While the reasons for 
considering the passages as crucial remain true we also see, first, that the notion of what 
an axiom is has shifted somewhat from Kant’s time to ours. It is not clear how much of 
what he has to say concerning axioms maps on to current usages of the concept. It is true 
that axioms generally are an important part of any system, unless that system explicitly 
lacks axioms. It is extremely hard to get around Kant’s clear statement that arithmetic has 
no axioms and one must wonder what implications this has for metaphysical systems as 
well. Second, while Schultz’s commentary was authorized by Kant it was never read by 
Kant in its published form. There is no way of knowing what changes were made 
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between the version Kant saw and the published version or how Kant would have 
responded to the final version. Finally, while interpretations based on the Schultz texts do 
show a Kant who bears a strong resemblance to his pre-critical self, this is not necessarily 
a desirable trait. There were rather dramatic shifts in Kant’s thinking between the Prize 
Essay and the KrV, and a robust theory of Kant’s mathematics needs to account for these 
as well.
139
 In the end it is not clear that what Kant had to say about axioms is central to 
his thought, and the claim that arithmetic has none may be far less interesting than it 
originally seemed. 
3. Conclusion 
 The preceding review of some of the key Kantian texts reveals a few reoccurring 
problems in the methodology used to interpret Kant’s theory of arithmetic. First, as 
Hintikka points out in his brief article “Kant’s Theory of Mathematics Revisited” most of 
the secondary literature regarding Kant’s views on arithmetic or mathematics more 
generally tends to focus on passages in isolation rather than attempting to fit those 
particular passages into the holistic and systematic picture that Kant’s philosophy 
attempts to create.
140
 This almost lends credence to Martin’s attempt to show that Kant 
thought there were axioms of arithmetic since the belief that he did not is based in large 
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part on one specific passage in a letter to Schultz. However, the whole which the rest of 
Kant’s work creates does not lend enough evidence to contradict this direct statement. 
There is not a convincing reason to throw it out, and it does not require doing violence to 
the text in order to have it fit in. It seems clear that what Kant meant about arithmetic not 
having axioms applies to the individual propositions and equations themselves (7 + 5 = 
12) as not having axiomatic status. It could be the case that all Kant meant when he said 
that there are no axioms to arithmetic was that arithmetical propositions, though 
universally valid, do not have axiomatic weight. Though a particular passage may seem 
to imply that number concepts are the result of reason or that we can have non-empirical 
intuition of numbers, it is hard to believe that Kant would contradict himself with regard 
to such major tenets of his thinking.
141
 
The second problem is that there is an overwhelming temptation by later 
philosophers to compare Kant to Frege in ways which frequently lead to a 
misconstruction of what Kant said. It is worth considering why there is such a lasting 
interest in the relationship between logic and mathematics or reducing mathematics to 
logic. Attempts to reduce mathematics to logic or prove that this could not be done date 
back to Leibniz if not earlier. The motivation for such work must rest in part on the 
inherent similarities between logic and mathematics. Both consist of a priori knowledge 
and attain apodictic certainty. Both have the possibility of infinite expansion through the 
addition of more proofs, equations, variables, sentences etc. but at the same time remain a 
                                                 
141
 While I am prone to agree with Hintikka in his assessment of Kant’s commentators, his own reading of 
Kant, while consistent, is hindered by his redefinition of Kantian terms in ways which do not seem to mesh 
with the way that Kant himself actually defined them.  
90 
 
mere form of knowledge devoid of content. Perhaps the most striking similarity though is 
one of method. Both practices involve deductions from general principles or rules to 
conclusions. Syllogisms and geometric proofs look and feel similar to one another in a 
way that makes one naturally wonder if the two practices are simply different 
instantiations of the same method. 
That being said, one cannot hold Kant accountable for Frege’s ideas, and asking 
how Kant would respond to Frege can do more harm than good to attempts to understand 
Kant on his own terms. This is not in any way meant to suggest that the question of what 
Kant would have thought about Frege isn’t an interesting and potentially fruitful one. 
However, one is best able to answer such a question only after providing a thorough 
account of what Kant says apart from its incorporation or rejection in later thought.  
A minimal reading of Kant’s theory of mathematics seems the wisest course given 
the minimal text with which we have to work. There seems to be good reason to think 
that rather than provide us with an account of arithmetic as a whole, Kant has only an 
account of addition.
142
 The non-geometric mathematical examples that Kant uses within 
his correspondence and the First Critique are always ones related to counting or basic 
addition. Any account of subtraction or multiplication, while possibly developed on 
Kantian grounds, would have to incorporate material from outside the Kantian corpus. 
Mathematical entities such as pi and negative or irrational numbers would be even more 
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difficult to explain in Kantian language
143. It doesn’t seem at all necessary to read Kant in 
a way which overcomes these errors.  
 What is undoubtedly useful about Kant’s account of mathematics (even if the 
entire account is fatally flawed) is the basis of comparison it creates for metaphysical 
cognition. Mathematical cognition is from the construction of concepts. Construction 
plays such a vital role in Kant’s conception of mathematical method that it would be 
difficult to overstate its centrality or importance. Without the defining contribution of 
intuition mathematical judgments would not be possible. For Kant mathematics is an a 
priori science, but one that cannot function without reference to intuition. Kant provides 
extensive insight into the methods appropriate to expanding our mathematical 
knowledge, methods that are entirely dependent for their success on the intuitive nature 
of mathematics. Now that we have some sense of what construction is and the role that it 
plays we can move on to a closer examination of the distinction it creates between 
mathematical and philosophical cognition. What is it about mathematics that allows us to 
construct our concepts and why does philosophy, as a fellow a priori science, not share 
this feature? The contract between the relatively robust picture Kant provides of the 
available methods of mathematics with the extremely limited information concerning the 
methods of metaphysics is stark. As the continuing discussion will show, since 
metaphysics lacks recourse to intuition there will be little Kant can say positively about 
the methods of metaphysics.  
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CHAPTER 3: WHAT MATHEMATICS CANNOT TEACH US 
Introduction 
Chapter one ended with a question about what it is that construction provides for 
mathematics that it cannot also bring to metaphysics. Put another way, the question is 
how does the lack of construction as a tool in metaphysics make the metaphysical 
enterprise different from the mathematical? I will try to answer this question by taking 
the mathematical background presented in the last chapter as a starting point, and attempt 
to show why it is that Kant thinks the mathematical path is not open to metaphysics. It 
will be helpful to first discuss what, if any kind of science metaphysics is in order to 
explain why one might be tempted to think that mathematics is an apt comparison. 
Section one begins to introduce what Kant claims mathematics and metaphysics have in 
common. The attempts at a definition or explanation of the proper method of metaphysics 
in this early section will be preliminary as the comparison between metaphysics and 
mathematics is essential to providing a full picture of how Kant thinks metaphysics must 
progress as a science. Section two looks in detail at the mathematical features which Kant 
outlines and the ways in which they fail to apply to metaphysics. I discuss the reasons 
that metaphysics cannot follow the methods of mathematics. Section three considers how 
metaphysics differs from other sciences more generally. In particular, in Section three I 
consider what factors metaphysics needs in order to be considered a science and how it is 
able to achieve them. I will discuss primarily passages from the KrV, Prolegomena and 
the Metaphysics of Morals. In Section 4 I draw some conclusions about what methods 
metaphysics must employ in order to secure the field as a science. In order to understand 
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why metaphysics is a science and what distinguishes it from other related sciences, it will 
be necessary to pay considerable attention to the “Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic 
Use” section from the beginning of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.144 The 
significant role the section plays in this chapter will become important for arguments 
about the structure and outline of the KrV which will be made in later chapters. 
1. What Mathematics and Metaphysics have in Common 
When David Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, introduces 
the distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas, mathematics is the clearest 
example he gives us of relations of ideas. For Hume, the preeminent modern skeptical 
empiricist, mathematical truths were something we can know with certainty because they 
do not pertain to objects in the world. They are, as one might say today, true in all 
possible worlds. Mathematics is merely a system of relating ideas to one another and as 
such can provide us with certain and reliable knowledge. Hume writes that, “Propositions 
of this kind [ones that express relations of ideas] are discoverable by the mere operation 
of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe.”145 Insofar 
as mathematics does apply to the world it must be as empirical as any other science and 
subject to the same lack of necessary connection. However, we can be sure that 2+2 = 4 
as long as we consider the numbers as mere constructs, ideas without any corresponding 
impression, in the same way that we can know a “bachelor” is always an unmarried man 
if this is the definition we have stipulated for the word. For Hume, all relations of ideas 
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are analytic, while matters of fact are all synthetic. The distinction between analytic and 
synthetic judgments thus coincides with the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori.  
At the time Kant was writing the KrV not even as strict an empiricist as Hume 
doubted that mathematics, at least arithmetic in the pure, stipulated sense, was a source of 
certain, non-empirically based truth. Nowhere in his published writings does Kant 
seriously entertain the idea that mathematics might be empirical. It serves as his paradigm 
case of an a priori statement and illuminates the connection between necessity and the a 
priori. 7 + 5 = 12 famously plays a pivotal role in Kant’s argument that there can be 
synthetic a priori statements. In his argument from the introduction to the B edition of the 
KrV Kant assumes any reader would readily accept that the equation is a priori and 
devotes the section to showing why the statement should be considered synthetic rather 
than analytic. While Hume did not consider mathematics synthetic, it is the only type of 
knowledge falling under the category “relations of ideas” that one could begin to consider 
synthetic. The merely definitional claims, such as “all bachelors are unmarried,” to which 
Hume also grants relations of ideas status are clearly analytic in any sense of the term. 
In addition to considering mathematics as an a priori science, Kant also classifies 
metaphysics as fundamentally consisting of synthetic claims. It is perhaps easier to accept 
the claim that metaphysics consists of synthetic propositions than it is to accept that 
mathematics consists of such propositions, but it is less clear why metaphysics is or must 
be a priori. Kant clearly follows Hume in thinking that experience can only ever provide 
us with contingent and falsifiable knowledge. Necessity and universality are for him as 
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they are for Hume characteristics of the a priori. Metaphysics is traditionally thought of 
as making claims which apply not only to experience but to the world as such. If the 
subject matter is beyond my experience then experience alone cannot be an adequate 
source of knowledge. For Kant, metaphysics must make universal claims to be of any 
interest. Metaphysical laws must apply without exception, and provide a foundation for 
all of human experience. There is no metaphysics without certainty and necessity. There 
is no certainty and necessity apart from the a priori. In order for metaphysics to have a 
hope of performing the functions to which it lays claim it must be a priori.  
What role metaphysics plays exactly must be left vague at this point. Though the 
introduction to the B edition provides some preliminary thoughts on metaphysics, it is not 
until quite late in the KrV that we get a fuller sense of what metaphysics is and should be 
for Kant. It seems wise for procedural reasons to delay discussion of the meaning of 
“metaphysics” until later. Until one comes to understand how metaphysics cannot 
proceed one cannot see what it is incapable of doing. Only when one understands what 
metaphysics cannot do does the possible use of metaphysics begin to become clear. 
 Beginning in the preface to the KrV and continuing through until the very last 
pages Kant discusses the need for metaphysics to be treated as a science and to be 
performed in a way that will allow it to be worthy of that title. Early in the B introduction 
Kant lists logic as another completed a priori science that might serve as an important 
point of comparison for what metaphysics can become. He claims that logic has avoided 
the sad fate of metaphysics by avoiding the “merely groping about” that comes from 
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failing to have a proper direction and agreement among practitioners.
146
 Logic, though it 
has moved little forward, has never had to go backwards.
147
 Kant views this as a sign that 
logic has found a secure course and as evidence that logic as a science may already be 
complete.  
Logic is for Kant the route through which the understanding understands itself. 
When it comes to determining a proper method of investigation, logic, much like 
mathematics, has an advantage in subject matter over metaphysics. In logic, “reason has 
to do only with itself.” This spares it the burden of confirming that its subject is in 
complete agreement with its object. While mathematics has an object that is distinct from 
its investigating subject (and thus has had a longer history of mistakes) it still has the 
advantage of being a science aimed at an object which is purely a priori. It, as he puts it, 
can easily be confirmed in pure intuition. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is not a science 
aimed at explaining itself, but must also extend our understanding of objects outside of 
us. As a result, the advancement of metaphysics could be a fatal “groping among mere 
concepts.”148 
 In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant defines metaphysics as “a system of pure 
cognition from concepts alone.”149 Metaphysics, to maintain its universality and 
necessity, excludes empirical knowledge from intuition and must consist of judgments 
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relying on pure, a priori concepts. This definition must be understood against the 
background of his understanding of philosophy more generally which is a “system of 
rational knowledge from concepts.”150 Metaphysics is a more specific type of philosophy. 
More precisely, it is pure philosophy or philosophy done only from a priori concepts. 
Philosophy needs metaphysics if it is to have any hope of being a “genuine science” as 
only this pure portion can give philosophy the systematicity a science requires.
151
 Based 
on the notion of science that Kant presents in the passage, a science must be grounded in 
first principles that allow one to derive further principles rather than merely containing an 
“aggregate of percepts sought out one by one.”152 A mere aggregate of perceptual 
principles discovered as they arise can never constitute a system, but systematicity is one 
feature of all sciences which metaphysics must share if it wishes to become properly 
scientific. One way to ensure the systematicity of metaphysics would be to start from a 
set of first principles, and then from those principles managed to derive a set of truths 
which clearly follow from the first principles and can be arranged in logical and orderly 
fashion which would allow one to easily see when all possible applications of the 
principles had been made. Any more haphazardly organized group would not constitute a 
system. 
Kant confirms the centrality of systematicity to his conception of a science in the 
KrV. In the text’s final paragraph he writes that, “Now as far as the observers of the 
scientific method are concerned, they have here the choice of proceeding either 
                                                 
150
 Ak. 6:375. 
151
 Ak. 6:375. 
152
 Ak. 6:375. 
98 
 
dogmatically or skeptically, but in either case they have the obligation of proceeding 
systematically.”153  
Much of the literature on Kant’s conception of a science focuses on unity and 
systematicity as key features of any discipline which can be called a science.
154
 However, 
when considering what it means for metaphysics in particular to be a science Kant also 
mentions a third feature which has received considerably less attention. In order for 
metaphysics to be a science it must be not only united and systematic but also complete. 
As W. H. Walsh puts it:  
Kant demands that knowledge which is to be called scientific must satisfy 
two requirements: (a) it must fit with all other knowledge of its kind into a 
single complete system which is constructed in accordance with an a priori 
idea; (b) it must be apodeictically certain. (c) A science cannot be a mere 
aggregate of separate cognitions: it is a complete whole of interconnected 
knowledge, and for that to be possible the place of each part of it must be 
determined by a single principle. This is Kant's consistent doctrine...”155  
On Walsh’s interpretation of Kant scientific knowledge of any kind must be systematized 
in a way which makes the route towards completing that science one that is laid out in a 
clear manner. For metaphysics, the route to completion needs to be more than clearly 
demarcated, it needs to be one which we have already travelled. The third requirement 
which Walsh lists, that of avoiding aggregation by developing a complete, interconnected 
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whole, is the most important. As I have already pointed out in the introduction, without 
the guarantee of systematicity there can be no assurance that metaphysics is a science. In 
the following two sections I will explicate and discuss some of the textual evidence 
supporting the idea that Kant views the path of metaphysics in this fashion and point to 
the role completeness plays in determining metaphysics as a system. 
2. Distinguishing Metaphysics from Mathematics 
In the opening section of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method Kant outlines 
the difference between mathematical and philosophical method. Philosophy is knowledge 
from concepts while mathematics is knowledge from the construction of concepts. As the 
discussion in chapter one begins to indicate, mathematics has the ability to construct its 
own concepts in ways which philosophy cannot because of the important role intuition 
plays in mathematics. For Kant intuition is the means by which our knowledge relates 
immediately to objects. He divides intuitions into two primary types: empirical and pure. 
Empirical intuitions are those which connect the knower to objects through sensation. 
When I hear, see, smell, taste, or touch something I have an empirical intuition of it. Most 
of our ordinary, everyday interaction with the world is through empirical intuition.  
However, Kant points out that not every aspect of our intuitions is the result of the 
empirical input of sensations. Whatever necessarily belongs to my intuitions, as 
demonstrated through its being present in all of them, must not be from sensation. These 
constant features, those left when we subtract out the judgments of the understanding and 
the sensible input of the sensations, Kant calls pure intuitions. He lists two pure 
intuitions, forms of intuition, which are contributed by the mind to sensation, namely 
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space and time. Space is part of all of my outer intuitions, or intuitions of objects 
represented as being outside of me. Time is part of all my outer and inner intuitions, those 
intuitions which are of objects outside of me but also inner intuitions or thoughts.
156
 
Kant claims that mathematics can construct its own concepts in intuition because 
mathematics, geometry and arithmetic in particular, are about the pure intuitions space 
and time. The geometer constructs shapes and figures, either in her mind or on paper, but 
in either case, shapes and figures which must be represented spatially. The arithmetician 
must always count in time and acknowledge the perception of time’s passing that comes 
with moving from each number to the next. Metaphysicians, on the other hand, do not 
have the same recourse to pure intuition. Metaphysics is supposed to answer questions 
about the humans, God and the world in the most universal sense of each term. Space and 
time are merely the forms of sensible intuition and necessary and universal only insofar 
as we cannot have specifically human cognition without them. Any answer to these 
questions which relies on space and time, or involves a construction in space and time 
cannot be truly necessary or universal in scope. Mathematician’s ability to reference 
constructions in space and time renders mathematics as a science radically different in 
content than metaphysics.  
However, the ability that mathematics has to construct its own concepts which 
philosophy lacks is not the only way in which Kant characterizes the methodological 
distinction between the two sciences. Kant also identifies the fields as being two distinct 
uses of reason and outlines features of mathematics that metaphysics does not share. This 
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section provides a brief account of the various ways in which Kant differentiates the 
method of mathematics from that of metaphysics. 
2.1 Concrete Exhibition 
In the introductory section of “The Discipline of Pure Reason”157 we get one of 
the clearest formulations of what distinguishes mathematical cognition from 
metaphysical. Kant contrasts pure reason with both empirical reason and mathematics. 
He claims that a critique of empirical reason is not required because experience provides 
a constant source of verification for empirical judgments. Likewise, a critique of 
mathematics is unnecessary because mathematical concepts “must immediately be 
exhibited in concreto in pure intuition, through which anything unfounded and arbitrary 
instantly becomes obvious.” This concrete exhibition in intuition of my mathematical 
concepts allows the concept to connect immediately to intuition. Both empirical and 
mathematical reason are subject to a kind of automatic critique, empirical reason’s is 
external while mathematics’ is internal. If I claim that an iron block floats in water as 
well as wood does, one could show my error simply by placing both an iron object and a 
wooden one in a pond. The test could be repeated with objects of varying shapes and 
sizes until I was satisfied that my claim was inaccurate. If I claim that any enclosed, 
three-sided figure made up of straight lines will always have angles that equal 360 
degrees, the image of a triangle (either drawn or imagined) will serve as the catalyst for a 
proof that my assertion in false. In an instance where an expert to redirect my thinking is 
absent, any attempts to move forward based on my misconceptions would eventually 
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make my mistakes clear. A geometry including a triangle with angles that equal 360 
degrees will be flawed, confused and eventually self-contradictory. My iron raft will sink.  
Pure reason is not subject to the same constraints from either internal or external 
sources as empirical reason. Some thinkers have assumed something like intellectual 
intuition which would allow the being that possessed such intuition to have immediate 
access to objects and thus immediate verification of their existence. Kant famously 
rejected such a notion. In the B version of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant declares 
that no finite, contingent being is capable of intellectual intuition, only mediated, sensible 
intuition.
158
  Thus, if I am convinced that all things exist as ideas in the mind of God or 
that the soul is eternal, nothing in my experience can serve as sufficient evidence to 
persuade me that these claims are false (nor true for that matter). If I postulate God as 
invisible and incorporeal not seeing him in the world tells me nothing about his existence. 
The external, empirical test reveals nothing. But what of the internal, mathematical 
critiques? Can’t they help? If my notion of an eternal soul won’t fit with my other 
conceptions of the metaphysical underpinnings of the world, this would serve as a sure 
sign of the falsity of the claim. Here, though we see one way in which mathematics and 
metaphysics differ. Mathematics gives me plenty of concepts firmly rooted in intuition 
with which to determine the sensibleness of new judgments. My judgment that a triangle 
has angles equal to 360 degrees will be quickly checked by my concept of “degrees,” 
“angle,” or perhaps “quadrilateral.” While it is possible that my judgment could be 
initially confirmed (or at least not denied) by other mistaken judgments (i.e. if my 
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concept of “quadrilateral” is also incorrect) there are some root mathematical concepts 
that will prevent the error from traveling all the way through my mathematical system 
without being discovered. Mathematics grants me access to firm concepts (“line,” 
“plane,” “angle,” etc.) substantiated in intuition with which, for Kant, I can confirm my 
judgments. 
The problem with metaphysics is that it has no such firm, root concepts. I cannot 
verify my notion of “God” by showing the relationship between “God” and “substance.” 
This would require first some concrete notion of what “substance” is. Lacking intuition to 
provide me with a construction to serve as confirmation of my concept I am forced to 
find some other more basic concept on which to rest the first. Within the metaphysical 
realm, this chain will continue on and on without an end in sight. Unless I have some 
basic concept which is either self-evident or demonstrable in pure intuition (a situation 
which the very nature of metaphysics will prevent as metaphysics claims to speak about 
what is beyond or undergirding experience) my metaphysical claims have only each other 
to turn to for confirmation. With each claim as indefensible as the last ultimately I will 
only ever be talking in circles. 
The situation for mathematics, on the other hand, is quite different. As Kant 
points out with respect to geometry in his late essay What Real Progress has Metaphysics 
Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff: 
One could rather address to the modern geometers a reproach of the 
following nature: not that they derive the properties of a curved line form 
its definition without first being assured of the possibility of its object (for 
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in doing so they are fully aware at the same time of the pure, merely 
schematic construction, and they also carry out the mechanical 
construction afterwards if it is necessary), but that they arbitrarily 
conceive such a line (e.g., the parabola through the formula ax=y
2
), and do 
not, according to the example of the ancient geometers, first bring it forth 
as given in the conic section, which would be more in keeping with the 
elegance of geometry, for the sake of which we have often been advised 
not to neglect so completely the synthetic method of the ancients in favor 
of the analytic method which is so rich in inventions.
159
  
The problem with the modern geometers is not that they consider the concept of a curved 
line and derive its properties from the definition of a curved line alone. Kant’s opponent 
Eberhard seemed to attribute the error to examining properties before a construction of 
the line has taken place or before establishing the empirical possibility of the curved line 
as an object. Kant says that deriving the properties of a curved line apart from its 
construction is acceptable because the line has already been given a “pure, merely 
schematic construction,” and that this construction is, for the time being, sufficient. 
According to Kant, the problem lies in their attempt to construct the line via formula 
rather than by introducing the line as given in the conic section. This seems to be a fairly 
modest point, however because the stated complaint is that the conic method is “more in 
keeping with the elegance of geometry.” The moral Eberhard takes from the story (that 
one cannot derive properties of a line not mechanically constructed) is inappropriate. One 
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can indeed derive properties from a line which has not been mechanically constructed as 
long as the line has a schematic construction.  
Rather there are two different points we should take from this section, and both 
apply to what Kant says about mathematics more generally. First, some kind of 
construction does seem to be necessary to ground any sort of geometrical (and perhaps) 
mathematical conclusion. On Kant’s account mathematics is reliant on being connected 
to intuition for immediate verification of its conclusions. A construction in intuition 
allows the geometer to know that her proof has proceeded properly and that her 
conclusion is valid.  
Second, this verifying construction (or construction generally speaking) does not 
have to be mechanical. A construction in the mind rather than on paper is adequate. On 
the description of intuitions Kant provides, intuitions are often spatial and of the world 
but they are not always. Inner intuitions still count as intuitions. If a geometer imagines a 
triangle and its parallel rather than drawing one on paper, this imagined triangle is no less 
an intuition than the one that is drawn. The intuitive nature of “schematic” constructions 
in arithmetic should be clear from the fact that arithmetical constructions are 
constructions in time, and time applies equally to inner and outer intuition. 
2.2 Solid Concepts 
As Kant presents it in the ‘Discipline’ the primary distinction between philosophy 
and mathematics is that philosophy proceeds according to concepts and mathematics 
proceeds “in accordance with intuitions that [one] exhibits a priori for the concepts.”160 
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As Kant explains earlier in the passage this difference is what gives mathematics a clear 
advantage over philosophy in performing geometric-style proofs. Both mathematics and 
philosophy work with concepts and both ultimately strive to make synthetic judgments 
about their respective fields. However, their difference is not merely one of content. 
According to Kant, a mathematician has concepts confirmed in pure intuition. This 
allows her to start from a firm and certain base, to use analytic definitions to support 
synthetic judgments. “To go beyond it to properties that do not lie in this concept but still 
belong to it.”161 Without intuition to ground their concepts, philosophers are left to 
perpetually re-ask the “what is..?” questions. Proving concepts on the solid ground of 
intuition allows mathematics access to a base from which to construct further concepts 
and judgments.  
Philosophy has no such luck. This does not mean, as Kant points out, that there is 
no room for synthetic judgments in philosophy. “There is, to be sure, a transcendental 
synthesis from concepts alone, with which in turn only the philosopher can succeed, but 
which never concerns more than a thing in general with regard to the conditions under 
which its perception could belong to possible experience.”162 The philosopher is not 
equipped to judge whether or not a thing exists or what a thing is. Answering either of 
these questions requires the ability to make analytic, definitional statements about things-
in-themselves. Instead, the philosopher is free to judge under what conditions the 
perception of some thing could be allowed as a part of experience. To put it in Kant’s 
words: 
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Synthetic propositions that pertain to things in general, the intuition of 
which cannot be given a priori, are transcendental. Thus transcendental 
propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but only 
in accordance with a priori concepts. They contain merely the rule in 
accordance with which a certain synthetic unity of that which cannot be 
intuitively represented a priori (of perceptions) should be sought 
empirically. They cannot, however, exhibit a single one of their concepts a 
priori in any case, but do this only a posteriori, by means of experience, 
which first becomes possible in accordance with those synthetic 
principles.
163
  
If a proposition is (1) not about a particular individual but speaks of things in general and 
(2) pertains to things that cannot be given a priori in intuition (i.e. not mathematical 
concepts) then that proposition is transcendental. In other words, transcendental 
propositions are, for Kant, synthetic propositions which speak about general but non-
mathematical content. These transcendental propositions cannot come about through the 
construction of concepts. Construction of a priori concepts can only occur in pure 
intuition, and we have already stated that no a priori intuition can be given of the 
concepts in question (i.e. they are non-mathematical). Without access to pure intuition to 
ground their concepts, transcendental propositions serve as rules which apply to the 
empirical. The concepts for which the transcendental propositions give rules are ones we 
can know about only empirically. For Kant, such discussions of transcendental principles 
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which apply only to objects of possible experience constitutes the major task of the 
metaphysician. Without a priori knowledge of the concepts under consideration no 
construction can occur. 
2.3 Distinct Functions of Reason 
In “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use” Kant claims that there are 
only two uses of reason.
164
 The first, is the use of reason in accordance with concepts. 
Here reason takes what occurs in appearance and thinks it under the appropriate concept. 
This is a clear a posteriori use of reason as it directly involves objects of our experience. 
The use of reason in accordance with concepts allows us to decide if things are quantum, 
whether they exist in space and/or time, whether something is primary or merely a 
determination of another thing, whether a thing is cause or effect of another, etc. This 
type of reasoning is necessary for at least some forms of philosophical cognition as it 
allows us to organize and interpret our experiences. The second use of reason is that 
through the construction of concepts. Such concepts constructed in pure intuition 
comprise the mathematical part of our cognition. One might be tempted to think that if 
mathematical concepts can be constructed in pure intuition then there is no reason that we 
may not construct philosophical ones as well. However, Kant quickly puts to rest this 
fleeting hope by reminding us of the special relationship which mathematics bears to 
intuition. Geometry does not merely concern spatial relations, but is a constitutive part of 
space itself. Likewise arithmetic does not merely take place in time, but through counting 
we generate our intuition of time. “Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the 
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synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, because I generate time 
itself in the apprehension of intuition.”165 While many commentators have remarked on 
the oddity of the intimacy Kant insists upon between arithmetic and time, the relationship 
seems necessary for a Kantian to ensure the possibility of the construction of 
mathematics in pure intuition and to prevent opening a wider door to unlawful 
constructions in other areas. 
2.4 Definitions, Axioms and Demonstrations 
In one of the most striking passages of explicit comparison between mathematics 
and philosophy Kant outlines his view of foundation mathematical concepts and the ways 
in which they fail to apply to philosophical inquiry. “Mathematics is thoroughly 
grounded on definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. I will content myself with showing 
that none of these elements, in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, can be 
achieved or imitated by philosophy; and that by means of his method the mathematician 
can build nothing in philosophy except houses of cards, while by means of his method the 
philosopher can produce nothing in mathematics but idle chatter, while philosophy 
consists precisely in knowing its bounds, and even the mathematician, if his talent is not 
already bounded by nature and limited to his specialty, can neither reject its warnings nor 
disregard them.”166 In the pages that follow Kant explains in detail how these three tools 
(definitions, axioms and demonstrations) ground mathematical progress and why their 
usefulness cannot be transferred to philosophy.  
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 Kant defines “define” as “to exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing 
within its boundaries.”167 As a result, empirical concepts can never be defined but only 
“explicated.” I can never be sure that all possible knowledge of an empirically contained 
concept has been exhausted. New experience always has the possibility of shedding new 
light on an old concept. On the other hand, a priori concepts can also never be defined as, 
“I can never be certain that the distinct representation of a (still confused) given concept 
has been exhaustively developed unless I know that it is adequate to the object.”168 
Knowing that a concept is adequate to its object would again require the kind of 
exhaustive analysis which we cannot have of objects of experience. I refer frequently to 
causes, an a priori concept, in my analysis of my experience, however, “cause” is said in 
many ways. While I might believe that my attempted definition of “cause” exhausts all 
possible applications, I can have this knowledge only with probability never with 
certainty. I can know with certainty only that there are causes or, better, that causal 
relations are constitutive of my experience. Since “cause” originates not in experience but 
as a concept of the understanding it is even more difficult to ensure that I have adequately 
considered every possible type of scenario to which the concept might apply. 
The only concepts capable of having real definitions are those which are 
stipulated arbitrarily. Kant claims that, “in such a case I can always define my concept; 
for I must know what I want to think, since I deliberately made it up.”169 For him, the 
only potentially useful concepts which fit these criteria are mathematical ones. In 
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mathematics I can not just stipulate definitions of concepts (e.g. a circle is a continuous 
line of which all points are equidistance from a center point), but I can also construct 
them in intuition in a way which allows them to correspond exactly to their objects. My 
definition of “circle” will always and only pick out circles. There is no risk of experience 
extending or invalidating my concept, though it may bring to light additional information 
about my concept (e.g. that the circumferences of all circles bear the same ratio to their 
center points). Kant has made clear that this additional information is acquired through a 
process (namely that of construction) and is a synthetic addendum to the concept rather 
than a mere analytic expansion.
170
 Our philosophical a priori concepts, by contrast, lack 
the possibility for synthetic construction and can only be examined analytically. As a 
consequence, non-mathematical a priori concepts can never be complete. There is always 
the potential for analysis to overlook some feature which can only be discovered by 
considering the way in which a concept corresponds to an object. 
 As a result of metaphysics’ lack of definitions the method of mathematics cannot 
be the proper method of metaphysics. Mathematics always begins with definitions. In 
philosophy we cannot start with them, but only hope to move closer to them through 
further exposition of concepts. The result of attempts to begin philosophy with definitions 
rather than conclude with them is a philosophy which is “swarming with mistaken 
definitions.”171 Kant claims that it is possible for mathematical definitions to be incorrect 
only in a very limited sense. One can put into the definition more information than is 
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really required. He gives the example of adding the word “curved” to a version of the 
definition of “circle” provided above. “Curved” is unnecessary as one could prove from 
the definition of circle that a line so described would have to be curved. However, this is 
less a mistake in the definition than it is an expansion. Philosophy, on the other hand, 
must acquire its definitions through other means and is liable to more errors. Kant called 
philosophical definitions “analytical definitions.” He does not explicate the term, but 
intends it to be contrasted with the unerring nature of “mathematical definitions” and 
likely with “empirical definitions” as well. Philosophical definitions are analytical in that 
they must be stipulated, but their stipulation cannot be confirmed by constructing the 
corresponding object. Their accuracy can be tested only by their correspondence to 
objects, of which we can have no experience. 
Kant claims that “axioms” are “synthetic a priori principles, insofar as they are 
immediately certain.”172 Axioms must be immediately certain, but synthetic principles in 
metaphysics always require a third thing to guarantee the connection of one concept to 
another. Concepts are never immediately connected one another; the connection is always 
mediated through an intuition. In order for something to qualify as an axiom it must be 
intuitive. An axiom must link a concept directly to an object that can be given in a priori 
intuition. Since mathematics has access to pure a priori intuition we have the ability to 
form axioms of those concepts which can be immediately constructed. An entirely 
discursive discipline such as metaphysics can never have axioms since they are intuitive 
principles. 
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Kant also claims that, “any synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental 
reason is infinitely less obvious (as is stubbornly said) than the proposition that Two 
times two is four.”173 The “obviousness” of “2 x 2 = 4” comes from the ease with which 
the proposition can be constructed in intuition. He likely has in mind once again the 
infamous dots of Segner’s Arithmetic. A square formed from two rows of two dots each 
is immediately seen as four. What is interesting about this particular example is that “2 x 
2 = 4” is a clear and obvious mathematical proposition but not an axiom. The synthetic 
propositions necessary for metaphysics are so far from being immediately apparent in the 
way that axioms must be that even an ordinary mathematical proposition with a clear 
intuitive demonstration comes closer to having axiomatic status than they do. 
While Kant calls one set of principles in the “Transcendental Analytic” “The 
Axioms of Intuition” he is quick to explain that he is not establishing actual axioms for 
philosophy. Rather than provide an actual axiom of pure understanding (and thus an a 
priori conceptual one) The section on the “Axioms of Intuition” grounds the possibility of 
mathematics by showing that all things in experience (i.e. all intuitions) must be 
extensive magnitudes. Kant claims that this principle is itself not an axiom, but “only a 
principle of the possibility of axioms in general.”174 The Axioms of Intuition make it 
possible for us to form mathematical axioms that are directly applicable to objects of 
experience. This results from their basis in the pure forms of intuition which underlie 
experience, as all appearances represented in intuition as spatial must be extensive 
magnitudes. While this spatiality applies only to objects insofar as they are objects of 
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experience, the principle is sufficient to ground all mathematical axioms which are 
relevant to pure and empirical intuition. 
An immediate problem arises when one considers that philosophy in general and 
metaphysics in particular, can have no axioms in the Kantian scheme. If there are no 
axioms then there is no proper place from which to begin a deduction. In mathematics 
one starts with definitions and axioms and moves from this basis towards the proposition 
one wishes to prove. In seventeenth and eighteenth century mathematics the only 
propositions capable of serving as axiom were those that one could claim as immediately 
apparent to all or self-evidently true. One begins with self-evident axioms and moves the 
proof forward only in accordance with established rules known to produce valid 
conclusions. In a sound argument the conclusion is known as true with absolute certainty. 
Since metaphysical (or transcendental) deductions cannot start with axioms, it is not 
entirely clear where the proper place to start is. Any non-axiomatic assertion one begins 
with will need to be proved later through some other deduction. If the later deduction 
presupposes the findings of the first then the entire enterprise becomes circular.  
Rather than suggest that the non-axiomatic principles introduced in philosophical 
deductions should be proven in further deductions, Kant claims that there is another way 
out for securing the principles necessary to ground philosophical thinking. Pure reason 
does not have a single direct synthetic judgment from concepts. It cannot make them with 
objective validity, but it does erect principles indirectly through relating them 
contingently to possible experience. Kant calls these indirect principles “secure” as they 
are not entirely specious but grounded in experience. As long as we presuppose that there 
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are objects of possible experience, then all other claims of philosophical deductions are 
not only certain but apodictically certain.
175
 All principles of philosophy are thus only 
true (1) under the assumption that we have experience and (2) with regard to that 
experience. It should then be the case that when we make synthetic proofs (those moving 
from what we already know to the conclusion which we wish to prove) we can be 
confident that our initial premises are true with respect to human experience. 
While deductions are possible in philosophy, they cannot correctly be called 
“demonstrations.” Kant claims that, “only an apodictic proof, insofar as it is intuitive, can 
be called a demonstration.”176 The intuitive nature of a demonstration is, in Kant’s view, 
a central feature of it. He contrasts demonstrations with discursive proofs which he would 
prefer to call “acroamatic.”177 Acroamatic proofs are those that rely on concepts rather 
than intuitions. Since philosophy is a conceptual rather than intuitive science it has only 
acroamatic proofs. Conversely, while empirical proofs do rely on intuitions they are also 
never demonstrations since they fail to show anything apodictically. Empirical proofs rest 
on the contingency of experience and cannot provide necessity. They can prove that 
things are, but they are not sufficient to show that things could not be otherwise.  
Nothing from a priori concepts is self-evident. The a priori can be self-evident 
only insofar as it is also intuitive since only intuition can provide the immediacy 
necessary for something to be self-evident. If a proof relies on intuition, that intuition 
must be either pure or empirical. Empirical proofs are not a priori, and philosophical 
                                                 
175
 KrV, A737/B765. 
176
 KrV, A734/B762. 
177
 KrV, A753/B763. 
116 
 
proofs, as we’ve already seen are conceptual rather than intuitive. Demonstrations are 
intuitive, a priori proofs which begin from self-evident principles. Thus only 
mathematical proofs can be properly called demonstrations. Whatever proofs philosophy 
is capable of deducing cannot begin from a set of self-evident axioms. 
Consider as an example the geometer who wishes to prove that the angles of a 
triangle are equivalent to two right angles. The geometer can safely begin with the claim 
that all triangles are three sided figures. The claim is universal in that it applies to all 
triangles. It is necessary because one could not have a triangle otherwise. It is self-
evidence because its truth rests only on the definition of a triangle and can be 
immediately demonstrated in intuition. From this and other similarly self-evident axioms 
the geometer can give a clear demonstration of the equivalence between two right angles 
and the angle sum of any triangle. The philosopher, on the other hand, is not nearly so 
lucky. If she wishes to prove the existence of human freedom, she has no relevant self-
evident truths from which to begin her proof. She cannot begin from a claim about the 
goodness of God or the necessity of moral responsibility without first providing a proof 
for these claims. But on what grounds can she provide a proof for them? She cannot 
begin a proof for the goodness of God by beginning with a claim about God’s perfection. 
Even if we grant our struggling philosopher the ability to stipulate a definition of 
“perfection” the definition of this concept will not show that it is one which exists in the 
world. The geometer can immediately turn to pure intuition as proof of the self-evidence 
of the definition of “triangle, but lacking a pure intuition of her concept this help is not 
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open to the philosopher. Thus we can have no self-evident a priori concepts and no 
demonstrations in philosophy.  
3. Science and Metaphysics 
Kant concludes the “Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard to its Dogmatic Use” 
with the assertion that he has not here discussed what the proper method of 
transcendental philosophy is, but only what it cannot be. It lacks the conditions that allow 
mathematics to make judgments a priori and with certainty and to fruitfully utilize the 
dogmatic method. If the model of mathematics can only show us what philosophy cannot 
be and how it cannot proceed, then perhaps examining the other sciences will provide 
more insight into how metaphysics can properly arrive at certainty. 
3.1 Metaphysics as a science in the B edition of the KrV 
Eager to solve the problem of metaphysics’ failure to advance, Kant claims that 
the entire science of metaphysics must undergo a radical revolution. He claims that up 
until his writing metaphysics has considered in what way it is possible for our knowledge 
to conform to objects. We desire to know about things outside of ourselves, but cannot 
anticipate that experience could provide us with any certain or necessary knowledge 
about them. However, if we model metaphysics after the success we have seen in 
sciences concerned with themselves or objects they create, we might find similar success. 
Metaphysics then becomes not the consideration of how our knowledge conforms to 
objects but how objects must conform to our knowledge of them. If metaphysics also 
looks at the sources of its own cognition, the conditions which must be in place in order 
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for us to have knowledge of objects, then metaphysics has every hope of being as 
successful as logic in its aims. 
The revolution of thinking about conditions for the possibility of knowledge 
rather than the objects of knowledge themselves results in a metaphysics that is far more 
limited in scope than previous attempts. While this could be seen as a bad thing, one 
positive result of the shift is that the narrow scope allows for a completable science. 
Indeed, Kant’s move to limit the boundaries of what can properly be considered 
metaphysics is the only hope he has for securing metaphysics as a science. Boundaries 
are what enable metaphysics to be complete, properly systematic, and scientific. Without 
this completeness metaphysics would be unable to claim its rightful place as the head of 
all the other sciences. 
Kant claims that metaphysics, “has the rare good fortune enjoyed by no other 
rational science that has to do with objects…,which is that if by this critique it has been 
brought onto the secure course of a science, then it can fully embrace the entire field of 
cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work…”178 For Kant metaphysics 
continues to be science about objects, but what it tells us about them is only what we 
ourselves provide for them. In this sense Kantian metaphysics becomes similar to logic in 
that it is now also a science of reason investigating itself (a “transcendental” logic). The 
similarities between Kantian metaphysics and logic give us some reason to hope that 
metaphysics, like logic, can also be completed. 
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As a science, metaphysics must share the general features of sciences. It has the 
systematic unity “which first makes any cognition a science.”179 It is dogmatic in that it, 
“must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from secure principles.”180 Like the 
possibilities of other sciences its possibility may be shown through its actual existence. 
However, since it does not yet exist, only a preliminary possibility can be known. In 
distinction from other sciences, metaphysics before Kant shows its actuality only as a 
“natural predisposition” rather than as a properly systematic body of knowledge.181 Kant 
is careful to explain that metaphysics is its own particular kind of science, or a science in 
ways which allow it to be distinct from other sciences not only in terms of its content, but 
of its form as well. Metaphysics becomes a science through systematizing the relevant 
knowledge, but unlike other sciences it can do this only through the process of critique.  
In the discussion of proofs in the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” Kant 
claims that apagogic proofs are possible only in science in which the subject and the 
object of the science cannot be confused with one another.
182
 Kant describes these “non-
critical” sciences as ones, “where the concepts through which the object is thought in 
general are not so different and heterogeneous from those that represent it in concreto, as 
it is given.”183 Biology and geology are examples of non-critical sciences. I am unlikely 
to confuse soil samples or animals organs with the principles and concepts I hope to learn 
through studying them, nor is my general idea of igneous rock or a liver radically 
different from any concrete examples of these things that I may have in front of me. 
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Metaphysics, as a critical science, suffers from a possible (and inevitable confusion) 
between subject and object, and as a result it is in need of critique to properly develop the 
boundaries between that which belongs to the objects of my perception and that which 
provides the conditions of their possibility as objects of experience. 
It is this critique of reason that allows it to be a science. In the B introduction 
Kant gives “critique” as the answer to his question, “How is metaphysics possible as a 
science?”184 Critique provides the middle path. It allows us to avoid both the “groundless 
assertions” of dogmatism and the skepticism that for Kant inevitably arises from 
counterarguments to dogmatic claims. By properly delineating the boundaries between 
the portions of my experience that our provided by my cognitive faculties and those that 
are not and by limiting metaphysics enquiry only to the former, metaphysics can hope for 
both systematic unity and completeness. Metaphysicians working within the proper 
boundaries can not only hope for completeness but be entirely assured of its availability. 
In the discussion of the antinomy Kant lists metaphysics as one of the sciences, “whose 
nature entails that every question occurring in them must absolutely be answerable.”185 
He claims that whatever concept gives rise to a question in metaphysics must also 
provide the solution since we can be assured that any concept of metaphysics does not 
have a corresponding empirical object. If our metaphysical concepts (God, justice, 
immortality, etc.) have objects, these objects cannot be known as objects of experience. 
We can be confident that the source of these concepts is internal and that the answers to 
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any questions they raise must be as well. Thus the traditional quandaries of metaphysics 
are restructured in a way that allows all of them to have definite answers. 
3.2 “Science” in the Prolegomena 
Kant’s discussions of metaphysics as a science in the Prolegomena helpfully 
expand and clarify some of the claims he introduces in the KrV. One reason provided in 
the Prolegomena for seeing metaphysics as a completeable science is the absence of 
probability or conjecture.
186
 Just as probability is completely absent in the field of 
mathematics, as another a priori science metaphysics is also unable to rely on anything 
other than apodictically certain judgments.
187
 If guessing or reasonable conjecture was a 
path open to metaphysicians it would be possible for them to carefully and tentatively 
expand their knowledge in to new territory. One could make probably claims about the 
existence of God or the immortality of the soul based on the appearance of consequences 
that these beliefs are likely to have. On Kant’s account, since we cannot even venture an 
informed guess as to what lies beyond the bounds of experience we have no hope of 
expanding our metaphysical knowledge through conjecture. Any metaphysician who 
makes claims about that which lies beyond the bounds of experience can only make 
assumptions without any possible ground.
188
 
In the preface to the Prolegomena, Kant explicitly points out what qualities 
metaphysics must have in order to be considered a science. Thus he claims that it must 
be, “systematic and complete as to its smallest parts, before one can think of permitting 
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metaphysics to come forward…”189 Without the proper foundation of a complete 
transcendental philosophy there is no hope for metaphysics. The critique which lays the 
foundation for metaphysics must, “set forth the entire stock of a priori concepts.”190 One 
must make clear which concepts stem from which faculties and produce a table which 
serves as evidence of their completeness. Accordingly, Kant views the completeness of 
the critique of metaphysics as one of its primary advantages over other sciences. The 
advantage rests in that, “it can be completed and brought into a permanent state, since it 
cannot be further changed and is not susceptible to any augmentation through new 
discoveries.”191 Under the guidance of proper critique metaphysics not only achieves 
status as a science it becomes, in some sense, a paradigm of knowledge. Metaphysics as 
critique allows us to have access to all possible knowledge within its field in a way which 
allows this knowledge to be entirely stable. The natural sciences are subject to change 
and advancement as we observe more of the natural world. While mathematics, on Kant’s 
view, does not change, its subject matter is sufficiently complicated that we still have not 
fully investigated its object. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is permanently fixed. If one 
were to memorize its principles, one would know all that there is or ever will be to know 
about metaphysics. 
While completeness is what grounds the possibility of metaphysics as a science, 
this completeness could not be assured without having its concepts and principles 
arranged according to a system. In the Prolegomena’s exploration of how natural science 
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is possible Kant also centrally claims that systematization is required for the form of a 
science.
192
 The distinction of ideas (of reason) from categories (of understanding) is 
important for establishing metaphysics as a science rather than “at best a random 
bumbling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or their 
fitness for one purpose or another.”193 He argues that without this distinction metaphysics 
as a science would be impossible. Without knowing that the concepts of the 
understanding have their application in experience and that the ideas of reason are only of 
transcendent use reason would be constantly victim to the illusion that the ideas of reason 
can be confirmed in experience. The ordering of these concepts according to their sources 
allows us to confirm the completeness and proper application of them. 
4. Conclusion 
The primary task of metaphysics is separating out the features of experience that 
are necessarily provided by my mental faculties from those that our provided by 
something outside of me.  In order to explain why rethinking metaphysics is enough to 
guarantee its status as a science, it is important to see what features Kant thinks a science 
like metaphysics needs to have and how construing metaphysics as critique allows it to 
have those features. By looking at the way Kant defines metaphysics and the 
requirements for doing metaphysics across many of his works on the subject we can see 
the consistency of his claims. In order to ensure that metaphysics as a science it must 
have three key features. First, it must be systematic. Second, it must have unity and third, 
it must be complete. 
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As I will employ there terms, a metaphysics is “systematic” if it proceeds without 
resting on any unwarranted assumption. For any metaphysical claim I make there must be 
an argument to support its truth. I cannot simply claim that the world was created by a 
beneficent God. I must first prove that the world is created and that any being that could 
be responsible for the creation must be beneficent. If I cannot prove these principles, any 
conclusion I draw from them is unwarranted and stands outside of the system which I 
want my metaphysics to have. 
A metaphysics is “unified” if its claims and conclusions are all consistent with 
one another. There can be no unity if adopting a metaphysical position means committing 
yourself to contradictory positions. If, for example, I show that all events have to happen 
in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason (the principle that for everything that 
happens there must be a reason explaining why it happened), then I cannot also assert, 
without further explanation, that the actions of human agents are entirely spontaneous 
and free. Whatever claims a metaphysics includes must be able to fit together into a 
unified whole. 
Most importantly, a metaphysics is “complete” if for any possible, properly 
metaphysical question an answer can be provided. To put it another way, for Kant every 
question of metaphysics must be decidable. If the question “Does God exist?” is a 
properly metaphysical question, then metaphysics must be able to provide an indisputable 
answer. I believe that completeness, the ability to answer or decide any question within 
the field, is the key to understanding Kant’s notion of metaphysics as a science. 
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Systematicity and unity are features Kant believes every science (biology, 
geology, etc) must have. Completeness he attributes only to some of the sciences 
(namely, mathematics, metaphysics and morals). The reason completeness is so essential 
to metaphysics is that only through completeness can we ensure the other two features. If 
my metaphysics is not complete then there is no way that I can guarantee that it is either 
systematic or unified. Systematicity follows directly from completeness. Completeness is, 
thus, the primary science-making feature of metaphysics. 
For Kant any attempt to answer big questions about God, soul, universe as a 
whole (i.e. the questions of metaphysics) must start with critique, a clear separation 
between the various parts of knowledge and sources of knowledge. Until I have a clear 
sense of which parts of my experience of the world are provided by my own mental 
faculties I cannot know which parts, if any, are actually reflective of the world outside 
me. If I want to know anything about things-in-themselves outside of my experience of 
them (which is the topic of metaphysics) I need to first understand what parts of my 
experience stem from my own intuition and understanding. 
Because this critique is a prerequisite for any possible knowledge in metaphysics, 
without critique there is no possibility for the systematicity, unity and completeness we 
want from a proper metaphysics. For Kant, metaphysical completeness can only be 
achieved if we limit metaphysics to those topics which we know are within the 
boundaries of our possible knowledge, namely the very conditions and boundaries of our 
knowledge itself. Without the completeness that allows metaphysics to exist as a unified 
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system, we cannot guarantee metaphysics as a science. This completeness is only 
possible if we re-construe metaphysics as critique.  
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CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICS AND COMPLETENESS 
Introduction 
Kant argues that our only hope for metaphysics as a science is narrow the scope 
of the field such that it is no longer required to answer questions whose scope includes 
knowledge of the world beyond experience. Metaphysics is only the search for the 
conditions of the possibility of experience in general. This new definition of metaphysics 
creates a limited field of exploration, one capable of being understood in full. Complete 
metaphysical knowledge can be arranged into a unified system, and through this 
systematic unity, ensured only by completeness, achieve the status of a science.  
In this chapter I will examine what it means for a science to be complete. In 
particular the chapter will attempt to answer the question, “Can Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem be used to sustain an argument against Kant’s critical metaphysics?” I suggest 
that this conclusion would be a mistake as it does not sufficiently take into account the 
ways in which Kant has narrowed the scope of metaphysics in order to render it 
complete. As I have said before, neglect of the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” has 
lead to a literature which focuses on the epistemological and theory of mind aspects of 
Kant’s philosophy in a way which overlooks his own explicitly stated interest in 
metaphysics. The project of the KrV is to make metaphysics rigorously scientific in a 
manner that is analogous to what Newton has done for the field of physics. The KrV is 
not a work of metaphysics, but a work that prepares the proper grounding for all future 
metaphysics. Kant uses mathematics as a continual point of comparison for what 
metaphysics is and should be as well as what it cannot and should not do. The 
128 
 
comparisons between mathematics and metaphysics illuminate not only what 
metaphysics is, but also the ways in which the intuition, understanding and reason 
distinctly contribute to knowledge formation. (Thus in seeking to explore the 
metaphysical strain of Kant’s thinking we also uncover the epistemological.)  
But in what sense is it possible to consider the conditions for the possibility of 
experience in general science? Kant employs a rather restrictive definition of science that 
excludes even such fields as chemistry and anthropology. A field of study is only as 
much a science as it has mathematics in it. Metaphysics, on Kant’s own definition, can 
contain no mathematics at all. Kant solves this problem by making metaphysics a science 
not because it is based on mathematics but because it shares the essential features of 
mathematics. Both fields are a priori collections of knowledge, systematic and complete. 
Systematicity and completeness then become not merely ancillary but essential, 
constitutive features of Kant’s metaphysics. In order for Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy to be successful on its own terms it must be able to demonstrate these two 
features. There is a substantial body of literature questioning whether or not Kant’s 
metaphysics is appropriately systematic. Much of this literature considers the argument 
structure of the KrV as a whole or the “Transcendental Deduction” in particular to 
determine whether the argument genuinely employs the synthetic method (put otherwise 
“is progressive”). However, I believe that the claim of completeness, while less discussed 
in the literature, is still crucial to determining the success of Kant’s project. Encouraged 
by the recently discovered solutions to many long unsolved mathematical difficulties, 
Kant thought that mathematics, as a science, was theoretically completeable. 
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Metaphysics, properly limited in scope, was a science he could complete himself. Given 
that metaphysics earns its status as a science by emulating essential features of 
mathematics, namely those of systematicity and completeability, it may be that the 
theorems of  Gödel concerning the completeness of arithmetic have devastating 
consequences for the completeness of Kant’s metaphysics.  
Since even mathematics has access to content from sensible intuition (the pure 
forms space and time) metaphysics alone becomes a peculiar, non-empirical science. If 
completeness is a necessary criteria for making a pure, a priori science a science, and if 
Godel’s incompleteness theorems can, by analogy, show us that metaphysics is not 
complete then it may be the case that metaphysics fails to meet even Kant’s modified 
definition of a science. For the sake of this chapter we will assume that metaphysics does 
still conform to Kant’s other criteria for non-empirical sciences. Metaphysics (at least 
Kant’s metaphysics) is critical. It never takes for granted assumptions that it cannot 
justify or makes universal laws from assertions based in experience, but only considers 
the conditions under which experience of the world is possible without expanding these 
claims to apply to things-in-themselves. 
According to Kant one criterion for the possibility of metaphysics as a science 
could be systematic completeness.
194
 “Completeness” for Kant seems to mean something 
like a systematic unity which creates a whole. He believes himself to have developed a 
complete system with a full explication of the final set of a priori concepts. However, 
Kant also thinks that the model for metaphysical methodology (and of all scientific 
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cognition in general) is mathematics, namely arithmetic and geometry. If metaphysics 
follows the path of mathematical enquiry (in particular arithmetical enquiry) then is not 
any claim to completeness immediately suspect? As Gödel has shown, there is no 
complete system of arithmetic. What reason have we to believe that we can obtain a 
complete system of metaphysics modeled after mathematics? I will not attempt in this 
chapter to give a firm answer to all of the questions posed above. However, I do hope that 
beginning to consider how one would go about answering such a question can provide a 
useful path for examining Kant’s notions of both mathematics and metaphysics. The 
primary goals of this chapter are to draw attention to the important differences between 
Kant’s notions of mathematics and metaphysics and to complicate this picture by 
exploring some ways in which Kant’s account of arithmetic differs from more 
contemporary ones. 
Gödel ‘s theorem presents a problem for Kant’s metaphysics only if two criteria 
hold true: (1) what is meant by “completeness” in the sense of Gödel is similar enough to 
the completeness of Kant to warrant the comparison, and (2) metaphysics really does 
follow the methods of mathematics to a sufficient extent. One might be tempted to think 
that “similar” is not nearly a strong enough criteria to warrant a comparison between 
Kant and Gödel, and that the comparison may only be useful if they share the same 
concept of completeness.
195
 However, I think this requirement is far too strong. First, it 
seems highly unlikely to me that metaphysics and mathematic, fields with distinct content 
if not form, would share an identical concept of completeness (or perhaps any identical 
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concepts). Concepts that apply over different domains of objects are frequently applied 
differently to one domain than they are to another. “Health” for a dog is certainly 
different than “health” for a human being, yet we find the concepts similar enough to 
grant them the same name without fear of causing confusion. Second, I think it is far 
more sensible task to attempt to show a strong analogy between the incompleteness of 
arithmetical systems and the (possible) incompleteness of Kant’s critical metaphysics 
than to show that the one logically entails the other. I am not seeking to show that one 
can simply substitute a few key words in Gödel’s proof with their metaphysical correlates 
and render Kant’s critical system unsound. Rather, I hope to see whether or not there is 
enough similarity between the systems to present a challenge to Kant’s claim of the 
completeness of his system. 
1. Completeness 
In his 1929 essay “On the Completeness of the Calculus of Logic” Gödel gives a 
brief definition of completeness. “Here [i.e. with respect to the restricted functional 
calculus] ‘completeness’ is to mean that every valid formula expressible in the restricted 
functional calculus (a valid Zählaussage, as Löwenheim would say) can be derived from 
the axioms by means of a finite series of formal inferences. This assertion can easily be 
seen to be the equivalent of the following: Every consistent axiom system consisting of 
only Zählaussage has a realization.”196 When Gödel began his work on incompleteness he 
was primarily interested in the formal mathematical system expressed by Russell and 
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Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica (PM). At the time many mathematicians 
speculated that within an axiomatic arithmetical system like PM one could provide a 
proof of every true statement. The proof of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems rendered 
this hope false by showing that for any deductive arithmetical system there was either at 
least one true statement which could not be verified within the system (despite its 
apparent truth outside the system, metamathematically) or that the system would contain 
a contradiction (i.e. proofs of both A and ~A can be given within the system). 
If one could show that Kant’s critical metaphysics contained the kind of 
contradiction that allowed both A and ~A to be true at once it would be a problem for any 
system regardless of the validity of any comparison to Gödel. Let us assume for the 
purposes of proceeding that Kant’s metaphysics is free from this kind of explicit 
contradiction and this is not the sort of incompleteness we are seeking. The preceding 
rudimentary outline of Gödel’s theorem provides us with basic definitions of 
“completeness” and “incompleteness” in the sense relevant to Gödel. A system is 
“complete” when a proof can be provided for all true theorems in the system and 
“incomplete” when one or more true theorems cannot be proven. This formulation is 
compatible with the definition of completeness Gödel provides. 
The next step is to determine whether Gödel’s notion of completeness is 
sufficiently similar to Kant’s. It seems indisputable that Kant attributes completeness in 
some sense of the word to his critical metaphysics. “…critique must exist as a science, 
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systematic and complete as its smallest parts…”197 The claim is repeated in more detail 
later on in the Prolegomena. 
In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim, not mere 
fallacious plausibility, but insight and conviction, a critique of reason must 
itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts, their division according 
to their various sources (sensibility, understanding, and reason), together 
with a complete table of them, the analysis of all these concepts, with all 
their consequences and especially the possibility of synthetic cognition a 
priori by means of the deduction of these concepts, the principles and 
bounds of their use, all in a complete system. Critique, therefore, and 
critique alone contains in itself the whole well-proved and well-tested 
plan, and even all the means required to establish metaphysics as a 
science; by other ways and means impossible.
198
  
Metaphysics as a science is possible only after we have completed a critique of reason. 
According to Kant’s own words this critique must (1) exhibit the whole stock of a priori 
concepts, (2) exhibit the division of these concepts into groups according to their sources 
in a complete table, (3) contain an analysis of all concepts which includes their 
consequences, and (4) demonstrate the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments by 
means of a deduction of the concepts and the principles and bounds of their use. The KrV 
confirms the need for completeness with regard to a priori concepts. With respect to “The 
Transcendental Analytic” Kant says that it “is the analysis of the entirety of our a priori 
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cognition into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding.”199 Paired with the 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” which provides the complete set of a priori forms of intuition 
as they relate to sensibility and the ideas of pure reason, we have the complete system of 
our a priori cognition.  
“Completeness” for Kant entails (among other things) a deduction of the complete 
table of a priori concepts. This seems entirely compatible with Gödel’s notion of 
“completeness” in that if there is some a priori concept for which Kant’s critique cannot 
provide a deduction then his system is thereby rendered incomplete (and no longer 
scientific). One might argue that Kant’s wording indicates only that there is a single 
deduction of the concepts in general, but even if the deduction is general the concepts 
themselves must appear in a complete table. It is not clear to me what grounds Kant has 
for claiming the completeness of his table if the deduction does not provide for these 
concepts and no others. Given that Kant’s most explicit claims for completeness within 
the KrV fall within the “Transcendental Analytic” and that the deduction of the table of 
categories has become a topic of such great interest in contemporary Kant scholarship I 
will primarily focus on the deduction of the categories in examining whether or not there 
are problems with Kant’s claims to completeness.  
Kant’s notion of “completeness” seems to map on to a mathematical notion in yet 
another way. After Lambert’s proof of the irrationality of pi and the settling of additional 
long standing problems in mathematics with impossibility proofs, many eighteenth 
century scholars began to hope that all problems in mathematics were ultimately 
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solvable, either in the form of a solution (e.g. the discovery of the ratio that would allow 
one to create a square of equal area to a given circle) or through a proof of the 
impossibility of such a solution (i.e. the proof of the irrationality of pi). General 
speculation was that mathematics was “complete” in the sense that all of its current and 
potential problems were solvable. Kant clearly states that all questions of mathematics 
and metaphysics (and morals) are solvable questions. The “Discipline of Pure Reason 
with Regard to its Polemical Use” suggests that for Kant, many of the traditional 
questions of metaphysics (those of God, freedom and the immortality of the soul) are 
solved by something akin to an impossibility proof. We cannot prove that these concepts 
have referents, but we know for certain that we cannot prove their truth, just as we know 
for certain that we cannot square the circle. 
For Kant God, freedom, and immortality or, more broadly expressed, psychology, 
cosmology and theology are not concepts but ideas of reason. Kant defines an idea as, “a 
concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience.”200 
Because these ideas consider notions beyond experience, when we try to consider them 
under the categories which govern our experience we fall prey to unavoidable illusions. 
If, for example, I try to determine whether or not the world is eternal or had a beginning 
in time, I can develop two “mutually conflicting” arguments, each concluding that one of 
the possible positions must be false. I can derive a contradiction from assuming that the 
world is eternal, showing that it must have a beginning in time. Likewise, I can derive a 
contradiction from assuming that the world was created in time, showing that the world 
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must be eternal.
201
 Kant solves this dilemma by pointing out that though these arguments 
are seemingly about the world of experience, the arguments do not consider actual 
empirical objects. When we ask about the origins of the world we consider the whole or 
totality of the world. Kant points out that, “there can be encountered no experience of an 
absolutely boundary, and hence no experience of a condition as one that is absolutely 
unconditioned empirically.”202 Since time governs only the world of sense and the totality 
of the world is not a sensible object than we can safely conclude the impossibility of 
providing any solution to this question.
203
 Kant makes a similar move with regard to the 
other questions of psychology, cosmology, and natural theology. Considered as ideas 
with no accompanying sensible intuition we can know that proofs concerning the 
pressing questions of these matters cannot be given. 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science seems to confirm some of my 
thoughts on the warrant of a comparison between Kant and Gödel. We see that in Kantian 
metaphysics we always have grounds to hope for the absolute completeness of the 
science.
204
 We also read that the table of the categories is the “schema for the 
completeness of a metaphysical system.”205 Kant reassures us in the passage following 
that the table itself is complete and encompasses “all determinations of the general 
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concept of a matter in general.”206 The categories present a complete table in the midst of 
a complete system. 
Metaphysics is complete-able because it is limited in scope. The object of a 
particular metaphysics (be it of nature or of morals) must only be considered “in 
accordance with the general laws of thought”207 and does not have to take into account 
the data provided by intuition. The pure part of any science is its metaphysics. It is the 
object of that science considered only with regard to how it can be thought under the 
general laws of all thinking.  
One could look to the distinction Kant gives between a “critique” and an 
“organon” of pure reason at A11/B25 as a possible challenge to the notion of the 
completeness of Kant’s deduction of a priori concepts. Kant renders the distinction in the 
following passage.  
“An organon of pure reason would be a sum total of all those principles in 
accordance with which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and 
actually brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon 
would create a system of pure reason. But since that requires a lot, and it is 
still an open question whether such an amplification of our knowledge is 
possible at all and in what cases it would be possible, we can regard a 
science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and 
boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing 
would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason, 
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and its utility in regard to speculation would really be only negative, 
serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our 
reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already 
won.”208  
In order to have a complete system of pure reason we would have to develop an organon. 
Lacking this organon Kant claims that what he presents is merely a critique of pure 
reason. Since a mere critique cannot present a complete system of pure reason it may be 
that Kant’s deduction of the categories fails to provide the kind of completeness that 
makes it sufficiently similar to a deductive arithmetical system to warrant a comparison 
to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. After all, the standard Gödel sentences which remain 
unprovable in arithmetical systems are hardly as crucial to the functioning of an 
arithmetic as Kant’s categories are to comprehending the system of pure reason. If even 
these ancillary statements are sufficient to prevent completeness than surely the 
completeness Kant attributes to his deduction of the categories is not on par with the 
robust nature of the kind of system to which Gödel’s theorem applies. Even if the 
deduction of the table of categories is sound, proving the existence of these and only 
these categories, it may not be enough of a developed system to warrant worries about 
completeness. Gödel’s theorem does still allow for the completeness and consistency of 
sufficiently trivial axiomatic systems. 
The preceding criticism and the passage upon which it is based are well worth our 
consideration. The objection itself gives us greater insight into the notion of 
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“completeness” while the passage, if we continue to read provides some helpful notes on 
Kant’s conception of “science.” In A12/B25 we see that if we had such an organon of 
pure reason at our disposal it would be called “transcendental philosophy.” Kant refers to 
this transcendental philosophy as a science, but a science which we do not have. Whether 
we can have it as a science is a question Kant does not answer. However, in both the KrV 
and the Prolegomena Kant is quite clear about the fact that metaphysics is a science 
which we can have, as indeed is philosophy more generally. We begin to see that primary 
sciences (such as philosophy or mathematics) can be broken down into smaller, 
subsidiary parts (logic and metaphysics or arithmetic and geometry). Moreover while one 
science will have one method the component sciences of a larger primary science will not 
necessarily follow the same method. The methods of metaphysics are distinct from those 
of logic, the methods of arithmetic from those of geometry, and so on. Thus metaphysics 
as critique can stand as a science, and a complete one, without committing us to a 
complete transcendental philosophy in the same way that a complete axiomatic system of 
arithmetic would not be required to contain all of the truths of geometry. The fact that we 
lack an organon of pure reason is not alone sufficient grounds for dismissing a 
comparison between Kant and Gödel. 
2. Methodology 
Having provided textual support of the similarity of Kant’s notion of 
completeness to Gödel’s and having dealt with one possible objection to the comparison 
we can now turn our attention to the second criteria concerning methodology. Two 
possible concerns with criteria (2) are immediately apparent. First, one central feature of 
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modern arithmetical systems that Kant’s metaphysics does not share is axioms. Second, 
for Kant the factor which most clearly distinguishes between metaphysical and 
mathematical cognition is construction. Metaphysical cognition is from concepts, 
mathematical from the construction of concepts.  
2.1 Axioms 
I do not believe that the problem of axioms is a terminal one. First, Kant thought 
arithmetic as well as metaphysics to be without axioms. One might argue that perhaps 
Kant’s arithmetic would be no more subject to threat from Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem than his metaphysics, but this grants Kant’s arithmetic far more credit than it 
deserves. Arithmetic apart from axioms seems impossible. Schultz in his authorized 
commentary on the KrV lists the associative and commutative properties of arithmetic as 
two axioms. Kant, while explicitly denying axioms to arithmetic, never directly mentions 
these two properties. He does not denounce their truth; he simply denies (or forgets to 
grant) them axiomatic status. Second, it seems that we can reasonably conclude that Kant 
was wrong about the existence of axioms in arithmetic (I have yet to see a defense of his 
account or an arithmetical system without them). Perhaps if he had thought better he 
would have been persuaded that arithmetic was just as much a product of axiomatic 
deductions as geometry. What prevents us from making the same leap with regard to 
metaphysics? In the preface to the B edition of the KrV Kant admits that all science must 
be dogmatic in that it “must prove its conclusions…from secure principles.”209 
Metaphysics may not have axioms per say, but it certainly relies upon the solid 
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foundation of the principle of non-contradiction, if not the principles of sufficient reason 
and parsimony as well.
210
 
The most compelling reason to think that Kant’s claims about axioms do not 
deliver a fatal blow to the comparison is a historical one. There is some equivocation 
involved in using the term “axiom” to apply both to Kant and to Gödel without 
explaining the different ways in which each author employs the term. For Gödel and 
contemporary mathematicians an axiom can be any statement which is asserted as true 
for the purpose of the system being established. These statements can be definitions, 
claims about the status of certain objects within the system, rules for manipulating 
elements within the system, etc. The truth value and provability of these statements 
outside of the context of the system of which they are axioms is irrelevant to their 
functioning within the system. Axioms have special status within a system not as a direct 
result of their content but because of the role they play within the system. The axioms 
serve as a starting point for deducing other truths within the system. In the contemporary 
sense “axiom” bears no real distinction from “postulate.” Both words can refer to a 
statement that has been postulated of a given system, and both may refer to statements 
which might be provable from other given axioms of the system. Both “axiom” and 
“postulate” are used in distinction from “theorem,” a term which applies to statements 
which are provable within an axiomatic system from the given axioms.  
Kant, on the other hand, relies on a much older sense of what an axiom is. 
Lambert writes in the “Treatise on the Criterion of Truth” that “Axioms are different 
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from theorems in that the latter demand proof, whereas the former do not. One admits 
axioms as soon as one understands the terms, whereas one must similarly understand the 
terms of the theorem but it will not be admitted without proof.”211 Within the Wolffian 
tradition it is not possible to grant axiomatic status to any statement one wishes. In order 
for something to be an axiom it has to be self-evident, garnering immediate assent from 
all hearers. One plausible reason Kant may have denied that arithmetic had axioms was 
that he did not find any of the properties of arithmetic to be immediately self-evident. 
Perhaps Kant thought that all of the arithmetical postulates could be proven from more 
basic principles. His denial of arithmetical axioms certainly does not indicate that Kant 
thought that arithmetic could be done without postulates from which to derive further 
theorems.  
2.2 Construction 
Construction stands as perhaps the largest hurdle to motivating a comparison 
between Kant and Gödel. Kant makes an explicit comparison between the a priori nature 
of both mathematics and metaphysics near the beginning of the ‘Discipline of Pure 
Reason in Dogmatic Use.’ He immediately goes on to point out the crucial difference 
between mathematical and metaphysical cognition. “Philosophical cognition is rational 
cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the construction of 
concepts.”212 The distinction between mathematics and metaphysics is mathematics’ 
ability to construct its own concepts. If we take Kant’s view of the distinction between 
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the two sciences at face value it leaves little room for a productive comparison between 
the incompleteness of arithmetic and the possible completeness of critical metaphysics. 
The methods of the sciences are radically different. Even basic arithmetical deductions 
require a construction while philosophical ones do not. Without a shared methodology it 
is hard to see why the problems of one science would present similar problems for 
another.  
When we look at a more modern view of arithmetic a potential for continued 
comparison emerges. While Kant insists that all arithmetical proofs require a 
construction, this requirement is not shared by contemporary mathematicians. Though the 
attempts of Frege and the logical positivists to reduce all mathematics to logic have been 
largely abandoned, their insistence that arithmetic contains no necessary intuition or 
construction remains the dominant view. If the arithmetic of PM was developed without 
an act of intuitive construction then it would not present a problem to compare it to 
Kant’s metaphysics. Neither Kant’ metaphysics nor PM contains constructions, and both 
are a priori acts of deduction which makes them methodologically similar.  
The problem with this seemingly simple solution is that Kant did not claim that 
his arithmetical system relied upon construction but that all arithmetical judgments do. 
To deny that PM is constructive is not simply to create a distinction between the 
arithmetic of the Principia and Kant’s, it is to claim that Kant is wrong about arithmetic 
in general. What my attempt to compare Kant to Gödel reveals most clearly is the wide 
gulf between Kant’s view of arithmetic and more contemporary ones. Kant’s idea of 
axioms, his refusing them a role in arithmetic, his notion of construction and the role of 
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intuition in arithmetical judgments all stand in sharp contrast to our modern ideas about 
mathematics. While this creates quite a hurdle for scholars who which to reconstruct 
Kant’s arithmetic in a way which renders it comparable to more contemporary theories, it 
does result in a contemporary arithmetic that bears more in common with Kant’s 
metaphysics than his own arithmetic does. When we make arithmetical judgments or 
prove theorems about arithmetical systems we are using methods that would have been 
quite familiar to Kant in the realm of metaphysical thought.  On the other hand, if the 
methodological similarity between mathematics and metaphysics is enough to warrant a 
comparison between Gödel and Kant it is possible only because we have rejected parts of 
Kant’s mathematics.  
3. Critical Examination 
One additional problem to consider when determining how to understand the 
relationship between Gödel’s theorems and Kant’s critical philosophy is whether or not 
the incompleteness of arithmetic is an impossibility proof. On one reading of the 
theorem, Gödel has shown us the impossibility of an axiomatized arithmetic or of an 
arithmetical system which can contain the proof for every true proposition within it. If 
this is the case, we might think of Gödel as having proved something on par with what 
Kant has shown about metaphysics in the critical philosophy. Metaphysics can be seen as 
“incomplete” in that it cannot provide a proof of all of the things which Kant believes are 
likely to be true (e.g. that there is a necessary being and that human moral actions are 
free). “Meta-metaphysically” we know that these things must be true because they hold 
of the moral realm, but for speculative reason we can show neither A nor ~A. Kantian 
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metaphysics is completeable in that we can show the impossibility of deciding these 
questions one way or the other.  
The problem with this interpretation is that it widens Kant’s view of what 
metaphysics is and can do while simultaneously contracting Gödel’s theorems. Kant 
describes metaphysics, and the metaphysical task of the KrV, not as one of showing the 
existence of God or the certainty of human freedom, but of providing the conditions for 
the possibility of human experience. Kant is not interested in showing the impossibility of 
any metaphysical system, but only those systems which reach beyond the boundaries of 
experience. Finding those boundaries is exactly what metaphysics is intended to do and 
the task at which Kant believes he has fully succeeded. The KrV can be construed as 
providing an impossibility proof for metaphysics only if we ignore Kant’s statements 
about what metaphysics is and limit it to those areas which are impossible. Metaphysics, 
as Kant conceives of it, is not only possible it is complete. 
While Kant’s metaphysics morphs and expands under this reading the importance 
of Gödel’s theorems seems to shrink. If we take Gödel’s proof as an impossibility proof 
we must consider what it has shown us the impossibility of. When Lambert proved the 
impossibility of squaring the circle the less than startling conclusion was that the ratio 
between a circle’s circumference and its radius is irrational. This was a claim that many 
mathematicians had long suspected was true and which required no fundamental shift in 
thinking about geometry more generally. One particular task became impossible, but 
many others suddenly opened up or grew easier. When Gödel proved that one cannot 
develop a set of axioms under which all possible true statements of arithmetic could be 
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proven, many were stunned. Rather than open up a new way of thinking about 
arithmetical systems, the impossibility of a complete arithmetic leaves us with the certain 
knowledge that none of them are adequate. There is no alternately stated positive 
outcome to soften the blow of the impossibility of one particular task. The Kantian 
equivalent would not be the impossibility of proving the existence of God, it would be the 
impossibility of properly defining the boundaries of experience. 
What does seem clear from the comparison between Kant and Gödel is the 
problems that arise when one attempts to mathematize metaphysics. Kant was aware of 
this problem and spends all of the “Disciple of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use” attempting 
to shows the ways in which mathematical and philosophical knowledge must differ. 
Oddly, though, this was not sufficient to convince Kant that metaphysics as a science of 
any kind was impossible. It seems in many ways the obvious conclusion to draw. 
Metaphysics cannot follow the methods of mathematics. It cannot follow the methods of 
the empirical sciences. What possible method that qualifies as scientific is left open to it? 
4. Conclusion 
What we can conclude from an examination of Kant’s methods and Kant in light 
of Gödel’s incompleteness proof is not addressing any fundamental incompleteness of 
Kant’s system, but should only be read as referring to the impossibility of doing 
metaphysics (even critical metaphysics) along a mathematical model. Mathematics and 
even physics have become more rigorous, more systematic since the late eighteenth 
century, but philosophy, even in the critical sense in which Kant takes it, has not. It is a 
divergence between science and philosophy which I believe (and will argue in a later 
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paper) should continue. The fundamental task of philosophy, and in particular 
metaphysics is not the uncovering of mathematically robust truths, but the questioning of 
our most fundamental assumptions. Kant called philosophizing about mathematics a 
difficult business, but perhaps it is exactly the business we as philosophers should 
undertake. It is a business to which Kant himself inadvertently contributed quite a 
substantial amount. Kant, encouraged by the success of impossibility proofs thought that 
all problems in mathematics were in principle solvable. His critical philosophy is aimed 
at bringing this kind of certainty into metaphysics. Sadly, if we take the comparison with 
Gödel seriously, there is a fundamental level on which the program fails. Even in 
attempting to be critical, to limit the realm of things over which metaphysical principles 
may hold, Kant may not be able to provide a complete system. He cannot ground the 
assumptions which his metaphysics requires even with its use restricted to the world of 
experience. In the end Kant shows us not, as he had hoped, the end of speculative 
metaphysics and not, as he is accused, the end of metaphysics altogether but the 
reiteration of a lesson that seems as old as Plato, the impossibility of philosophy as 
system. 
I have introduced three possible problems (on the Kantian side) with attempts to 
render a comparison between Kant’s metaphysics and Gödel incompleteness theorem 
useful. First, we must ensure that Kant and Gödel use the term “completeness” in 
compatible ways. Second, we must consider whether the comparison is hindered by 
Kant’s position that metaphysics has no axioms. Third, we must decide whether or not 
Kant’s arguments that arithmetic is grounded upon constructions in intuition renders 
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mathematical methodology too distinct from metaphysical methodology to warrant a 
comparison.  
As the first problem seems the least troubling to me, I wish to set it aside and 
consider the latter two. Kant’s metaphysics seems quite distinct from Gödel’s notion of 
arithmetic in that it lacks axioms. It is possible to read Schultz in such a way that this 
problem is overcome with regard to Kant’s mathematics, but far less likely that Kant 
himself would accept axioms in metaphysics. However, it seems that we can overcome 
even this obstacle if we abandon the eighteenth century notion of “axioms” in favor of a 
more contemporary one. A transcendental deduction is, on Kant’s account, a radically 
different form of argument from a mathematical construction, but even a transcendental 
deduction must have some rule of inference (a condition for the possibility of experience) 
which allows it to move from premise, to premise, to conclusion. However, if we allow 
that transcendental deduction is a radically different form of argument than mathematical 
construction then we seem to have been stumped by the third problem. A metaphysics 
without construction cannot be constructively compared to a mathematics with it. If we 
allow the same move to save the comparison a second time, namely abandoning a 
Kantian notion of arithmetic in favor of a more contemporary one, what are we actually 
comparing? It seems that we’ve subtracted a central component of Kantian mathematics 
and added a component to his metaphysics. The original question from the chapter’s 
introduction asks us to make a comparison between Kant’s eighteenth century notion of 
metaphysics and a far more recent version of mathematics. Are these cross-historical 
comparison questions ones that we can answer without doing substantial damage to the 
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theories under consideration? Though this is yet another question that this paper will not 
attempt to answer in full, I hope that the thoughts presented here will break some early 
ground for later answers. What does seem clear is that the success or failure of Kant’s 
critical metaphysics will rest not on the strength of a possible comparison to Gödel, but 
on whether or not his own methods are sufficient for providing the completeness his 
metaphysics needs in order to secure its place as a science. The nature and success of 
Kant’s methodology will be the subject of the following chapter. 
Kant does confirm the notion of the possibility of the completeness of systems, 
but only sufficiently small ones. It is possible to have a set of axioms that are both 
complete and consistent but not for a system with the broad ranging uses of PM. Kant’s 
metaphysics may well be complete and consistent, but it is not nearly as useful as more 
robust metaphysical systems. 
  
150 
 
CHAPTER 5: THEMES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF METHOD 
Introduction 
The primary aim of many of Kant’s pre-critical works was to reconcile 
Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics with Newton’s revolutionary new physics.213 In many 
of these works Kant was quite willing to abandon or revise claims of the Wolffian 
metaphysical picture that could not made to coincide with Newton’s physics.214 Kant 
seemed to think that Newtonian physics need not supplant the standard metaphysics of 
his day if it could be shown that the two were on the whole roughly compatible. Though 
the reconciliation of Leibniz and Wolff with Newton could be construed as the ultimate 
project of the KrV as well, I believe this would be a mistake. Leibniz, Wolff and Newton 
all certainly play an influential role in the development of the KrV. However, if Kant’s 
primary aim was to reconcile dogmatic metaphysics with Newtonian physics it seems 
unlikely that he would have been willing to reject Newton’s absolute space or Leibniz’s 
pre-established harmony. Instead, I believe that the aim of the critical project began as 
one of introducing the methods of Newton into the metaphysical enterprise. Kant thought 
that since, after Newton, physics was no longer floundering about in search of a method, 
it was time to develop the systematic and mathematical rigor that Newton introduced into 
physics for metaphysics. 
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When emphasizing Kant’s goal to reconcile Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics 
with Newtonian physics commentators might be tempted to write as though this is Kant’s 
only goal and that this motivation accounts for nearly every innovation and aspect of his 
project. If reconciling the two modes of thought is Kant’s only project and if the 
noumena’s only end is to allow Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics to still be in some sense 
true and if we as modern enlightened individuals are happy to throw off the yoke of 
dogmatic metaphysics and its religious constraints altogether then there is no reason to 
maintain that the noumena exists.
215
 It serves only to justify a position we no longer need 
or wish to hold. However, this sort of Kantian reading overlooks what may be the most 
radical and interesting of the Kantian claims, the one he himself refers to as being on par 
with the Copernican revolution: that the primary difficulty of both physics and 
metaphysics is the need to discover what parts of our experience of the world are the 
result of external factors and what parts are provided by our own minds as the conditions 
of the possibility of experience. If I accept that the world as such and the conditioning 
provided by my mind are distinct from one another then I must admit that all I believe to 
be true of the physical world applies only to my perception of the physical world.  I am 
still left without metaphysical knowledge of the world as such. Perhaps the world as such 
just is the Newtonian picture, but I have no real justification for this assumption (even 
less now that the Newtonian picture has been at least partially discredited). The noumena, 
on Kant’s picture, is not a creative way of appeasing the metaphysical dogmatists, it is a 
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salient fact about our lack of knowledge concerning the world. There is no perfect 
correspondence between the world and my perception of it. A great deal of metaphysics 
after Kant is no truly post-Kantian because it possesses no mechanism for answering the 
question, “How do I know what you say is true of the world as such rather than simply 
my experience of it?” It seems nearly indisputable that Kant’s reconciliation project lead 
him to this insight, but the insight stands whether the reconciliation project succeeds or 
fails.  
Perhaps Kant’s goal in pre-critical works was to reconcile Leibniz and Newon, 
but the critical turn that begins with the Inaugural Dissertation wants to introduce the 
methods of Newton into the enterprise (i.e. metaphysics) of Leibniz and Wolff. He first 
articulates the project to import Newton’s methods into metaphysics in the Inaugural 
Dissertation, but thanks to Lambert’s correspondence (on the separation between the 
sensibility and the understanding) Kant realizes that the project won’t work. Metaphysics 
fails to share key necessary features with the natural sciences that make Newton’s 
methods possible ones for metaphysics. It takes Kant a decade to determine how best to 
recover from this problem, and the KrV presents a revised version of Kant’s original 
project. Rather than import Newton’s actual methods into metaphysics, Kant uses 
Newtonian physics as a model for what he hopes metaphysics can accomplish. Kant 
desires to find the same systematic simplicity and completeness for metaphysics that he 
believes Newton has found for physics. 
Rather than copy Newton’s methods, Kant looks for a complimentary route that 
will allow him to arrive at a similar endpoint. The attractive qualities of Newtonian 
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physics are its systematicty, simplicity, unity and completeness. Simple rules explain a 
wide variety of phenomena; the rules hold absolutely and without exception in a manner 
which allows them to have universal explanatory power. Kant desires this same regularity 
and law following for metaphysics. He is not alone in this desire. Previous rationalist 
metaphysics like Wolff and Leibniz had the same aim. What separates Kant from early 
systematic metaphysicians is the way in which he appropriates the Newtonian model. For 
Leibniz every proposition of metaphysics follows from the nature of God. This affords 
his system unity and simplicity in explanation. However, much like Aristotelian physics 
Leibniz’ system finds its guiding principles not in a set of laws but in the innate 
properties of an object (God). Unlike Aristotelian physics Newton’s laws hold regardless 
of the innate properties of individual objects. The laws explain the objects rather than 
being created by them. Kant writes laws for metaphysics that also precede any objects to 
which they may apply. His laws do not determine objects directly, but any possibility of 
having an experience of them. 
In order for Kant to finish the project he has posed for himself he needs to find an 
appropriate method for metaphysics that will allow metaphysics to have all the necessary 
criteria of an a priori science. In comparing metaphysics to mathematics Kant provides a 
foundation for what qualities the science of metaphysics must have and what methods of 
investigation it cannot share with other sciences. Rather than progressing through the 
proper use of definitions, axioms and demonstrations, metaphysics must find its course 
without these aids. Kant believes that metaphysics can still find the systematic unity and 
completeness necessary to make metaphysics a science if we are careful to properly 
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delineate the boundaries and limitations of the field. The method through which these 
bounds are discovered and the knowledge that lies within them will be a continuing 
theme of the following chapters. 
One conclusion to draw from the preceding chapters is the limited scope of Kant’s 
re-definition of metaphysics. Since philosophy cannot follow the path of mathematics and 
metaphysics must be comprised of synthetic, a priori knowledge, we cannot hope to 
achieve any kind of certainty regarding the traditional questions of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics then becomes the system of a priori knowledge available to us through pure 
reason. In other words, metaphysics is the science which examines what reason can teach 
us a priori.  
The last seventy-six pages of the KrV present Kant’s most sustained discussion of 
philosophical method within all of his critical philosophy. In the opening remarks of the 
KrV’s ending section, the Doctrine of Method, Kant claims that while the preceding 
section of the book surveys the materials reason has available for building a system of 
pure reason, the Doctrine of Method will attempt to supply a plan that can operate using 
only the limited materials available.
216
 After outlining the faculties of the mind available 
for knowledge production and the sources of our knowledge that stem from within and 
without experience, Kant turns to discussing the method through which our pure 
knowledge can be expanded.  
Since understanding the Doctrine of Method is vital to understanding how Kant 
thinks we should do philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular, this chapter will 
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be devoted to examining the general outline of the section. Outlining the content of the 
Doctrine of Method is important not only because the section itself gives us vital 
information for understanding Kant’s picture of philosophical methodology, but also to 
draw attention to a long neglected section of the KrV. While the primary purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss elements of Kant’s argument in the Doctrine of Method that are 
crucial for understanding what makes metaphysics a science, I hope that it will also serve 
as a starting point for further reflection on the Doctrine of Method and the role that it 
plays in framing Kant’s critical philosophy.217 As the preceding chapter paid a fair 
amount of attention to the “Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use” this chapter will 
tend to focus more on the earlier and later portions of the Doctrine of Method. 
I have ordered the outline of this chapter to follow the order of the sections as 
they are presented in the Doctrine of Method. I admit that this decision may make it more 
difficult for the reader to see important thematic connections between material that is 
presented in disparate parts of the section. However, in covering the material 
systematically I hope to draw attention to a point which I believe is more central to the 
overall argument of this dissertation. In particular, the close, orderly reading I give is 
intended to persuade the reader that though every mention Kant makes concerning the 
nature of metaphysical method within the Doctrine of Method is covered, there is no 
strong, positive statement of what the proper method of metaphysics is. The extensive 
discussion of method Kant provides is entirely devoted to saying what the method of 
metaphysics is not or cannot be. I believe that this “missing” discussion of positive 
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metaphysical method provides substantial support for my claim that, for Kant, doing 
metaphysics correctly is primarily a consideration of limiting the scope of metaphysical 
enquiry in a way which excludes any topic that interferes with metaphysics’ status as a 
complete science in which all questions are answered.  
Before attempting to discuss the main points of the Doctrine of Method, it may be 
helpful to briefly review what has already been established regarding the materials 
available to reason. All of our knowledge of the world begins with sensibility. Sensibility 
refers to the sense faculties. It is our ability to take in sensory data from whatever 
provides outside experience. Intuition is the faculty that begins processing this data. It 
organizes input through the lens of space and time making the distinction between inner 
and outer possible. Taking in spatially-temporally ordering information puts our 
cognition roughly on par with that of similar animals. These are capacities we also 
attribute to dogs, horses, mice and insects. On Kant’s view, however, human beings 
possess two (or three) additional mental faculties which animals do not possess in a full 
sense. The first is the understanding. The understanding imposes order on our intuitions 
by organizing them according to concepts. The concepts themselves derive in important 
ways from distinct categories which allow us to make different kinds of judgments. These 
judgments will always be judgments about what is given in the senses, namely objects of 
sensible experience. Without the understanding I could not make claims about my 
experience. The coffee is hot. The sun causes the rock to be warm. Lewis has more 
apples than Karl. I first connect my experience with concepts and then connect these 
concepts with one another in accordance with laws. While the laws are used by the 
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understanding the discovery of their use and explanation of their working requires an 
additional faculty, namely reason. Reason is what allows me to make judgments not only 
about objects of possible experience but about the nature of experience more generally 
and the conditions under which experience is possible. In order to form judgments of 
reason I need not only concepts, but ideas. Concepts are either pure categories provided 
by the understanding or they are formed from the combination of intuition with the 
categories (via the imagination). The final faculty that Kant mentions (or perhaps half 
faculty) is the imagination. The imagination, via the schematism, provides the necessary 
link between the content of my intuitions and the concepts of the understanding. It is less 
clear at this point where ideas come from and how we can know which ideas of reason 
are legitimate ones. 
Thus, when I do mathematics I am primarily using my intuition to demonstrate 
the truth of the immediate connection between pure intuitions (e.g. that three points are 
always on a single plane). When I do physics I primarily rely upon the understanding in 
determining what the necessary features of the physical world are. The categories and 
principles of the understanding are, for Kant, what gives the world its coherence. I 
“legislate” the laws of physics, giving physics both empirical and a priori components. 
When I do metaphysics I rely on reason alone. This means that I make a priori claims that 
do not depend on only possible experience but on experience in general. Thus they must 
consider not experience but the conditions for any possible experience as it is not possible 
for metaphysics to consider objects of experience and also do so a priori unless it limits 
itself to the conditions for the possibility of those objects. While this is not meant to serve 
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as a summary of all of the Doctrine of Elements
218
 it should suffice as an introduction to 
what the Doctrine of Method considers the materials of reason. 
1. Prefatory Remarks of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
In transitioning from the much longer content of the Doctrine of Elements section 
into the Doctrine of Method Kant provides a brief overview of the Doctrine of Method 
and its relation to the earlier section. Kant describes the Doctrine of Elements (the first 
major section heading of the KrV, containing everything after the preface and 
introduction and before the Doctrine of Method A19/B33-A704/B732) as showing the 
failure of reason to provide sufficient material for expanding the scope of reason. Kant, in 
the first of many metaphors within the section, compares human attempts to expand the 
scope of reason to the Biblical story of the Tower of Babel. Earlier philosophers, in 
surveying what reason had to offer, had determined that we could build a structure 
reaching to the heavens, providing us with knowledge even of the divine. Upon the closer 
examination of the materials of reason which Kant provides in the Doctrine of Elements, 
we see that there are only enough supplies to build a dwelling which is “just roomy 
enough for our business on the plane of experience.”219 If the Doctrine of Elements 
presents the lack of materials available to reason, the Doctrine of Method expands the 
metaphor by presenting the other problem which thwarted the efforts of the workers of 
Babel, the confusion of languages. Kant describes the confusion of languages as, “leaving 
each to build according to his own design.”220 Without a clear, coherent method or plan 
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philosophy has also resulted in disparate groups of workers whose independent structures 
are incompatible with one another and do nothing to promote the systematic structure we 
desire. The Doctrine of Method is designed to fulfill this need for a coherent plan of 
action. 
Kant defines the transcendental doctrine of method as, “the determination of the 
formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.”221 Kant contrasts his project with 
that of the scholastics, claiming that he will accomplish transcendentally what they 
attempted as a practical logic. Unlike general logic which is intended to apply to all 
knowledge of the understanding regardless of content, the transcendental doctrine of 
method will illuminate only the possible uses of pure knowledge from the understanding. 
He purports to undertake this examination in four parts: Discipline, Cannon, 
Architectonic and History.
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2. The Discipline of Pure Reason 
Kant begins the Discipline of Pure Reason by discussing the importance of 
negative judgments. They are primarily necessary for preventing error. Thus, when the 
potential for error is great, there is a correspondingly great need for negative judgments. 
He argues that in the case of pure reason, the need for negative judgments outweighs the 
need for positive ones. Accordingly, he defines “discipline” as, “the compulsion through 
which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated, 
and one of the primary goals of the Doctrine of Method is to provide this discipline for 
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pure reason. ”223  Such a disciplinary critique is not necessary for the empirical or 
mathematical uses of reason as they can always check the accuracy of their concepts with 
the content provided by empirical or pure intuition. Since pure reason in its 
transcendental use is concerned only with “mere” concepts it has no guiding intuitions to 
monitor and correct its course. Kant’s critique is thus designed to censure these causes of 
error via a transcendental discipline. Put in more Kantian language, in the Doctrine of 
Elements Kant disciplines the content of pure reason by showing the limits of what we 
can know a priori. In the Doctrine of Method the critique now turns to the method by 
which we produce a priori knowledge claims. 
2.1 The Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use 
In the first section of the Discipline Kant contrasts mathematical and 
philosophical cognition and claims again that philosophy (and more specifically 
metaphysics) not only differs in content from mathematics but cannot follow its methods 
either. As we have already seen, definitions, axioms and demonstrations, the primary 
building blocks of mathematical thinking are not available to the philosopher. The result 
of the lack of these fundamental materials is that pure reason, “is not capable of any 
synthetic judgments that would have objective validity.”224 Pure reason can form 
principles, but these principles cannot directly relate concepts to one another in the way 
that I can discuss the relationship between concepts like “parallel” and “triangle.” The 
security of the principles is guaranteed by their relation to a third contingent thing, 
possible experience. I can speak with certainty about pure reason, but only about pure 
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reason as it provides the conditions for the possibility of experience. Considered in the 
larger context of the remainder of the Doctrine of Method, introducing this distinction 
early in the discussion paves the way for Kant to discuss the negative conception of 
method he gives in the rest of the text. In the “Dogmatic” section Kant goes on to argue 
that pure reason must rely on negative judgments because it does not have the resources 
to produce many positive ones. By the end of the Doctrine of Method one should be 
convinced of the utter lack of any positive method for metaphysics and the need for 
completeness as our only hope of ensuring metaphysics as a science. 
2.2 The Disciple of Pure Reason with Regard to its Polemical Use 
In the second section of the Discipline Kant attempts to show that the primarily 
negative judgments of pure reason also allow us to prevent ourselves and others from 
falling into error. Kant claims that the very existence of reason is dependent upon the 
freedom of universal critique. We must be allowed and are in fact required to consider the 
truth or falsity of every supposed claim of reason. The polemical use of reason is one 
which would move us closer to renouncing “all pretensions to dogmatic authority.”225 It 
would be one which presents, “the defense of its propositions against dogmatic denials of 
them.”226 While reason cannot lead us to certain truths that apply outside of the realm of 
experience it can at least ensure that any propositions made by others about things 
beyond the world of experience which lay claim to apodictic certainty are false.  
Kant finds it “worrisome” that pure reason, which is meant to judge all 
metaphysical or philosophical disputes, comes into conflict with itself. In some cases 
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there is only a seeming contradiction (e.g. when we contrast claims about the world in 
itself with claims about the world of appearances), but there is, according to Kant, also 
genuine conflict (e.g. there is/is not a highest being) when we are concerned not with the 
distinction between thing considered in themselves and things considered as appearance, 
but with the existence of things in themselves. I can, for example, meaninfully say that 
my actions are determined with respect to appearances but free in the “noumenal” sense. 
I cannot likewise say that God does not exist with respect to appearances but that he does 
exist as a thing in itself. In these cases it is clear that one side has the “interests of reason” 
to speak for it, but there is no other grounds from which to judge. I cannot prove with 
certainty that God exists, but I can see that it is in the interest of reason with regard to its 
moral use for myself and others to continue to believe that this is the case. With regard to 
these matters I can be certain that current attempts at proof are insufficient and that there 
are not better proofs waiting to be discovered.  
However, with respect to the question of which position is in the interest of 
reason, I can also be certain that no one will be able to prove the opposite view either. As 
Kant believes he has shown in the Dialectic, it is safe to assume claims such as “the soul 
is immortal” and “there is a highest being” because they are consistent with the 
speculative interests of pure reason and, moreover, they cannot be disproved. If belief in 
God will motivate me to behave morally and rationally then I should believe in God, and 
I can do so safe that I will not be forced to abandon this believe as a result of a rational 
argument conclusively disproving the existence of God. Moreover, Kant insists that 
views including that of the existence of God present the only means of uniting the 
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speculative and the practical interests of reason. A belief in the existence of God that I 
recognize as ungrounded in rational argument prevents me from overstepping the bounds 
of reason (and assenting to a claim for which I have no basis) while also providing me 
with the necessary moral motivation by giving me hope to think that happiness and 
worthiness to be happy will eventually be made to coincide. 
Kant distinguishes between the position of the thesis in the Antinomy and that of 
the antithesis. The former is rational, and latter empirical. Kant claims that the thesis has 
several advantages over the antithesis. It corresponds with practical and popular concerns 
in ways which allow us to continue to believe the things about God, the unity of the soul 
and freedom which correspond to an easy understanding of morality and the way in 
which most people already think about the world. He concludes, however, that there is 
then “properly” no antithetic with respect to pure reason. The seeming antithesis created 
by the competing claims he mentions are not properly claims of pure reason. In pure 
theology or psychology these issues present a genuine ground for disagreement, but pure 
reason leaves both sides equally without the resources to prove their positions. Rather 
than a true antithesis, pure reason can produce only an antinomy, an apparent dispute 
which resolves itself when one takes into consideration the fact that the categories and 
forms of intuition do not apply outside of experience.  
One possible conclusion to draw from the seeming lack of help that pure reason 
offers us in proving any of the things we might wish to prove by speculation is that pure 
reason is of little use. Purely speculative reason is full of “self-conceit.” It plays at 
providing us with solutions to fundamental questions but, in the end, can only illuminate 
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itself and its own limitations. Kant rejects this conclusion, and claims that all things serve 
some good purpose and considers an analogy between pure reason and poison. Just as 
poison seems to serve no good aim and can only useful for harming but has a positive use 
in helping us to recover from the harm of other poisons, so too pure reason is the only 
“cure” for the conflicts created by those who would use reason beyond its proper bounds. 
One can often only fight off the ill effects of one poison with another poison. In like 
manner, only pure reason has the capacity to protect one from falling prey to illegitimate 
uses of reason. Reason should, he assumes, be granted “full freedom in its search as well 
as its examination, so that it can take care of its own interest without hindrance.”227 
Reason, properly tended, will set its own limits and form its own boundaries, keeping 
itself from falling into error. One risks more if “foreign hands intervene” than if reason is 
left to properly restrict itself.  
It seems clear that one of Kant’s primary aims in this section is to secure the right 
to free thought and speech for all who consider the possible interests and concerns of 
reason. He repeatedly mentions the benefits of allowing reason free reign, the detriments 
of attempting to restrict free thought and the harmlessness of allowing arguments on 
speculative topics that might injure the concerns of practical interest to be heard. While 
Kant is careful to restrict pure reason within his own thought he is quite willing to allow 
it to run wild in the thought of others and to acknowledge these uses as potentially 
beneficial.  
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Kant claims that it is good to grant reason full freedom to set its own limits and 
attempt to expand them. The possible errors in judgment that may accrue are not nearly 
as harmful as those that follow from allowing reason to be forcibly carried off its path 
through the interference of others. Since practical concerns never enter into the debates of 
speculative reason, there is no need to worry that disputes over speculative matters will 
cause errors of judgment to end in errors of moral action. The dispute itself can only 
reveal the antinomy of reason, never a genuine contradiction. He does not fear that these 
debates will undermine any necessary belief. Kant’s only command with regard to taking 
up speculative disputes is that you fight fairly with your opponent. You tone can be one 
of firm belief but not of knowledge. 
Kant here draws an analogy between two paths that start out with ill motivation 
but ultimately result in a good outcome. Many people striving to maintain an appearance 
of goodness in order to be thought admirable by friends and neighbors can eventually be 
led to seek genuine morality even if a semblance of morality for the sake of appearances 
will also be a hindrance to genuine goodness. Likewise, many people claim to use reason 
when they attempt only to bolster their own views, but the truth of critique can eventually 
come out even when it was not the disputant’s original aim.  
The result of Kant’s discussion of the usefulness or harmlessness of disputes of 
speculative reason is that there can be no polemical use of pure reason, e.g. we cannot 
make any purely rational claims with dogmatic authority. The objects or actualities we 
would need to confirm such claims are beyond experience and thus cannot be 
demonstrated in experience. Critique allows reason to move from a “state of nature” to a 
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“state of law.” In reason’s “state of nature” the strong take from the weak by force. If I 
can argue my point better (or louder) than you can yours you are forced to accept my 
view as the correct one. Others will support my position and may take it upon themselves 
to punish those who disagree. As the old adage goes, might makes right. In reason’s 
“state of law” we begin to consider due process. In considering the justice of disputes we 
look not only at who was the victor, but what means he or she used to achieve their 
success. Ill gotten gains must be returned. Arguments that rest on false premises will be 
discovered as illegitimate. The movement from nature to law is a movement from the end 
of a dispute being “victory” to it being a “verdict.” Kant concludes that in such a system 
the proper verdict will ensure perpetual peace by going to the origin of the conflict and 
rooting out all that is mistaken. In addition to there being no polemical use of pure reason 
there is also no skeptical use of pure reason. Being modest in speculative matters is not 
meant to result in one side besting the other or spectators seeing no solution but in the 
realization of reason’s limitations. Such battles should be a “cure for dogmatic self-
conceit.” 
2.3 On the Impossibility of a Skeptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason that is Divided 
Against Itself 
The second section of the Discipline is followed by an unnumbered subsection, 
“On the Impossibility of a Skeptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason that is Divided Against 
Itself.” This section provides further arguments about the lack of a skeptical use of pure 
reason. Since Kant is arguing that we are ignorant about the very things many 
metaphysicians claim to know, a discussion of the sources and uses of ignorance is in 
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order. Characteristically, Kant finds that ignorance is of two kinds, either of things or of 
the determination and boundaries of cognition, and it usually arouses inquiry. If my 
ignorance is a contingent ignorance then in the first case (that in which I am ignorant of 
things) I will investigate dogmatically. If, for example, I know nothing about dogs, a do 
not need to first perform a critique of the possibility of knowing things about dogs, I can 
simply proceed to learning about dogs (through testing, observation or reading). In the 
second case of ignorance (that in which I am ignorant about the bounds of my cognition) 
I must investigate these bounds critically. One can never determine empirically that 
ignorance is necessary, only critique can provide that conclusion. If my investigation of 
dogs fails to yield the information I desire (perhaps whether or not dogs communicate 
complex messages to one another through barking)  this is not sufficient to inform me 
that such knowledge is in principle unobtainable. The determination of the bounds of 
reason can only be performed a priori. Limitations, on the other hand, can be seen a 
posteriori. Limitations can be discovered through perception but the boundaries of pure 
reason constitute  a science, the critique of pure reason.  
Kant illuminates this final claim by way of a metaphor about an attempt to 
determine whether to earth is spherical or flat like a plate. The, “sum total of all possible 
objects for our cognition,” may at first seem to be a plate, a flat object of indeterminate 
size. Kant credits Hume with banishing questions which stretch beyond what experience 
can teach us, such as whether or not causality is an inviolable law, as outside of the 
horizon of reason. He claims that Hume further inferred that experience was the outer 
limit of human knowledge. We can determine the content and boundary of reason 
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(namely, experience and objects of experience), but outside of experience nothing is an 
object for it. According to Kant, reason, however, is not to be compared to a plate but to a 
sphere. Once we know that a given shape is a sphere, we can determine its exact size by 
finding the radius. Hume’s failing is based in that “he did not systematically survey all 
the kinds of a priori synthesis of the understanding.” If he had, Kant claims, he would 
have found not only causality but the principle of persistence as necessary principles of 
human understanding. Hume merely limits understanding (empirically) but doesn’t draw 
boundaries (systematically and a priori). Skepticism is sufficient to refute dogmatism, but 
it is insufficient to show that we do not have synthetic a priori cognition. Thus his 
objections to dogmatism rest only on fact, not on principles. Skepticism is disastrous for 
the dogmatist who has not measured the sphere of his understanding. 
Kant refers to the process of subjecting “the facta of reason” to examination and, 
when necessary, blame the censorship of reason. When we attempt to determine the 
boundaries of pure reason, Kant claims that the first step is always dogmatic. In the 
infancy of our journey to understand reason we begin with uncritical arguments and 
assertions. The second step  is the skeptical one. As we mature in our use of reason and 
its contours become familiar to us, it becomes clear that some of our arguments and 
guiding rational principles are not as secure as we might like them to be. We begin to 
doubt. In Kant’s view this was for Hume the final step. His own view of reason requires a 
third and final move which does not amount to censorship, but to critique. In critiquing 
reason we determine not merely the limits, but for the boundaries of reason. Skepticism 
not intended as a place of permanent residence, since reason will rest only on complete 
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certainty. Complete certainly with regard to reason can only be achieved with respect to 
determining what it is that reason can know. Censure alone is not enough to show us 
what things lie outside the boundaries of reason, only critique can provide that. 
Thus, on Kant’s account, Hume performed only a censure of pure reason. He did 
not separate pure understanding from pure reason and thought that there was no 
possibility for augmenting concepts out of themselves without recourse to experience. 
Hume was thus forced to conclude that there could be no a priori principles, only custom. 
Hume could have avoided this mistake if he had recognized the distinction between 
understanding and reason. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, shows us that though 
we can never immediately go beyond the content of a given concept we can still cognize 
the law which determines the connection of one concept with another a priori, at least in 
relation to a third thing, possible experience. Certain concepts must be able to be 
connected, and with regularity in order for one to have experience. The possible 
experience with regard to which my concepts must be connected serves as a necessary 
condition or law for connecting concepts.  
Hume’s failing is based in that, “he did not systematically survey all the kinds of a 
priori synthesis of the understanding.” If he had, he would have found not only causality 
but principle of persistence as connections of concepts that are necessary in order for 
experience to be possible. Hume merely limits understanding; he does not draw 
boundaries. His objections to dogmatism rest only on fact, not on principles that can be 
developed through proper critique. 
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In discovering this flaw in Hume’s work Kant believes that he is able to move 
beyond the decidedly unsystematic metaphysics of Hume without falling prey to the 
“spirit of systematicity” which plagues Leibniz and his followers. In keeping with the 
middle path embraced by Condillac and d’Alembert Kant embraces a “systematic spirit” 
which recognizes that systematicity is possible and useful in certain realms. However, he 
avoids the false application of mathematical method or principles in a way which would 
reduce the complexity of a field which needs to accommodate a wide variety of relevant 
empirical experiences. Kant’s limited but complete metaphysical system allows us to 
retain all that is valuable about Hume without requiring us to discard all that is valuable 
in Leibniz.   
2.4 The Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard to Hypothesis 
In the "Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard to Hypothesis" Kant explains the 
uselessness of transcendental hypotheses for forming foundational principles that can 
expand our understanding. He takes particular aim at "hyperphysical hypotheses" or any 
appeal to a divine author. Kant begins by asking whether or not the fact that critique 
shows us that we cannot have pure speculative knowledge from reason is sufficient to 
make hypotheses impossible. Before we can hypothesize we need to show that any 
objects under consideration are at least possible objects. He defines a hypothesis as, “an 
opinion concerning the actuality of an object that must be connected as a ground of 
explanation with that which is actually given and certain.”228 Kant explains that given the 
limitations of pure reason we have relatively limited resources available with which to 
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construct hypotheses. We cannot construct a priori the concept of the possibility of 
dynamical connection, and the category of the pure understanding allows us to 
understand things but not invent them as apart from empirical properties. We can think 
up nothing new beyond the laws we have, thus all possible hypotheses will have to be 
constructed within the confines of the connections and properties already available to us 
in the categories. We cannot create new conditions for the possibility of things or new 
things which are independent of those conditions and anticipate that they would hold any 
explanatory power. They would be concepts without objects. Even the concepts of reason 
which we do have are mere ideas and have no object in experience. They are thought 
only “problematically” as “heuristic fictions.”229 Kant here provides a rare illuminating 
example. He explains that I can think of a soul as simple in order to make a mind a unity, 
but that to assume that it is a simple substance is indemonstrable and “hazarded entirely 
arbitrarily and blindly,” since no experience can give us this.230  
Kant uses the example of the soul as a unity to transition into a discussion of a 
particular type of hypotheses, transcendental hypotheses. He claims that while we cannot 
rely on hypotheses that make recourse to the ideas of reason, possible intelligible 
properties of things in the sensible world cannot be assumed with any authority of reason 
but they also cannot be dogmatically denied. A transcendental hypothesis is a, 
“hypothesis which uses a mere idea of reason for the explanation of things in nature.”231 
Such a hypothesis provides no genuine explanation as any grounds of explanation on 
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which it might rest can serve only for the satisfaction of reason not the, “advancement of 
the use of the understanding with regard to objects.”232 When we attempt to explain 
nature, the “wildest” physical hypothesis still better than a hyperphysical one (i.e. one 
which appeals to a divine being as a form of explanation). While it may be the case that a 
divine being is ultimately responsible for all that we encounter, attributing any individual 
effect to this cause is not a sign of devotion but of “lazy reason.” Genuine explanation of 
objects in the world must explain things in terms of their location within a causal chain. If 
we are allowed recourse to divine intervention it allows us to ignore the relevant causes 
that lead to real understanding. Kant claims that while we may find these sorts of ideas 
“comforting to reason” they fail to contribute to learning.  
Moreover, Kant claims that a license to explain things by means of a 
transcendental hypothesis which makes recourse to mere ideas of reason would 
ultimately destroy experience. According to Kant order and purposiveness in nature must 
be explained from natural grounds, and any good hypothesis must be adequate for 
determining a priori the consequences that follow. As a result, there can be no real or 
physical hypothesis that the soul is a unity or that God exists. These hypotheses cannot 
contribute anything to explanation through natural causes. In addition to making recourse 
to objects outside of experience hyperphysical hypotheses also leave us without any clear 
method of integrating them into the causal chain. If I explain the rotation of the planets 
through recourse to divine love than I must also explain how divine love is capable of 
causal efficacy in the physical realm. A hypothesis which requires new hypotheses to 
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support it adds to the trouble because the additional hypotheses are as unsupported as the 
first. 
For Kant hypotheses are not useful for grounding or proving positions, but they 
may be used to defend them. As mentioned in the discussion of reason’s polemical use, 
sometimes it is necessary to make arguments for the purpose of showing an opponent (or 
oneself) that a particular position cannot be shown as any more valid or convincing than 
the opposing position. It is perfectly reasonable to put a hypothesis to such a use as long 
as one is not thereby persuaded to accept as an opinion the claim put forward as a 
hypothesis. Like the other tools of reason which Kant outlines in the “Discipline” 
hypotheses have an exclusively negative function. We cannot build our knowledge from 
them, but we can use them to keep reason from becoming corrupted by arguments which 
cannot be substantiated. 
There is a small but important ambiguity in the way in which Kant’s discussion of 
hypotheses is written. One could read it as a broad argument for eliminating all 
metaphysical speculation (i.e. any appeal to an idea of reason as holding explanatory 
power within the realm of experience). One could also take the argument as being 
intended in a more narrow sense which outlaws only those hypotheses which appeal to a 
divine fiat in a way which cuts off any additional insight which the understanding might 
provide through experience. The narrow sense of the argument is clearly within the realm 
of things which Kant wishes to eliminate, but it is not clear that all possible 
transcendental hypotheses pose the same problem. Would all appeals to non-
hyperphysical hypotheses close off paths of empirical inquiry? Kant admits that a 
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physical hypothesis (no matter how wild) is always preferable to a non-physical one, but 
what if this physical hypothesis includes implicit assumptions about the unity of the soul 
as a simple substance or the beginning of the world in time? Does Kant have the 
resources (or the desire) to rule out these forms of speculation as well? 
Consider, for example, two possible hypotheses about matters of fact. In scenario 
one we are attempting to answer a question about why some tobacco smokers get lung 
cancer while others do not. We are interested in what makes the difference between the 
two cases. One potential hypothesis that would solve this problem would be if the world 
is ordered by a divine being who doles out lung cancer as a punishment for wrong doing. 
One can infer that the smokers who get lung cancer are simply more blasphemous than 
the smokers who do not. In Kant’s view the problem with this hypothesis (God uses lung 
cancer as a punishment for blasphemous behavior) is that it does not leave room for 
information gathered via the sense and the understanding to contribute further 
information to the way in which we think about the case. Genetic markers, age of the 
patients, exposure to other carcinogenic substances, etc. all become irrelevant 
information for determining anything about the causes of lung cancer. Moreover, the 
hypothesis is not genuinely falsifiable. Even if I discover several devout patients with 
lung cancer, this is not enough to show me that my hypothesis is false. Perhaps they only 
seem devout. They all curse God in secret. My hypothesis prevents me from drawing 
helpful conclusions about the way things operate in the world of experience. Even if I am 
correct, it will not provide me the sort of information that will lead to additional laws of 
nature. My understanding cannot process blasphemy as a causal mechanism for illness in 
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a way that contributes to a systematic picture of how the world of experience is 
organized. 
In scenario two we want to know why people who are abused as children as more 
likely to experience a psychotic break later in life. One hypothesis that might contribute 
to our thinking about the relevant cases is that the soul or self is singular and unified 
through time. While the hypothesis relies upon ideas of reason and makes reference to 
something which is potentially supersensible, it seems to open rather than close potential 
avenues of discovery. If I assume that the self is a unified whole, then I can consider 
whether the childhood abuse might have some causal relation to the psychotic break. 
Perhaps further investigation will reveal other elements of childhood experience that 
contribute to psychological illness or wellbeing in adults. I could discover some empirical 
laws that would allow me some measure of predictive power about what populations are 
most at risk for mental illness. My hypothesis, while transcendental, has informed rather 
than controlled my inquiry. It places me in a position to better consider what import the 
empirical data in front of me may have. It seems unlikely that Kant wishes to rule out 
metaphysical speculations of this variety. 
2.5 The Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard to Its Proofs 
In his discussion of proofs, Kant presents us with the closest thing to a positive 
method for moving forward in philosophy that the “Doctrine of Method” has to offer. He 
begins by claiming that proofs of synthetic transcendental propositions (i.e. those of 
philosophy) are different from ordinary proofs because in them it is not permissible for 
reason to apply directly to reason through concepts. Reason first has to establish the 
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objective validity of the relevant concepts and that it is possible to synthesize them a 
priori. In other words, we need to establish that the concepts under consideration are ones 
that can refer to objects of experience and can be used to make judgments about them. If 
we cannot verify that these conditions are met then the proofs themselves are not 
possible. This preliminary step is not needed in mathematical proofs where pure intuition 
is available to confirm the connection between concept and object, nor is it necessary in 
empirical proofs where the connection of the concept to the object is already confirmed in 
experience. In transcendental proofs possible experience provide the key to the objective 
validity and possible synthesis of the necessary concepts. Transcendental proofs show 
that experience and the object of experience are impossible without the connection 
between the concept and the object. The proof must show the possibility of having 
synthetic and a priori certain knowledge of things not found in the mere concepts of those 
things.  
Failure to structure proofs in a way which first demonstrates the objective validity 
and possible synthesis of the necessary concepts in possible experience leads to the 
illusion of connection which is not really there. Kant gives the example of philosophers’ 
various attempts to prove the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Proofs of the PSR 
wrongly assume that it is a universal principle which applies to everything without 
bounds rather than a principle of the possibility of experience alone. Within experience it 
is possible to show that we cannot but attribute a cause to any given effect. Beyond those 
bounds, however, a proof of the PSR will inevitably go astray. Where but in possible 
experience can one prove the application of the PRS to sequences of events?  Thus 
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conclusions of proofs must be limited to things within experience and can never rule out 
other possibilities (i.e. they are always contingent). When we attempt to consider ideas 
which are necessary for representation as part of the object we run into unavoidable 
paralogisms. The solution is to keep in mind the “criterion of the possibility” of the 
synthetic a priori we wish to prove (i.e. experience). This will help us to avoid attributing 
to reason things beyond its capacity. 
In light of the limitations of transcendental proofs Kant offers three rules to 
follow in using them. First, “attempt no transcendental proofs without having first 
considered whence one can justifiably derive the principles on which one intends to build 
and with what right one can expect success in inferences from them.” Second, “for each 
transcendental proposition only a single proof can be found.” Third, transcendental 
proofs “must never be apagogic but always ostensive.” Apagogic proofs can never 
produce “comprehensibility of the truth in regard to its connection with the grounds of its 
possibility.”233 While the rules provide helpful guidelines and sure ways of rooting out 
any false but seemingly transcendental proofs, they, like most of the “Doctrine of 
Method” provide more advice about what not to do than ways in which one can 
productively move forward. Rather than a set of guidelines, the rules provide limitations 
which will prevent reason from moving beyond its boundaries. 
For Kant then the difference between a transcendental proof and an ordinary proof 
(one that might apply to pure science or mathematics) does lie in the type of conclusion 
one can draw. A transcendental proof can never show that things are thus and so and 
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cannot be otherwise. They can only show that things must be this way in order for us to 
have the experience that we have. All conclusions of transcendental proofs are contingent 
upon the possibility of having this sort of experience. They cannot show the absolute 
necessity of any principle or proposition they conclude, only that if we have experience 
the proposition must hold of that experience as a way of making it possible. This can 
never show us that we couldn’t have some other kind of experience organized in some 
other kind of way. However, Kant makes no distinction between synthetic and analytic 
proofs with regard to the conclusions they are capable of drawing. Whatever form of 
presentation transcendental proofs take they still can show their conclusions as contingent 
upon possible experience. The analytic/synthetic proof distinction is only one of 
presentation not one of scope.
234
  
3. The Canon of Pure Reason 
The Canon of Pure Reason is interesting because it contains Kant's first 
formulation of the moral philosophy from his mature period. While what he says here is 
not wildly divergent from his later moral writings, the distinctions are substantial enough 
that one should be reluctant to that this as Kant's final word on the subject. The "Canon" 
has received comparatively more attention than the other sections of the "Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method" as a result of its use in showing the evolution of Kant's moral 
thought. In the section Kant emphasizes that while metaphysics has a foundational role to 
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play in the establishment of moral philosophy, moral philosophy itself has nothing to 
contribute to speculative philosophy. For these reasons I think it is appropriate to say 
only a few words about the "Canon" before moving on to the "Architectonic."  
The "Canon" provides a remedy to the idea that Kant has so destroyed or limited 
metaphysics as a discipline that he has rendered it entirely impotent. While the 
"Discipline" emphasizes the vital negative use of metaphysics (a use that Kant exerts 
great energy to emphasize as important), the "Canon" shows that even metaphysics as 
critique has a positive use as well. Though there is no positive use within speculative 
reason, practical reason would be entirely lost without the postulated assertions of God, 
freedom and immortality. Devoid of these ideas, we would be unable to give a satisfying 
answer to two of the questions Kant deems our most vital: what should we do and what 
may we hope for. 
4. The Architectonic of Pure Reason 
Kant defines “architectonic” as “the art of systems.”235 It is systematic unity 
which, “makes ordinary cognition a science.”236 Kant opposes “science” here to an 
“aggregate.” Rather than merely collecting knowledge, a science must organize 
knowledge into a system. A system presents, “The unity of the manifold of conditions 
under one idea.” The unity of a system is of one of two types. Either it is a technical unity 
which is a merely empirical unity “in accordance with contingent aims” or it is an 
architectonic unity “from a single supreme and inner end which first makes possible the 
whole.” Lacking empirical input, metaphysics must have an architectonic unity. The 
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various branches and principles of metaphysics must be shown to all stem from a single 
idea which connects all subordinate ideas in a way which makes the clear the 
completeness of the collection. The various parts of the science of metaphysics must have 
a natural unity. 
Kant states that all knowledge must be isolated with respect to its species and 
origin in order to determine its proper value and influence. Metaphysics, as the collection 
of our of our a priori knowledge from concepts is vital to this organizational enterprise. 
Kant claims that the proper marking of the sources of knowledge was what was missing 
from previous attempts at metaphysics. Previous attempts at systematic metaphysics 
frequently began with a search for or statement of first principles, but for Kant finding the 
first principles of metaphysics is not sufficient to render it a science. First principles are 
enough to provide a single degree of subordination of knowledge. It provides to 
categories: first principles and things which follow from first principles. However, a 
single degree of subordination is not enough to determine the boundaries of a science. In 
order to show where a science ends (and a new one begins) one needs to show the origin 
any piece of knowledge under question. Two cognitions that spring from distinct sources 
belong to separate sciences.  
The bulk of the “Architectonic” is most easily summed up with a chart. Kant 
outlines the various branches of knowledge, their origins and their distinction from one 
another. The “Architectonic,” particularly in contrast with Kant’s discussion of the 
categories is a strange section. Here rather than provide a chart which would suffice to 
demonstrate the hierarchical relationship between the various branches of knowledge 
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Kant discusses, Kant gives us a rather lengthy description of each important branch and 
the ways in which its particular type of knowledge varies in source from the others. He 
follows this with a discussion of two possible objections to the idea that these branches 
flow lawfully from one another and showing the necessary connections between them. In 
the discussion of the categories, by contrast, Kant feels that a table will suffice. Rather 
than a long exegesis providing some ground for believing Kant’s assertion of the 
completeness of the table we get a deduction that makes no mention of the individual 
categories themselves. It immediately raises the question of why Kant felt that the 
endeavor of the Architectonic merited such detail.  As to why we should trust Kant on the 
completeness of the categories, the strongest argument for this comes from Klaus Reich’s 
excellent volume on the topic, one which reiterates a point Kant makes here in the 
Architectonic, the concept itself proscribes the division. 
5. The History of Pure Reason 
The final section of the KrV is a brief one in which Kant outlines what place he 
believes his project has within the history of philosophy. He claims that philosophy 
begins, in the historical sense, with theology. Theology leads us to consider morality, 
originally conceived as a question concerning which actions will please the divine. He 
opposes “sensible” philosophers (Epicurus) to “intellectual” ones (Plato), empiricists 
(Aristotle) to “noologists” (Plato and Leibniz) and naturalistic philosophers with the 
scientific. All previous scientific philosophers have been either dogmatic (Wolff) or 
skeptical (Hume). Kant suggests that he overcomes this divide by offering a third, critical 
path. Kant’s extremely abbreviated history of philosophy goes a long way towards 
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showing how radical he believes his new doctrines are and the significance which he 
thinks his findings will hold for philosophy as it moves forward. He was not altogether 
wrong. 
 6. Conclusion 
As a discourse on method, the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” is an odd 
work. If the primary methodological tool and innovation of Kant’s critical philosophy is, 
as many scholars believe it to be, transcendental deduction, it is strange that Kant devotes 
so little space in the text to explaining how they work. Aside from the three rules outlined 
in the section of the “Discipline” devoted to proofs, very little guidance is provided.  If 
one views the transcendental deduction as the crux of the KrV this might provide a 
substantial reason to think that the “Doctrine of Method” is of little importance for 
understanding the work as a whole.  
It is worth considering if the appropriate conclusion to draw from the lack of 
attention paid to transcendental deductions in the “Doctrine of Method” is the relative 
unimportance of the text. It seems at least equally plausible that the “Doctrine of 
Method” devotes so little time to transcendental deductions because they are not as 
important to Kant’s notion of method as the topics to which he does devote significant 
attention. On careful examination of the “Doctrine of Method” proper methodology in 
philosophy seems to have less to do with what one includes and far more to do with what 
one is required to leave out. If the “Doctrine of Elements” surveys the materials available 
for building a system of reason, the “Doctrine of Method” insists that we build with only 
those materials and should not mistakenly believe that others are at our disposal.  
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Kant concludes transcendental deduction is an appropriate form of philosophical 
argumentation because it leans only on those assumptions which we can legitimately 
make and concludes only what is within our power to conclude. The deduction begins 
with the assumption that experience happens. This assumption could be disputed, but 
only at great skeptical cost and never as a kind of skepticism which can be maintained 
over time. It moves from this claim to a consideration of what must be the case in order 
for this experience to be possible. We do not here search for what conditions in the world 
make this experience possible, but what conditions in our own faculties are necessary, a 
priori conditions that make the experience possible. The field of inquiry has been 
properly limited to reason itself. I can know with certainty the claims that reason provides 
because they are only claims about itself. Moreover, even what I can know about reason 
is less what it can do and more what it is incapable of doing and knowing.  
One may be tempted at this point to consider Kant’s metaphysics worthless. It is 
merely negative and tells us almost nothing about what or why things are. It is preferable, 
however, to think of Kant’s negative metaphysics in analogy to Aquinas’ negative 
theology. Though we cannot say what God is, but we can learn a great deal about him by 
saying what he is not. While Kant’s metaphysics cannot solve the speculative questions 
we have, it shows us a great deal about the kinds of knowledge we are capable of having. 
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CHAPTER 6: KANT’S LAST CHAPTER 
Introduction 
Even a brief survey of the literature on Kant’s KrV is enough to reveal the deep 
disagreement about the proper way to interpret Kant. Some scholars fully embrace Kant’s 
vision of his own work as bringing about a Copernican revolution in metaphysics, i.e. 
initiating an entirely new way of dealing with metaphysics. Some argue that Kant only 
advances theories which bear a strong resemblance to ideas already put forward by Hume 
and Newton, while still others think that Kant’s writings deviate little from the dogmatic 
systems of Leibniz and Wolff. One primary point of disagreement concerns the very topic 
on which the KrV is attempting to speak. Fundamentally, is this a book about 
metaphysics or epistemology?  
For those who see, the central aim of Kant’s KrV as metaphysical in nature, Kant 
focuses on sorting the truth from the error in a traditional, dogmatic metaphysical 
enterprise. For those who view Kant’s project as an epistemological project, we discover 
in the KrV the cognitive structures through which our experience of the world is 
processed and organized. My view is that both of these aims are present in the work to 
some extent, it is important to determine which of these plays a more fundamental role. If 
we can better understand Kant’s view of the primary aim of the work, we will gain some 
insight into how the work is structured and what sort of role its various pieces play in the 
larger puzzle.  
In chapter one I argued that one can best understand Kant’s mathematics by 
identifying properly central passages and allowing other difficult passages to be read in 
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light of the themes which they emphasize most strongly. I intend to make a similar 
methodological move in this chapter by arguing that our understanding of the KrV’s 
general outline affects the way we view the meaning and import of the individual 
components. To repeat, a reader who views Kant’s central aim in the work as serving an 
epistemological purpose will come to different conclusions about the nature and 
importance of various sections than one who views the work as primarily metaphysical in 
nature. To decide what is primary is, therefore, of the greatest importance. 
In addition to suggesting that the way in which one conceives of the outline of the 
work directly affects the way in which one interprets individual passages, I will argue for 
a new way of thinking about the relationship of the parts of the text to the whole. 
Specifically, I wish to suggest that one can read the work as being framed by the 
introduction (particularly in the B edition) and the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” 
in ways which helpfully illuminate the central portions of the text. I believe that the 
beginning and ending sections of the book mirror one another and provide the reader with 
crucial guidance in understanding the section of the “Doctrine of Elements” which 
constitutes the bulk of the work.  Thus we see, focusing on the role of the “Doctrine of 
Method” in helping to frame the KrV draws attention to the centrality Kant grants to the 
task of grounding metaphysics as a science. 
1. Historical Background 
One strong reason to think that epistemology was not foremost in Kant’s mind 
while writing the KrV is historical. The first edition of the work appeared in 1781 with 
the substantially revised B edition appearing in 1787. However, “epistemology” in its 
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current usage as a term for a theory or theories of knowledge, is generally believed to 
have been coined only in the 1850s by the Scottish philosopher James Ferrier. Though 
Ferrier was clearly not the first philosopher to concern himself with wondering about 
how knowledge is constituted, what forms it takes, and what justifies it as knowledge, it 
was not until the nineteenth century that epistemology came to be conceived of as its own 
distinct field of philosophy. Furthermore the question as to what constitutes knowledge 
(as compared to true belief) has been a part of metaphysics since Plato’s time. 
It was common in medieval universities for philosophy to be divided into three 
parts, natural philosophy, moral philosophy and metaphysics, with logic as a necessary 
prerequisite for studying any of them. The medieval notion of moral philosophy 
resembled something like today’s notion of “value theory” as aesthetics, for example, 
was considered a branch of moral philosophy. Political philosophy and other subjects 
thought today to compose distinct subfields would have also been grouped under the 
“ethics” heading. All other areas would have been divided between metaphysics and 
natural philosophy.
237
  
In the early modern period and even into the mid-eighteenth century philosophy 
generally followed a tripartite division of philosophical subjects. Logic, metaphysics and 
ethics were the three primary branches of study. Some of the considerations of 
knowledge which we now consider epistemological were grouped under the “logic” 
heading. Concerns in the philosophy of language and theory of ideas were commonly 
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included in logic books. Arnauld and Nicole, for example, in their Port Royal Logic 
consider under what conditions we can consider a statement to be true or false.
238
 Wolff 
defines logic as, “that part of philosophy which treats of the use of the cognitive faculty 
in knowing truth and avoiding error.”239 Kant includes similar concerns in his own logic 
lectures as well as in the discussion of logic in the KrV.
240
 To construe any of these 
thinkers as primarily making contributions to epistemology is a-historical at least to the 
extent that, given the absence of “epistemology” as a category, they themselves would 
not have thought of their work as epistemological. 
While one could think of Kant’s discussions of the table of judgments and the 
table of the categories (along with other parts of the KrV contained under the 
“Transcendental Analytic” heading) as being part of a theory of ideas, it is less clear that 
Kant himself considered them in this way. Kant does refer to the second part of the 
“Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” as a kind of logic and even includes a section 
discussing the nature and content of logic in general. What is less clear is how Kant 
views the relationship between traditional logic and transcendental logic. Are the two 
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forms of logic separated by their own content or the content over which their laws are 
valid? Kant offers no explicit answer to this question.
241
  
What Kant does make clear concerning his views on logic is that logic is a science 
of form rather than content. In the KrV he defines logic as, “the science of the rules of the 
understanding in general.”242 General logic he divides into two kinds: pure and applied, 
both of which abstract, “from all content of cognition i.e. from any relation of it to the 
object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, 
i.e., the forms of thinking in general.”243 Transcendental logic, however, is the science, 
“which would determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity,” of the 
concepts “by means of which we think of objects completely a priori.”244 Here Kant 
characterizes transcendental logic as a subset of general logic containing rules of reason 
and the understanding as they relate to objects a priori, rather than more general rules 
which would apply to empirical knowledge as well. With respect to both general and 
transcendental logic Kant subdivides them into analytic and dialectic. In both cases the 
dialectical part of logic is concerned with how one discovers the truth.  
Though Kant does call a central portion of the text a “logic” this does not 
immediately allow us to conclude that the general aim of the work is an epistemological 
one. It can be helpful to keep in mind that not everything we currently consider the 
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territory of epistemology would fall under the general medieval heading of logic; some of 
the field would have been thought to be part of metaphysics. Even when considering 
contemporary scholarship there is frequently a fuzzy line between what is metaphysics 
and what is epistemology. While one might consider this a reason to think that the 
question of whether the KrV is an epistemological or metaphysical work is not a 
particularly enlightening one, it could also be viewed as reason to take Kant at his word 
when he claims the work as a metaphysical one. 
One conclusion that does seem to be clear from considering the historical 
divisions of philosophical sub-disciplines is that the KrV does contain some material 
which contemporary scholars have justification for considering epistemological. As is 
clear from my introduction, my goal is not to show that the KrV contains no 
epistemology, but only that there are downsides to considering it a primarily 
epistemological (rather than metaphysical work). Though the Transcendental Logic is 
one of the most frequently read sections of the KrV and has been the source of nearly 
endless controversy in the literature it does comprise only a single sub-section of the 
work. The special place of the Transcendental Logic within the general outline of the 
work will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
2. The Outline 
According to Kant’s own outline, the KrV is divided into three primary sections: 
the Preface and Introduction, the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, and the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method. The Doctrine of Elements is further subdivided into 
two primary sections: the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, with 
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the latter being further subdivided into two primary sections: the Transcendental Analytic 
and the Transcendental Dialectic. In the original outline of the KrV Kant does not label 
the various portions of the front matter under a single heading, but simply places them in 
the list before the two major divisions. For the sake of clarity, I have taken the liberty of 
adding this numeral, thereby necessitating the changing of Kant’s “I” to “II” and so on. 
Thus we see can the table of contents of the work rendered in standard outline form: 
I. Front Matter 
 A. Preface 
 B. Introduction 
II. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements 
 A. Transcendental Aesthetic 
 B. Transcendental Logic 
  1. Transcendental Analytic 
  2. Transcendental Logic 
III. Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
 
This, therefore, is simply a listing of the book’s primary headings as Kant himself 
organized them with the minor addendum of the Roman numeral marking the front 
matter. In drawing your attention to this rather mundane point about the outline of the 
work I hope to make clear the general hierarchical structure of the work. All of the 
passages generally thought to be fundamental to understanding the scope and aim of the 
Kantian project fall under a single heading of what is at root a tripartite (or at least 
bipartite) structure. I would venture to add that a standard reading of the text considers 
the work under an outline that presumes the work is divided more like this: 
I. Introduction 
II. Transcendental Aesthetic 
III. Transcendental Analytic 
 A. Transcendental Deduction 
 B. Schematism 
 C. Axioms of Intution 
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 D. Anticipations of Perception 
 E. Analogies of Experience 
IV. Transcendental Dialectic 
 B. Paralogisms 
 C. Antinomy 
 D. Ideal of Reason 
 
The primary differences between the book’s given outline and the one contemporary 
scholars seem to prefer is the promotion of the three main divisions of the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements (The Aesthetic and the two main subsections of the Logic) from 
sub-headings to primary divisions and the abandonment of the Doctrine of Method. 
Though it may seem strange to suggest that contemporary scholars are ignoring or 
rewriting the outline of the book, a survey of the recent literature reveals that writing on 
the Transcendental Doctrine of Method is extremely rare.
245
 In his “Recent Work on 
Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy” Karl Ameriks lists transcendental idealism and 
transcendental arguments as the two central issues of the KrV.
246
 Both of these issues find 
their primary treatments within the Transcendental Logic. Written work focusing on the 
transcendental deduction, the schematism, the analogies of experience, the antinomy, and 
the paralogisms is easy to find. Even guides to the KrV that otherwise go section by 
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section through the work will end after considering the Transcendental Dialectic.
247
 
Though it would be foolish to deny that these are important passages it seems unlikely 
that their importance would be diminished by the existence of scholarship on additional 
parts of the work. 
The best hypothesis I have at the moment as to why the final section of the KrV 
has been so sorely neglected is fatigue. After seven hundred plus pages of the KrV 
perhaps many readers simply give up before reaching the final section. Moore suggests 
that, “the comparative dearth of material on the second part of the Critique actually 
exemplifies a more general rough-and-ready rule: that the amount of attention paid to a 
given section of the Critique is inversely proportional to its distance from the beginning 
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of the book.”248 While Moore’s suggestion may serve as an explanation for the 
distribution of scholarly writing on the KrV it should not be used as a guide for reading 
and understanding the book. It is reasonable to assume that any reader encountering a 
work this difficult is likely to be overwhelmed by the many important details and is liable 
to, in a manner of speaking, miss the forest for all of these trees. My aim is to provide 
here a reading that takes account of the whole rather than focusing on the particulars of 
the details. 
In what follows I will discuss what I take to be some of the consequences 
ignoring the Doctrine of Method has had on the general perception of the goals and aims 
of the work. The following section of the paper will follow the KrV section by section 
discussing what contemporary scholarship generally regards as the primary features of 
each section and comparing this with what I believe to be lost by not considering the 
section in terms of its position within the larger work. I will pay some attention to 
relevant literature and provide references to substantiate the claims I make about the 
general thread of interpretation. Providing a detailed exploration of the vast literature on 
the KrV is not the primary aim of this discussion. Greater attention will be given to 
suggesting alternate themes and readings than to justifying any position as the dominate 
one. 
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3. Re-outlining the KrV 
3.1. The Introduction 
Though there are many valuable things to say about the Introduction from the A 
version of the KrV, following the general course of the literature I will focus on the 
longer B version of the Introduction. In many introductory texts and frequently in courses 
on Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the B Introduction has only a single primary function. 
Kant here provides his version of the analytic/synthetic distinction and a proof of the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Both the A and B versions of the Introduction 
contain the now famous discussion of “7+5=12” as an example of and proof for the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. 
An analytic judgment is a “judgment of clarification” while a synthetic judgment 
is one of “amplification."249 As analytic judgments do not add any additional content to 
their subjects, synthetic judgments are essential for the expansion of knowledge. One 
might be tempted to think that all synthetic judgments are based on experience (as all 
judgments of experience are synthetic)
250
 in a way which would prevent us from 
expanding our knowledge of what is universal and necessary (e.g. metaphysics). 
However, Kant points out that all synthetic judgments cannot be a posteriori because 
mathematics consists of synthetic judgments which must be a priori in order to ensure 
their necessity. Through mathematics we receive confirmation that synthetic a priori 
judgments are possible and hope that they might be made in fields outside of 
mathematics. 
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Since the B Introduction is thought to focus on establishing the existence of 
synthetic, a priori judgments literature on the B Introduction is frequently aimed at 
determining whether or not Kant’s argument for their possibility is sound.251 Kant’s 
argument is seen as relying heavily on the premise that mathematical judgments are 
synthetic, thus scholars have considered whether mathematical propositions are genuinely 
synthetic and if Kant’s definition of “synthetic” maps onto later considerations of the 
term.
252
   
While these are clearly important issues discussed in the B Introduction, they do 
not seem to encompass everything that Kant offers by way of orienting the reader to the 
text. Synthetic a priori judgments are undeniably an important part of this puzzle, but 
they alone are not enough to solve it. When we confirm the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgments by showing their existence in mathematics, we should be lead to wonder 
where else they have made an appearance. In the B Introduction Kant discusses their 
existence not only in pure mathematics, but in the guiding principles of the natural 
sciences. Kant holds the view that a subject is as much a science as there is mathematics 
in it. If Newton places physics securely within the realm of the sciences by introducing 
mathematics into it, Kant’s question seems to consider whether a similar move is possible 
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for metaphysics. The nature of science, or the nature of metaphysics as a science, is the 
central theme. 
Near the end of section six, Kant offers the question whose answer he takes to be 
the book’s primary concern: “How is metaphysics as a science possible?” This question 
posed near the end of the introduction is related to the concern that metaphysic has lost its 
way which Kant expressed earlier in the work. The question about the possibility of 
metaphysics as a science is an echo of the previous concern.  Metaphysics is currently 
lost, floundering in the dogmatism of Leibniz and Wolff. How can we (or, ‘is it possible 
to’) put metaphysics on a path of certainly much like the one Newton has so valiantly 
discovered for physics? This is the broader concern in which the question about the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgments finds its place. 
The transition Kant makes in the Introduction from discussing the methodology of 
science, in particular mathematics, to questioning the possibility of a rigorous method for 
metaphysics is echoed in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. In the Doctrine of 
Method’s first section (The Discipline of Reason in Dogmatic Use) Kant considers 
whether or not mathematics is distinct from philosophy only in content or if the form of 
the sciences differs are well. The hopeful proclamation of the possibility of synthetic, a 
priori judgments as opening the door for metaphysics as a science in the Introduction is 
revisited in a more reserved, and wary fashion in light of the intervening Doctrine of 
Elements. Metaphysics is possible as a science, but only when it remains confined to 
uncovering the conditions for the possibility of experience. Since our access to the world 
is always mitigated through the organizing function of space and time we cannot expand 
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our claims about the world beyond the world of experience. It turns out that mathematics 
differs from philosophy not only in content but in form as well. Whereas pure 
mathematics utilizes only the pure forms of intuition and can introduce definitions for 
objects and terms that prove useful, philosophy cannot construct its own concepts without 
fear of contradicting the world as such. 
Reading the B Introduction in light of the themes presented in the Doctrine of 
Method thus sheds new light on the significance of Kant’s discussion of the use of 
synthetic a priori judgments in the natural sciences as well as mathematics. Kant 
introduces these sciences not only as additional proof for the existence of the synthetic a 
priori but in order to suggest a model for metaphysical methodology to emulate. 
Mathematics is Kant’s paradigm science, and metaphysics is similar to it in that it also 
must be carried out by means of synthetic a priori claims. However, the two sciences are 
also different. Mathematics is complete, on Kant’s account, because its procedures are 
robust enough to provide for the solution of every problem within its domain. 
Mathematics proceeds through the use of definition, axioms, and demonstrations all 
immediately verified in pure intuition. The question of how it is possible for metaphysics 
to be complete is answered not through adequate method but through limitation of scope. 
Both sciences are systematic, but they achieve systematicity in very different fashions. In 
some sense the KrV presents metaphysics as an attempt to find a middle ground between 
mathematics and the natural sciences. Metaphysics must be a priori but it also must be 
true to the world of and outside our experience. It is meant to provide the a priori 
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principles governing the existence of the world which ground our scientific judgments 
and allow them to be universal.  
3.2 The Transcendental Aesthetic 
The traditional reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic focuses on the 
introduction of space and time as the pure forms of intuition. Kant claims that it is 
possible for us to have certain knowledge of things pertaining to experience so long as 
that knowledge is of the things we ourselves add to that experience. Space and time are 
not in the world, but in us as perceivers of it. Kant makes this argument by pointing to the 
fact that all of our outer intuitions must take place in space (this is what leads us to 
describe them as outer). If we know space to be a necessary part of all outer intuitions 
then we must also know that our knowledge of space cannot be based on experience as 
experience can never yield necessity. As Kant puts it, “Thus the representation of space 
cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this 
outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.”253 Space 
becomes the first of many conditions for the possibility of (outer) experience.  
Kant’s “Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time” in the B edition of 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, the so called “argument from geometry,” is often seen as 
the linchpin of his argument for the transcendental ideality of space.
254
 Here Kant asserts 
that only if we have pure a priori knowledge of space can geometry as an a priori science 
be possible. However, we can only have a priori knowledge of space if space, “has its 
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seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects and 
thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e., intuition, of them, thus only as the form 
of outer sense in general.”255 Geometry, as the science of considering points, lines and 
shapes in space, cannot have the apodictic certainty of a mathematical science unless the 
space geometers examine is something other than mere experience. The only way that a 
part of experience is necessary is if its source is not external to the geometer but a 
condition of the representation of objects. 
Some commentators think that though the argument from geometry is crucial for 
Kant’s claims about the a priori nature of our intuition of space, the argument creates 
more problems than it solves. Kant may be right in asserting the necessity of conceiving 
space as a pure form of outer intuition as a condition for the apodictic certainty of 
geometry, but what sort of geometry does this leave us? Is there room in space so 
conceived for non-Euclidian geometries or is the world of our perception always going to 
be one in which two parallel lines never meet? If Kant’s forms of intuition will not allow 
us to move beyond Euclid then is he correct in his description of the space we 
perceive?
256
 
An often overlooked but important theme introduced in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic is the special nature of mathematical cognition. Kant establishes mathematics 
as an intuitive rather than conceptual kind of knowledge, rendering it different in kind 
than all other cognition. As Kant points out in the Doctrine of Method (and reiterates in 
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both the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and the Critique of Practical 
Reason) mathematical cognition is knowledge from the construction of concepts. 
Philosophical thought rests only in reason and the understanding since sensibility cannot 
provide us with the apodictic certainty necessary for the kinds of claims philosophy must 
make if it is to act as a science. Philosophers are required to make claims that apply with 
necessity to the world, but they must do so without recourse to contingent knowledge 
from the world. As a result, metaphysics can only show us the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of experience.  Mathematics, on the other hand, has the resources of the 
entire realm of pure intuition at its disposal. Space and time offer ample setting in which 
to construct a myriad of mathematical concepts. The succession of time and the extended 
nature of space serve as the basis for our concepts of lines, planes, and numbers. While 
mathematics has concepts it takes place fundamentally in intuition.  
If space and time were features of the world (rather than conditions of experience) 
any knowledge that relied upon them would be merely empirical knowledge. They would 
be, “...empirical concepts, together with that on which they are grounded, empirical 
intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also merely empirical, 
i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never contain necessity and absolute 
universality of the sort that is nevertheless characteristic of all propositions of 
geometry.”257 On the other hand, if we were to divorce geometry from space, the 
concepts alone would not allow us to progress. At A47/B65 Kant gives an example of the 
hopelessness of deriving the proposition “with two straight lines no space can be 
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enclosed” from only the concept of straight lines and the number two. He gives a similar 
example at A716/B744. Proceeding philosophically (by concepts alone) one cannot 
discover that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, but the wise geometer 
will construct a parallel. Because of its place as the only science which is both entirely a 
priori and based in intuition, mathematics becomes and unique science with features that 
no other science shares. It happily marries the world of experience to the realm of a priori 
concepts. 
The mentions of mathematics Kant makes in the Transcendental Aesthetic are 
part of an important argument for the transcendental ideality of space and time. In 
addition, they point to the regularity with which Kant uses mathematical arguments and 
examples. When considered in light of Kant’s extended discussion of mathematics in the 
Doctrine of Method it becomes clear that mathematics provides a model for the kind of 
knowledge by which Kant measures other sciences (metaphysics included). However the 
frequent references to mathematics also show us the special nature of mathematical 
knowledge which makes it distinct from all other sciences. We could expand our 
metaphysical knowledge with the same zeal and success as we can our mathematical if 
metaphysics had access to (relevant) pure intuition. As we see in chapter 2 philosophical 
knowledge, however, is concerned primarily with concepts rather than intuitions. The 
limited scope of our a priori concepts combined with our inability to construct new ones 
the relate to our experience renders metaphysics unable to progress into new territory 
following the lead of mathematicians.  
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3.3 The Transcendental Logic – Analytic and Dialectic 
The Transcendental Logic is usually read as the heart and soul of Kant’s critical 
philosophy. The Transcendental Aesthetic importantly sets the stage for what follows, but 
it is the transcendental arguments of the Analytic section of the Transcendental Logic that 
determine whether the project as a whole has any merit. It is thought that this section is 
intended to explain how our experience of the world is conditioned by our mental 
faculties. Accordingly, the transcendental deduction of the categories of the 
understanding is generally regarded as the central passage of the book. Thus, it has long 
been a primary focus of Kant scholarship, and many feel that the success of Kant’s 
project rides on whether the argument works.
258
 Dieter Henrich, for example, claims that, 
“The transcendental deduction of the categories is the very heart of the Critique of Pure 
Reason.”259 Moreover, this is a heart consisting of, “thirty-five pages, which are easily 
separated from their context.”260 Kant himself suggests the centrality of the 
transcendental deduction in the introduction to the B edition.  
While in previous chapters of the dissertation I have suggested alternate or 
additional themes that I believe the traditional reading of the KrV overlooks, here I only 
want to suggest a small caveat or amendment to how the overarching theme of this part of 
the KrV is usually read. I would not want to dispute any claims about the importance of 
the Transcendental Analytic, I think it is helpful to remember that it is merely part of a 
larger project rather than the sum total of all its worth. The rest of the work throws more 
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light than is usually admitted on this part of it. Thus, even if one could definitely show 
that the deduction of the categories is circular or question begging it would not be 
sufficient to render the entire text of the KrV worthless. If one takes the passages of the 
Analytic as an explanation of experience through separating the conditions from the 
conditioned, the value of the project seems to hold even if any of the particular conditions 
Kant gives fail to have the secure place in the conditions for possible experience that 
Kant grants them. Showing that the transcendental deduction of the categories fails would 
not be tantamount to showing that transcendental arguments, generally speaking, are 
invalid. One we need to argue that the method as a whole fails to adequately justify the 
claims it allows one to make or that it results in conclusions that are demonstrably false. 
It is also worth mentioning that the transcendental deduction is neither the first 
transcendental argument in the book nor perhaps even the most crucial. The ideality of 
both space and time are confirmed via transcendental deduction in the Aesthetic.
261
 If the 
primary contribution of the KrV is the introduction of transcendental argumentation there 
are many other passages of the book worth examining in detail. Indeed, A. W. Moore 
cites the information Kant provides there for understanding transcendental arguments as 
one of the primary reasons to examine the Doctrine of Method.
262
 
Much of the literature on the Transcendental Dialectic focuses on what Kant’s 
negative metaphysical claims can teach us positively about his views in other areas of 
philosophy. Karl Ameriks’ Kant’s Theory of Mind spurred interest in discovering what 
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the paralogisms have to offer on the book’s title topic.263 Considerations of the antinomy 
(particular the first and second conflicts) have lead to speculations about Kant’s views of 
natural science and causality.
264
 If one stopped reading the KrV at the end of the Dialectic 
section of the Transcendental Logic it might make sense to assume that Kant saw no 
future purpose for metaphysics, and that issues of mind and natural science were his 
primary aim in the Dialectic. However, when one takes into account the themes that 
appear in the Doctrine of Method it becomes clear that the primary topic of the Dialectic 
is the unavoidable illusion that arises when we attempt to make claims regarding the 
immortality of the soul, the existence of God or the fundamental nature of the universe.  
If you wanted to make the argument that Kant’s philosophy ushers in the death of 
metaphysics, the Transcendental Dialectic is an excellent place to start. Here Kant seems 
to give up on answering any of the traditional questions of metaphysics. We cannot know 
for certain what a substance is (or how many there are), prove whether or not God exists, 
provide any experiential evidence of human freedom or determine what happens to the 
soul after death. The end and moral of the story is a grim one: metaphysics is impossible. 
In light of the continuing mentions of metaphysics in the Doctrine of Method, it seems 
more accurate to construe the Transcendental Dialectic as a discussion of the 
metaphysical errors that arise as a result of our cognitive conditioning combined with an 
attempt to do deductive metaphysics. 
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I am far from the first scholar to suggest that Kant’s KrV has an important, 
positive metaphysical component. Heinz Heimsoeth, in reaction to the epistemological 
strain he saw in the Neo-Kantians, argued for a reading of Kant that emphasized 
metaphysics as early as 1924.
265
 On his reading Kant designates two primary functions 
for “practical-dogmatic” metaphysics. The first is a critical function designed to keep 
rationalist metaphysicians from claiming more than the constraints of the conditions for 
the possibility for experience will allow them. The second function provides the 
metaphysical basis necessary for the kind of religious faith Kant deems necessary for 
moral motivation. Without the ability to honestly assert a belief in the existence of God, 
the immortality of the soul and freedom of will there is little reason to think that human 
beings can act morally or that both the righteous and unrighteous will eventually see 
justice. Heimsoeth also emphasizes the influence that Kant’s philosophical education and 
upbringing had on his thought and the common presence of metaphysical themes in 
Kant’s pre-critical writings (Kant’s Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God 
serves as one obvious example). Heimsoeth points to the metaphysical framing that Kant 
provides at the beginning of the KrV as further evidence that Kant remained interested in 
metaphysics even after his “critical turn.” 
Still, his view is far from being uncontroversial. W. H. Walsh finds much to fault 
in Heimsoeth’s account of Kant’s metaphysical interests.266 He argues that Heimsoeth 
view of Kant requires far more in the way of religious commitment than Kant himself 
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intended. He draws the final conclusion that Kant’s morality does not require 
metaphysical truths, but only “metaphysical convictions.”267 Without a positive moral 
role for metaphysics to play we must, “see Kant’s philosophy as the Neo-Kantians did, as 
a combination of modified empiricism in theory of knowledge with an ethics of the pure 
will.”268 
While I find parts of Walsh’s criticism of Heimsoeth compelling it is less clear to 
me that his conclusion follows. Heimsoeth’s discussion of religion does seem to require 
one to adopt a heartier metaphysical conviction than the Kantian text can (or would want 
to) support.
269
 However, as this is not the only positive task (and certainly not the only 
negative task) that Heimsoeth attributes to metaphysics in Kant it is not clear to me why 
this overreaching is enough to damn metaphysics in the Kantian enterprise altogether. In 
this section I wish to endorse and rehabilitate the other arguments for the centrality of 
metaphysics which Heimsoeth gives and to offer a new one that I believe is contiguous 
with the better parts of the position he presents. 
Frederick Rauscher, in comparing the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ 
to the ‘Cannon of Pure Reason’ section of the Doctrine of Method, also concludes that 
Kant makes room for a positive use of metaphysics.
270
 Examining these two passages in 
conjunction leads him to argue that Kant allows for two positive uses of reason. The 
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‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ presents the theoretical use of reason as 
regulating the knowledge claims of the understanding while the ‘Cannon of Pure Reason’ 
shows that practical reason plays an analogous regulative function. 
After the primarily negative representation of metaphysics we receive in the 
Transcendental Dialectic, the Doctrine of Method can be thought of as transitioning to 
considering what possible use metaphysics might still have. The Doctrine of Method 
presents the way forward, a new, task for metaphysics which does not require following a 
mathematical method. There is a sense in which the Doctrine of Method mirrors the 
content of the Introduction. It provides a conclusion for the text, provides answers the 
questions initially raised and prepares a way for moral and religious philosophy. In short, 
the task of metaphysics becomes a “critical” one. Metaphysics cannot help me to prove 
that God exists or provide evidence of the soul’s immortality, but it can help prevent the 
errors that arise from thinking that one can prove these sorts of metaphysical positions. 
Metaphysics, for all its historical claims to grand, all-encompassing theories of 
everything, turns out to be a tool for the protection of intellectual humility. Without 
“good” or “critical” metaphysics we might be tempted to think that we can have 
knowledge of the world-as-such beyond its existence as an appearance for us.  
4. The Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
It is difficult to say what space the Transcendental Doctrine of Method occupies 
in a traditional reading of the KrV as so little attention is devoted to it. Many 
undergraduate level courses on Kant’s philosophy do not require students to read it. Some 
courses look only at those sections of the Doctrine of Method which seem the best segue 
208 
 
into a discussion of the Critique of Practical Reason. While graduate level seminars are 
often devoted to a particular Kantian text or topic (the KrV, Kant’s moral philosophy, 
Kant’s psychology, etc.), I have yet to see one that chooses the Doctrine of Method as its 
primary text. I have spoken with plenty of scholars who feel perfectly comfortable 
claiming that they have “read Kant” who have ignored the Doctrine of Method entirely. If 
the other sections of the KrV are thought of as guests at a family Thanksgiving dinner, the 
Doctrine of Method is stuck at the children’s table without the ability to substantially 
contribute to the conversation.  
Though the evidence for the Doctrine of Method’s neglect presented in the 
previous paragraph is largely anecdotal and confined to the KrV’s consideration among 
non-experts, a review of the scholarly literature will only confirm this picture. A search 
through the past eighty odd years of Kant-Studien, The Kantian Review, Kant Studies 
Online, relevant articles from the Journal of the History of Philosophy, the British 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, etc. reveal almost 
nothing dedicated to this portion of the text.
271
 While the Transcendental Aesthetic, The 
Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic have all received several book 
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length treatments it is rare to see even a reference to any passage of the KrV past 
A704/B732.
272
  
Since the content of the Doctrine of Method itself has been well covered in the 
preceding  chapters, in order to avoid needless repetition I will focus primarily on 
discussing what little literature there is that does directly address the Doctrine of Method 
or the important themes that the section introduces. The text of the passage itself will be 
discussed as it corresponds to the literature under consideration. There are a few notable 
recent exceptions to the long-standing dearth of literature on the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Method, The first is the two articles published in the recent Cambridge Companion to 
the Critique of Pure Reason.
273
 Frederick Rauscher’s “The Appendix to the Dialectic and 
the Cannon of Pure Reason” considers the relation of the two portions of the KrV 
mentioned in the title to the larger picture of Kant’s moral philosophy.274 A. W. Moore’s 
“The Transcendental Doctrine of Method” is intended to cover the sections of the 
Doctrine of Method not discussed in Rauscher’s essay. While it is encouraging to see that 
some attention is being spent on these valuable end sections of the KrV these two essays 
leave a great deal of territory left to be covered. The second exception is recent work on 
Kant’s philosophy of arithmetic. The ‘Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’ 
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contains the most sustained discussion of arithmetic in all of Kant’s published writings, 
and scholars working on Kant’s arithmetic frequently site the passage.275 
Moore begins his essay from the Cambridge collection by bemoaning the 
“unfairness” of being asked to discuss an entire main division of the KrV in a few pages 
while the other primary division of the work is covered in several chapters. Yet, he 
quickly retreats from his recognition of the KrV’s fundamental outline by claiming that 
Companion divided its essays fairly with respect to the length and importance of the two 
primary divisions. Not only is the Transcendental Doctrine of Method a mere fraction of 
the size of the preceding section, “but even in a metaphorical sense of magnitude, the 
second part brooks no real comparison with all that has gone before.”276 This attitude 
toward the Doctrine of Method is further reflected in Moore’s decision to begin his 
discussion of the section with mention of some of its “incidental delights.”277 In 
particular, Moore repeatedly references the analogy Kant makes between the limits of 
reason and the circumnavigation of a globe. While Moore makes a convincing case for 
the charming nature of the analogy, his discussion does little to further the idea of the 
Doctrine of Method as a text of scholarly significance. After finishing Moore’s essay the 
reader may be left wondering why the volume’s editors thought it worth devoting any 
space at all to a relatively uninformative and uninteresting section of the KrV.  
                                                 
275
 As much of this work has already been examined in chapter 1 I will not reiterate the discussion here. 
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood’s introduction to the Cambridge translation to the KrV also provides a nice, 
brief overview of the content of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, but sadly makes no effort to relate 
the content to earlier portions of the work. 
276
 Moore, “Transcendental Doctrine,” 310. 
277
 Moore, “Transcendental Doctrine,” 311. 
211 
 
One reason that scholars might focus on the interior sections of the KrV rather 
than the introduction and conclusion which present the work’s overall aim is if they are 
convinced that Kant’s critique and reconstruction of traditional metaphysics does not 
work, but that his observations about the organization of the faculties and unique style of 
argumentation offer something which may be true. In a series of articles reprinted in 
Gram’s Kant: Disputed Questions Arthur O. Lovejoy offers a series of arguments that the 
criticisms Kant offers of earlier “skeptical” and “dogmatic” philosophers are not 
sufficient to address their claims or differentiate Kant’s work from their own. Lovejoy’s 
claims are interesting and worth evaluating individually.  
In “Kant’s Antithesis of Dogmatism and Criticism” Lovejoy argues that Kant’s 
definition of “dogmatic” philosophy is not one that fits the philosophers Kant clearly 
wants to reject (Leibniz and Wolff among others). Moreover, Kant’s attempts to do 
“critical” philosophy fail to adequately distinguish him from his predecessor’s. Lovejoy 
takes seriously Eberhard’s early criticisms of Kant on the grounds that what is correct in 
Kant was already present in Leibniz (and everything else is false).
278
 While Lovejoy 
argues that there are some significant flaws in the Kantian project, he does not dispute the 
claim that Kant’s views his own aim as that of moving beyond dogmatic metaphysics. 
Lovejoy sees Kant as being wrong about his predecessors and about the success of his 
own project, but clearly accepts that Kant is attempting a fundamental shift in 
metaphysical thinking.  
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In “On Kant’s Reply to Hume” Lovejoy argues that Kant fails to provide an 
adequate, original response to Hume’s skepticism about causality. Lovejoy again claims 
that Kant’s view represents a fundamental misunderstanding about the relationship of his 
own work to that of influential predecessors (in this case, Wolf and Leibniz). Kant’s 
discussion of causality, “fails to establish any essential difference,” between his own 
view and that of earlier thinkers.
279
 Instead of viewing Kant as providing an extension 
and refinement of Humean skepticism, Lovejoy argues that Kant bears fare more in 
common with his rationalist predecessors.  
Why would Lovejoy, and others of the metaphysical school of Kant scholars, 
think that Kant was attempting to revive Leibniz/Wolff or that Kant’s work bore no 
substantial distinction from theirs? Why would they think there is a great continuity 
between Kant’s early and critical work when Kant himself denies such a connection? One 
reason might be the fundamental compatibility between Kant’s critical work and 
Leibniz’s monadology. Though the KrV provides counterarguments to some of Leibniz’s 
metaphysical positions, many of the central Leibnizian tenets are never directly 
challenged. Kant’s phenomenal-noumenal distinction allows him to avoid directly 
dealing with any of the issues concerning freedom, immortal souls or the will of God. Do 
Leibniz’s God or his monads really exist? On Kant’s account we cannot say with 
certainty one way or the other.  
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However, it is not clear that this compatibility has enough weight to carry the 
claim that Kant’s work bears no significant distinction from that of Leibniz and Wolff. It 
does not speak to what justifies ignoring Kant’s claim of a radical break with his earlier 
self or to the ways in which Kant disagrees explicitly with Leibniz in other realms. Kant 
diverges from Leibniz on more than minor mathematical points. The kind of 
methodology Leibniz employs to justify his metaphysics is completely without merit 
within the Kantian critical system. In fact, there would be more merit in reading a work 
which attempts to destroy the Leibnizian system than there would be in reading Leibniz 
himself according to claims Kant makes in the Doctrine of Method. Leibniz is quite clear 
in his claims that we can have rational knowledge of the existence of the divine, and Kant 
makes it equally clear that such knowledge cannot be rationally justified.
280
 It seems clear 
through all this that some advancement in metaphysics is a key part of Kant’s aim in the 
KrV. 
There is a sense in which the Doctrine of Method provides a means through which 
to read the remainder of the KrV. The Doctrine of Method lays out the place of the 
Aesthetic and the Logic in Kant’s larger theory of reason. While this might lead one to 
believe that the work as a whole is epistemological in aim, or even that Kant’s project 
broadly construed is epistemological at heart, I think it instead gives greater credence to 
the idea that the work is primarily a metaphysical one. As the Doctrine of Method makes 
clear, one prominent motive for investigating the sources and functions of reason is to 
show with certainty the kind and extent of metaphysical knowledge available to us. One 
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of Kant’s primary concerns is illuminating the relationship in which the conditions for the 
possibility of experience places us with respect to the world outside of our minds. The 
ultimate aim is not knowledge of ourselves but knowledge of the world.
281
 However, it is 
only through coming to terms with what we ourselves add to our experience that we can 
have any sense of what knowledge of the outside world is possible.  
In the Introduction Kant praises mathematics as the confirmation that synthetic, a 
priori judgments are possible.
282
 Mathematics offers us hope that philosophical 
knowledge can be likewise expanded. In the Doctrine of Method the tone radically shifts. 
We revisit mathematical knowledge now convinced that its method will not work in 
philosophy. Philosophy must be based on concepts rather than on intuitions. As a result 
we can never be certain that our concepts do in fact conform to objects (i.e. intuitions). 
Mathematics has special access to its object that philosophy cannot duplicate. Concepts, 
as mediators, cannot provide us with immediate access to things. There must always be a 
third thing connecting or confirming the connection of two concepts if their connection is 
meant to have any correspondence to reality (i.e. truth).  
The Doctrine of Method also makes it clearer that the scope of Kant’s project is 
intended to extend beyond the KrV.  Even if the primary content of the KrV is seen as 
epistemological in nature, the KrV itself is only a prelude to the larger metaphysics 
project Kant is undertaking. One could even consider the content of the KrV as being 
primarily logical in nature since it sets up a rather abstract set of rules for reasoning that 
                                                 
281
 Those who hold that the (or one of the) fundamental aims of Kant’s project is to provide a rational basis 
for science (or Newtonian science in particular) should be amenable to this point of view. 
282
 Here we can again point to an important distinction between Kant and Leibniz, as Leibniz would have 
considered mathematical propositions analytic. 
215 
 
must be followed in order to undertake metaphysics as a science. Though the KrV rules 
out metaphysical knowledge of God, freedom and the soul, it calls for further 
examination of the metaphysical underpinnings of practical reason and natural science. 
This metaphysical project is carried out in the The Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, The Metaphysics of Morals, and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science.
283
 The a priori nature Kant grants to metaphysics is not intended as an 
abandonment of empiricism but a refinement. Metaphysics provides an a priori grounding 
from which to interpret our experience. Without knowing what in our experience must 
stem from outside of it we cannot properly understand it.  
5. Conclusion 
If I am not suggesting that the traditional reading of Kant is without merit it might 
be worthwhile to consider why the re-outlining of the KrV matters. I’d like to suggest two 
reasons why the outline I’ve developed here is worth considering.  
5.1 Our Past Affects Our Future 
The history of philosophy is important as more than just a description of, 
philosophically speaking, where we have been and the many ways we went wrong. At 
least as early as Plato, philosophers have used the ideas of those before them as an 
important starting place for their own ideas. How one does philosophy is in large part 
decided by how one perceives what has already been said. Contemporary philosophers 
continue to incorporate, react against, argue for, etc., the perceived positions of earlier 
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thinkers in the process of doing philosophy. If we as contemporary philosophers work 
from inaccurate or wrongheaded versions of historical philosophers we are far more 
likely to fall into error or follow dead ends than if we start with clear ideas of what went 
before us. Good history of philosophy is an integral part of good philosophy. History of 
philosophy improperly done leads to a repetition of mistakes already made while 
important insights from the past are lost. 
With regard to Kant, the confusions of contemporary philosophers in interpreting 
his thought (many of which have existed since the inception of Kant scholarship) are not 
only about specific claims or particular arguments, but concern the entire aim and scope 
of Kant’s project. This creates a serious problem since appropriations of Kant are 
essential to philosophy as it moves forward. The idea that “one can do philosophy with 
Kant or against Kant but not without Kant” is an adage repeated by many scholars.284 
One would be hard pressed to find western philosophy in the nineteenth century and 
beyond that does not bear some mark of Kant’s influence.285 This seems to me to be as 
true today as it was two hundred years ago. If Kant's work plays such a large role in the 
history of philosophy then discovering overlooked themes seems to be a valuable 
contribution to not only the history of philosophy but philosophy as such. 
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5.2 Is Philosophy a Science? 
In properly understanding what is at stake in Kant's philosophy we are drawn 
closer not only to understanding his time but issues that remain vital for us today and 
beyond today. Historically, Kant's philosophy provides a crucial turning point for 
metaphysical discussions. Contemporary metaphysicians should be eager to learn what 
limitations Kant saw on the possibility of introducing metaphysics as a science and 
interested to know whether their own metaphysical projects would meet the criteria of 
"critical" metaphysics Kant outlines. Those interested in the still relevant questions of 
whether or not philosophy is a science, whether it is possible to make philosophy a 
science and whether it is desirable to make philosophy a science can benefit from Kant’s 
perspective. 
In the preceding chapter I argued that the fundamental aim of the KrV is best 
interpreted in light of the claims about metaphysics that Kant presents in the 
“Transcendental Doctrine of Method.” While this might seem to be a digression from the 
general argument thread of the dissertation as a whole, I believe that the argument of this 
chapter is an integral part of my overarching project. Chapters two and three presents us 
with evidence for thinking that completeness is a necessary condition of conceiving of 
metaphysics as a science. If completeness really plays the central role in shoring up 
metaphysics as a science which I believe that it does then the “Transcendental Doctrine 
of Method” provides us with the closest look at the methods Kant believes are able to 
accomplish this aim. Moreover the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” is itself a part 
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of Kant’s work and a complete picture of his philosophy must take into account the way 
in which this final section relates to earlier portions of the work. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant defines metaphysics as “a system of pure 
cognition from concepts alone.”286 Metaphysics, to maintain its universality and 
necessity, excludes empirical knowledge from intuition and must consist of judgments 
relying on pure, a priori concepts. This definition must be understood against the 
background of Kant’s understanding of philosophy more generally which is a “system of 
rational knowledge from concepts.”287 For Kant, metaphysics is a more specific type of 
philosophy. More precisely, it is pure philosophy or philosophy done only from a priori 
concepts. Philosophy needs metaphysics if it is to have any hope of being a “genuine 
science” as only this pure portion can give philosophy the systematicity a science 
requires.
288
 Without metaphysics there is no philosophy as a science, and without proper 
method there is no metaphysics. 
When scholars today speak of method in Kant’s critical philosophy, they often do 
so in ways which highlight particular features of Kant’s notion of method without 
examining the larger picture in which those features are found. There is a vast body of 
literature on the argument structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 
and the viability of transcendental arguments more generally. There are many 
comparative studies on the argument structure of Kant’s various works and 
considerations of whether or not the table of categories follows in whole or in part from 
Kant’s deductions of it. What these studies neglect is a careful consideration of the ways 
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in which Kant views his own method and what such an examination can reveal about the 
validity of the arguments Kant gives.  
The deduction of the categories is, in some sense, Kant’s key employment of his 
method and many believe that the overall success of Kant’s critical project stands or falls 
with this deduction. However, the example of transcendental argumentation presented in 
the deduction of the categories is helpfully illuminated by Kant’s descriptions of how the 
method works and what pieces it must and cannot contain. As a result of focusing on the 
example rather than Kant’s explicit discussion of metaphysical method, accounts of what 
Kant’s metaphysics is and how it takes on scientific status tend to focus on two criteria: 
unity and systematicity. While these are vital features of Kant’s account of metaphysics 
as a science, there is a third key feature which I believe the Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method helpfully explains, namely completeness. 
While there is a substantial body of literature questioning whether or not Kant’s 
metaphysics is appropriately systematic, I believe that the less discussed condition of 
completeness  is far more critical to determining the success of Kant’s project. Indeed, 
completeness is the key feature of Kant’s understanding of metaphysics. It ensures the 
possibility of metaphysics as a science by providing the only means through which 
metaphysics can be systematic. Encouraged by the recently discovered solutions to many 
long unsolved mathematical difficulties Kant believed that metaphysics, properly limited 
in scope, was a completeable science.  
Kant advocates an architectonic view of the sciences in which each science has its 
own appropriate content and method. What all sciences must hold in common is some 
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notion of method that ensures the validity and systematic unity of its content. However, 
each science must develop through a unique method, one that properly takes into account 
the aim of the science and the nature of its content. Just as one will fail to progress in 
mathematics by relying on the methods of physics, in the same way one will fail to make 
progress in metaphysics by relying on the methods of mathematics.  
Kant defines “architectonic” as “the art of systems.”289 It is systematic unity 
which, “makes ordinary cognition a science.”290 Kant opposes “science” here to an 
“aggregate.” Rather than merely collecting knowledge, a science must organize 
knowledge into a system. A system presents, “The unity of the manifold of conditions 
under one idea.” The unity of a system is of one of two types. Either it is a technical unity 
which is a merely empirical unity “in accordance with contingent aims” or it is an 
architectonic unity “from a single supreme and inner end which first makes possible the 
whole.” Lacking empirical input, metaphysics must have an architectonic unity. The 
various branches and principles of metaphysics must be shown to all stem from a single 
idea which connects all subordinate ideas in a way which makes the clear the 
completeness of the collection. The various parts of the science of metaphysics must have 
a natural unity. 
 A mere aggregate of perceptual principles discovered as they arise can never 
constitute a system, but systematicity is one feature of all sciences which metaphysics 
must share if it wishes to become properly scientific. One can ensure the systematicity of 
metaphysics by starting from a set of first principles, and then from those principles 
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deriving a set of truths which clearly follow from the first principles and can be arranged 
in logical and orderly fashion which would allow one to easily see when all possible 
applications of the principles had been made. Any more haphazardly organized group 
would not constitute a system.  
The problem this particular method faces in its application to metaphysics is that 
metaphysics, on Kant’s definition, must be passed on a priori concepts, and nothing from 
a priori concepts is self-evident. The a priori can be self-evident only insofar as it is also 
intuitive since only intuition can provide the immediacy necessary for something to be 
self-evident. If a proof relies on intuition, that intuition must be either pure or empirical. 
Empirical proofs are not a priori, and philosophical proofs, as we have already seen are 
conceptual rather than intuitive. Demonstrations are intuitive, a priori proofs which begin 
from self-evident principles. Thus only mathematical proofs can be properly called 
demonstrations. Whatever proofs philosophy is capable of deducing cannot begin from a 
set of self-evident axioms. 
Systematicity for metaphysics cannot come about as the result of derivations from 
first principles. We have no first principles. On Kant’s account, however, derivation from 
first principles is not the only way to make a body of knowledge systematic. A body of 
knowledge is also systematic if it is complete. The metaphysician thus proceeds not as 
the geometer, who knows she has finished the proof when the sought after conclusion is 
firmly established, but rather more like the method of someone putting together a jigsaw 
puzzle. The puzzle is finished when it is complete, a whole or unity leaving no gaps for 
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lost pieces. Likewise, we can know that our metaphysical enquiries are complete when 
we arrive at a full table of truths that answer all possible relevant questions. 
Kant is most famous for enacting a Copernican revolution in thinking that 
requires own to focus first on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge rather than 
the objects of knowledge themselves. If we consider this exercise of examining the 
conditions for the possibility of experience as metaphysics, it results in a metaphysics that 
is far more limited in scope than previous attempts. While this could be seen as a 
negative consequence of Kant’s metaphysics, one positive result of the shift is that the 
narrow scope allows for a completable science. Indeed, Kant’s move to limit the 
boundaries of what can properly be considered metaphysics is the only hope he has for 
securing metaphysics as a science. Boundaries are what enable metaphysics to be 
complete, properly systematic, and scientific. Without this completeness metaphysics 
would be unable to claim its rightful place as the head of all the other sciences. 
Kant claims that metaphysics, “has the rare good fortune enjoyed by no other 
rational science that has to do with objects…,which is that if by this critique it has been 
brought onto the secure course of a science, then it can fully embrace the entire field of 
cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work…”291 For Kant metaphysics 
continues to be science about objects, but what it tells us about them is only what we 
ourselves provide for them. In this sense Kantian metaphysics becomes similar to logic in 
that it is now also a science of reason investigating itself (a “transcendental” logic). The 
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similarities between Kantian metaphysics and logic give us further reason to hope that 
metaphysics, like logic, can also be completed. 
While completeness is what grounds the possibility of metaphysics as a science, 
this completeness could not be assured without having its concepts and principles 
arranged according to a system. In the Prolegomena’s exploration of how natural science 
is possible Kant also centrally claims that systematization is required for the form of a 
science.
292
 The distinction of ideas (of reason) from categories (of understanding) is 
important for establishing metaphysics as a science rather than “at best a random 
bumbling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or their 
fitness for one purpose or another.”293 He argues that without this distinction metaphysics 
as a science would be impossible. Without knowing that the concepts of the 
understanding have their application in experience and that the ideas of reason are only of 
transcendent use, reason would be constantly victim to the illusion that the ideas of 
reason can be confirmed in experience. The ordering of these concepts according to their 
sources allows us to confirm the completeness and proper application of them. 
The important distinct between intuition, the understanding and reason that Kant 
first develops explains why previous thinkers were unable to develop the complete 
system of metaphysics. Hume’s failing, for example, is based in that “he did not 
systematically survey all the kinds of a priori synthesis of the understanding.” If he had, 
Kant claims, he would have found not only causality but the principle of persistence as 
necessary principles of human understanding. Hume merely limits understanding 
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(empirically) but does not draw boundaries systematically and a priori. Skepticism is 
sufficient to refute dogmatism, but it is insufficient to show that we do not have synthetic 
a priori cognition. Thus his objections to dogmatism rest only on fact, not on principles. 
Skepticism is disastrous for the dogmatist who has not measured the sphere of his 
understanding, but without problem for the critical philosopher who has carefully 
considered the bounds within which we can avoid it. 
On the account of Kant’s metaphysics I have given, a proponent of traditional 
metaphysics may be tempted to consider Kant’s metaphysics worthless. It is merely 
negative and tells us almost nothing about what or why things are. I believe that it is 
preferable, however, to think of Kant’s negative metaphysics in analogy to Thomas 
Aquinas’ negative theology. Though we cannot say what God is, but we can learn a great 
deal about him by saying what he is not. While Kant’s metaphysics cannot solve the 
speculative questions we have, it shows us a great deal about the kinds of knowledge we 
are capable of having. The comparisons between mathematics and metaphysics 
illuminate not only what metaphysics is, but also the ways in which the intuition, 
understanding and reason distinctly contribute to knowledge formation. Kant argues that 
our only hope for metaphysics as a science is to narrow the scope of the field such that it 
is no longer required to answer questions which include knowledge of the world beyond 
experience. Metaphysics is the search for the conditions of the possibility of experience 
in general. We should be grateful to Kant for his valuable work in completing this 
arduous task for us. 
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